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1. Introduction 
 
China is one of the world’s greatest development experiences today. Economic reform 
and open-door policy over the last 30 years have transformed the world’s most populous 
nation into a most influential major economic power with an average annual GDP growth 
rate above 10 percent. Its per capita income, with an average annual growth rate of more 
than 8 percent, has increased by more than five-fold over the last 20 years. It contributed 
dramatically to the decline in poverty in China. When measured on a purchasing power 
parity (PPP) basis, China has contributed about twice as much to world GDP growth as the 
United States since 2000 (cf. Roach, 2009a, pp. 169-170; Asian Development Bank, 2007). 
According to the statistics of 2006, China was the world’s second largest exporter, the third 
largest importer, and second to the United States in world oil consumption, third in imports 
of oil, following the US and Japan (cf. Iley, Lewis, 2007, p. 204). Very recently China  
overtook Germany  as the world’s top exporter (cf. New York Times, 2010).  
However, the rapid growth of China has been accompanied by growing challenges. To 
analyse the present challenges of China’s economic development is the motivation of this 
research. Two of the most essential challenges in the economic area are the increasing 
wealth disparity, especially the inequality of income distribution, and the trade conflicts 
with the industrialized countries, which are supposed to hinder the future development of 
China. These two challenges are seemingly not related to each other at first sight, but they 
have in fact the same origin in the export-led growth mode of China over the last 30 years. 
Whether China can sustain its development in the future depends principally on whether it 
can strike the root cause of its challenges successfully. 
The assessment of the achievements and major challenges, the study of their causes 
and effects as well as the suggested solutions are the main focus of this research. China’s 
growth achievement will be briefly introduced and assessed, but it is not the focal point. In 
this investigation the author focuses on the challenges and comes to the conclusion that the 
top priorities for China’s policy makers are to manage the inequality of income distribution 
and the trade relations with the West. The former leads to a decrease in aggregate 
consumption, i.e. effective demand, and thereby a reduced level of output and employment 
which, in turn, leads to further decrease in consumption. Thus the economy finds itself in a 
vicious circle. The latter, mainly the very high growth rates of exports, has been of vital 
importance for China’s growth till today, but since recent years, the West and China have 
more and more trade conflicts mainly due to the low value of the Chinese currency and the 
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increasing trade deficit of the West which implies job losses there. Meanwhile, the 
excessive dependence on exports also caused a number of problems in China, such as an 
inequitable income distribution, pollution, energy shortages, most importantly. In this 
thesis, based on theoretical and empirical considerations and on policy issues, the author 
attempts to provide the reasons why export-led growth mode is indeed at the origin of all 
the above-mentioned problems. The challenges of environment pollution, corruption, 
energy shortage, financial reform etc. are not focused upon in this research, because they 
are supposed to rank as second priorities in the economic policy making and most of them 
will be reduced in importance during the transition of China from an export-led economy 
to a domestic demand driven economy.  
There are numerous discussions in economic policy-making and also in academic 
circles about strategy options for dealing with the current difficult economic situation and 
sustaining development of China. This research was prompted by some of these 
discussions and aims to make a contribution to the study of how the Chinese economy 
could extract itself from the difficult situation. In the concrete, China must promote 
domestic consumption through increasing the public welfare, improving the income 
distribution and the employment, especially in rural and low developed areas. With the 
initiative of ‘building a harmonious society’ in recent years, the Chinese government is 
intending to realize and defend the social fairness and justice, and create a future where 
people are supposed to live with each other in harmony with equality and fraternity (cf. Bo, 
2006, pp. 19-20). This initiative highlights the urgency and importance of achieving a more 
equitable income distribution throughout the whole country. 
The methods of this research are both descriptive and analytical. In analytical respect 
the author takes an experimental and deductive approach and relies on statistical data. The 
results will be generalized by modelling and analyzing the variables concerned. In a 
research one can not come to a proper conclusion without reliable sources of statistical 
data. The main statistical data in this research are quoted from worldwide officially 
recognized organizations, such as International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), World Trade Organization (WTO), 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, etc.  On the other hand, inductive approach related 
to descriptive method will also be used to identify the scale and nature of economic 
problems, however, certain discussions to explore perspectives can be open-ended. Both 
the economic literature from the West and from China will be studied in this thesis, often 
representing different research results on the same topic and sometimes totally different 
 2
view points. An objective comparison of the different opinions proves to provide 
significant new knowledge about the growth drivers and challenges for China. Theories of 
growth and development will be briefly introduced and by assessing the concrete situation 
of China, the appropriate theory for China’s future development seems to emerge, namely, 
the Classical-Keynesian Theory of development.  
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. The first chapter is the general introduction.  
Chapter 2 reviews the literature about economic growth and development. At first the 
neoclassical growth theory and Keynesian growth theory are studied and compared. Then a 
comparison is made between the economic growth and economic development. This 
comparison is essential for this thesis, because economic growth and economic 
development can be totally different. In comparison with economic growth which is often 
measured by GDP growth, economic development is a more complex process involving 
not only the rising output, but also changes in living standards, life style, policies and 
technologies. China has made great achievement in economic growth, but faces severe 
problems in economic development. Classical-Keynesian theory of development is 
reviewed and will be used as the conceptual basis in this thesis.  
Chapter 3 assesses the major achievements of China’s growth. The broad outlines of 
China’s growth include enormous increase of output, employment, productivity, exports 
and incomes; unprecedented progress in poverty reduction and material well-being; and the 
integration of China as a major force in global markets (cf. Brandt, Rawski, 2005, p. 1).  
Chapter 4 discusses the key challenges for China’s economy, namely the inequality of 
income and wealth distribution and poverty in China and the increasing tendency of trade 
protectionism of the West. Issues introduced within this subject include urban–rural 
disparity, regional and personal variation in incomes, the gap between the coastal areas 
which have been strongly benefiting from the expansion of China’s exports and the inland 
areas which are relatively underdeveloped. In addition, China’s foreign exchange policy 
that is under great international pressure due to high trade surplus, and the anti-dumping 
measures launched by many western countries on account of the pressure to maintain 
employment levels will be discussed.    
Chapter 5 identifies the drivers and assesses the consequences of the achievements 
and challenges. Classical-Keynesian theory is supposed to provide solution for China’s 
problems in economic development. This chapter tries to answer the question why the 
achievements and challenges arise, as presented in the above two chapters. Not only 
statistics regarding the development but also different views of economists are introduced. 
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Relevant theories are reviewed and combined with the practice in China. This chapter also 
examines the impact that a variety of different factors have had in determining 
achievements and challenges and their dynamics. Factors examined include the effects of 
investment, consumption, export growth, income inequality and rising protectionism of the 
West against China’s exports. The great debate on China’s currency policy is also 
discussed. Further, this chapter discusses the economic relation between Europe and China, 
sums up the current problems and recommends solutions.  
Chapter 6 is essential for this thesis. On the basis of the theoretical background, it 
explains why government expenditures are the key for China’s development and 
demonstrates the uneven impact of economic policy on the inequality of income 
distribution and the imbalance in the provision of economic and social infrastructure. 
Keynesian theories are used to discuss the interaction between government expenditure, 
private consumption and employment, and explain why the domestic private consumption 
will play a central role in China’s further development and how to make it happen.   
Chapter 7 reviews at first two opposed theories on social security and discusses why a 
well-functioning social security system and sufficient coverage are significant for China. 
Then the current social security system of China is briefly presented and policy solutions 
are suggested. This chapter is the extended part of chapter 6, since social security is closely 
connected with private consumption and employment.  
Chapter 8 studies the influences of the present global financial crisis on China. At first 
an empirical evidence is reviewed, namely the Great Depression. Then it introduces the 
influences of the present financial crisis on China’s economic development and China’s 
reactions, as well as the impact of China’s reactions on the world economy. Finally, the 
Keynesian bancor approach is presented for the purpose of global economic integration on 
the basis of a new financial and economic world order. 
Chapter 9 firstly summarises and concludes the thesis generally, and then attempts an 
outlook on the possible future development of China.  
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2. Theories of Economic Growth and Development 
 
For the economists, a theory is a systematic explanation of the functioning of 
economic systems, of the behaviour of individuals and collectives, as well as of the 
influence of exogenous factors. “In its most elementary form, an economic model is a 
statement of relationships among economic variables” (Kindleberger, Herrick, 1977, p. 
40). As a rule, theories improve our understanding of the real world and provide a 
conceptual basis for policy making. However, reality is so complicated that a simple model 
can not include all critical variables in the real world, nor can any single theory consider all 
factors influencing economic growth (cf. Nafziger, 2006, p. 123; Kindleberger, Herrick, 
1977, p. 40). It is important that economists determine which variables are crucial and 
which are of secondary importance, or irrelevant. Although the mathematical models can 
handle a large number of variables, they have not been very successful in explaining 
economic development, especially in the third world, e.g. China (cf. Nafziger, 2006, p. 
123). In this thesis we concentrate upon simple and robust models of the Keynesian-
Ricardian type, aiming at capturing essentials and picturing how the fundamental causal 
forces work in principle. Statistical and historical evidence may, subsequently, be used to 
illustrate the principles. 
 
2.1 Theories of Economic Growth 
 
Economic growth is the increase in the amount of the goods and services produced by 
an economy. It is usually measured by changes in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (cf. 
Dolan, Frendreis, Tatalovich, 2008, p. 3).  
 
2.1.1 Classical Growth Theories: Adam Smith and David Ricardo1  
 
Jean-Baptiste Say pointed out that the investors, who have capital at their command, 
always weigh beforehand the advantages and disadvantages of the different modes of 
investment and naturally prefer, ceteris paribus, those presenting the smallest risk and the 
quickest return; so that hazardous and long-winded investments are not preferred (cf. Say, 
1857, pp. 354-356). In other words, the expectation of profits determines the investment.  
                                                 
1 The author reviewed the theories of Adam Smith and David Ricardo by means of both original literature and 
discussions with Prof. Heinrich Bortis of the University of Fribourg, Switzerland.  
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In his book The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith expounded his ideology of the 
“invisible hand” that “the private interests and passions of individuals naturally dispose 
them to turn their stock towards the employments which in ordinary cases, are most 
advantageous to the society … Without any intervention of law, therefore, the private 
interests and passions of men naturally lead them to divide and distribute the stock of every 
society among all different employment carried on in it, as nearly as possible in the 
proportion which is most agreeable to the interest of the whole society” (Smith, 1864, pp. 
260-261). Further, Adam Smith believed that by pursuing his own interest, an individual 
“frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to 
promote it” (Smith, 1864, p. 184). This means in the broader sense that the economy works 
like a self-regulating system, so that state intervention in the economy will hamper this 
natural process.  
Adam Smith grouped the labourers as productive and unproductive workers. The 
productive workers N are employed in the production sector (e.g. agriculture, 
manufacturing and handicraft) and produce a revenue (profit and rent). The unproductive 
workers are mainly in the service sector (e.g. officials, professors, politicians, actors and 
servants) and are maintained by the revenue produced in production sector (cf. Smith, 
1864, p. 136). 
The capital consists of fixed capital and circulating capital. 
Circulating capital includes:  
a. Wage costs of the productive workers W = wN, where w is the wage rate, N is the 
amount of workers; 
b. Raw material consumption mN, where m is the raw material consumption per 
worker. 
Fixed capital: kN, where k is the fixed capital endowment per productive worker. The fixed 
capital consists of machines, tools, buildings (e.g. factories) etc. Adam Smith also seems to 
count the human capital and money to fixed capital (cf. Smith, 1864, p. 112-115). 
Thus, the total capital is  
 
K = (m + w + k) N.    (2-1)  
 
The gross income (or gross product) is 
 
QG = Q + Int      (2-2) 
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where Q is the national product and Int  is the intermediate product. 
Note the wage costs of the productive workers wN, the intermediate products Int and 
part of the fixed capital dK = dkN will gradually expend in the production process (d is the 
depreciation rate of the capital).  
Then the net income (or net product) is 
 
QN = QG - (w + m + dk)N = QG – cN    (2-3) 
 
where cN represents the value of the goods consumed (used up) per worker in the 
production process. This is the productive consumption of Marx and the Classics. 
Thus the net product is   
 
QN = P + R     (2-4) 
 
where P is the profit and R is the rent. The net income is the sum of profits and rents (cf. 
Smith, 1864, pp. 136-137).  
The net product corresponds to the social surplus which can be used for: 1) increasing 
the capital stock (net investment), 2) financing (through taxation) the political, social and 
cultural life (institutional superstructure); 3) luxury consumption (cf. Smith, 1864, p. 67, p. 
278, pp. 385-386). 
The growth model can be derived from the basic equation: 
 
QG = A (k) N      (2-5) 
 
where A is labour productivity, depending on the capital endowment per worker, k. The 
output depends on labour productivity and on the amount of labour (cf. Hicks, 1985, p. 31). 
If we combine the equation (2-3) and (2-5), we get the equation of net output: 
 
QN = QG - c N = [A (k) - c] N   (2-6) 
 
A certain part of the net product is saved and invested: 
 
I = ∆K = s [A (k) - c] N    (2-7) 
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where s is the savings rate. Savings determine investment and put the economy in motion 
(cf. Smith, 1864, p. 118).  
However, the non-saved part of net income (1-s)[A(k) - c] N is used for luxury 
consumption and for the establishment of an institutional superstructure.  
Let us divide both sides of the equation by the capital stock K = (m + w + k) N. We 
get the growth rate of the capital stock as well as the rate of growth of the national 
product, i.e. the wealth of a nation: 
 
( )[ ]
( )
( )[ ]
( )mwk
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Nmwk
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K
K
K
I
K ++
−=++
−==Δ= .    (2-8) 
 
On the basis of these essential elements of Adam Smith’s growth model we may 
conclude: 
• The most important element is the relationship between growth and income 
distribution: A lower wage rate w leads to a higher net product per worker: A (k) - c 
rises; at the same time the expenditure for wages is falling (w is falling). Both 
factors increase the rate of growth gK. 
• A high growth rate gK implies extensive investments that cause an increase 
of capital endowment per worker (k). A rising k increases the labour productivity A, 
which in turn increases the rate of growth gK. This leads to a cumulative process of 
growth.  
• Finally, the growth rate of economy is higher, the larger is the fraction s 
saved out of the net income. In contrast to the Mercantilists and Keynes, saving is a 
virtue for Adam Smith. Hence he dislikes luxury consumption and excessive 
government spending. Given this, Adam Smith’s growth model is entirely supply-
sided. Demand factors do not play any role. 
This tradition is carried on by David Ricardo. According to Ricardo’s doctrine, profit 
finances investment because “no one accumulates but with a view to make his 
accumulation productive, and it is only when so employed that it operates on profits … 
Without a motive there could be no accumulation ... The farmer and manufacturer can no 
more live without profit ... Their motive for accumulation will diminish with every 
diminution of profit, and will cease altogether when their profits are so low as not to afford 
them an adequate compensation for their trouble, and the risk which they must necessarily 
encounter in employing their capital productively” (Ricardo, 1821a, p. 123). Therefore, 
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growth rate of capital stock is positively related to profit rate and negatively related to 
wage costs. Financed by profit, the investment is directly associated with the growth of 
agricultural sector and thus the national product. The agricultural sector includes also those 
parts of the industry and handicraft sector, which produce tools and machines for 
agriculture; here, the indirect employment of agriculture is active.  
Ricardo’s growth model is based on the following assumptions:  
• The wage costs for direct and indirect labour W are equal to the capital K 
invested: W = K.  
• The profits will be completely invested: P = I.  
• The investments are equal to an expansion of the capital stock: I = ∆K. 
Thus, the profit rate is equal to the growth rate of the system: 
 
r = P/W = P/K = I/K = ∆K/K = gK.   (2-9) 
 
Profits finance investments, and the growth rate of the capital stock determines the 
growth rate of the national product. The relationship between profit rate and growth rate is 
a fundamental feature of classical political economy. 
David Ricardo expressed Say’s Law in a different way: excessive saving would not 
reduce demand for home products, a general overproduction is impossible, in other words, 
each supply creates its own demand; money serves only as an instrument to facilitate 
production and exchange, but doesn’t have any influence on the real economic sector, that 
is, money will not be held, because holding money doesn’t yield profits. Hence income will 
be either consumed or saved and invested. Both Say and Ricardo admitted that innovations 
can destroy jobs in the short run, whereas Say pointed out that the new technology created 
jobs in the long run (cf. Kates, 2003, p. 40) and Ricardo argued that “the discovery and use 
of machinery ... will be injurious to the labouring class, as some of their number will be 
thrown out of employment, and population will become redundant, compared with the 
funds which are to employ it” (Ricardo, 1821a, p. 472), but Ricardo also believed that in 
the long run technical progress would eventually set the economy on a course of expansion 
(cf. Akhtar, 1973, p. 252). The adaptation of the products to the consumption preference is 
more important for the economic growth than enough production in each sector in general. 
“In all cases a good distribution of the produce, and an adaptation of it to the wants and 
tastes of society are of the utmost importance to the briskness of the trade and the 
accumulation of capital. The want of this is in my opinion the only cause of the stagnation 
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which commerce at different times experiences. It may all be traced to miscalculation, and 
the production of a commodity which is not wanted instead of one which is wanted” 
(Ricardo, 1951, p. 415). 
In the view of Ricardo, wages are regulated by the increase of capital. “In the natural 
advance of society, the wages of labour will have a tendency to fall, as far as they are 
regulated by supply and demand; for the supply of labourers will continue to increase at 
the same rate, whilst the demand for them will increase at a slower rate [and such a 
tendency continues] until the capital became stationary, when wages also would become 
stationary, and be only sufficient to keep up the numbers of the actual population” 
(Ricardo, 1821a, pp. 95-96). The labour growth rate is taken to be constant in Ricardo’s 
model. However, there is, besides the market price for labour, also a “natural price of 
labour [the natural wage rate] which is necessary to enable the labourers, one with another, 
to subsist and to perpetuate their race, without either increase or diminution. [The natural 
price of labour] depends on the price of the food, necessaries, and conveniences required 
for the support of the labourer and his family” (Ricardo 1821a, p. 91). The natural price of 
labour is a kind of institutionally governed equilibrium price depending upon socio-
economic and, eventually, political forces. 
As entrepreneurs invest their profits in the production sector, the national product, 
population and labour supply increase. More and more labours will be employed in 
agricultural sector in order to feed the rising population. Consequently, more and more bad 
land has to be cultivated. Thus marginal and average earnings are falling off until the so-
called stationary state is reached. “In a stationary state of society … there is neither 
increased nor diminished facility of producing corn … in such a state, corn will be at an 
invariable price and the tax will be also invariable” (Ricardo, 1821a, p. 196). The 
stationary state of capital and population is inevitable and characterized by:  
1. w = w*, i.e. the natural wage rate is in accordance with the minimum living 
wage (because of population pressures). In the stationary state, the change of wages 
is regulated wholly by the change of the population (cf. Ricardo, 1811, p. 379). 
2. Ricardo defined rent as “that portion of the produce of the earth which is 
paid to the landlord for the use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil” 
(Ricardo, 1821a, p. 53). Land is not unlimited in quantity and uniform in quality, 
and with the progress of population, land of an inferior quality has to be cultivated, 
thus the rent will be paid for the use of it. When the land of the second degree of 
fertility or even third degree of fertility is taken into cultivation, the rent of the first 
 10
quality land will rise, for it must always be above the rent of the second, by the 
difference between their productive powers with a given quantity of capital and 
labour (cf. Ricardo, 1821a, p. 57). There must be a very high proportion of rent 
income. Therefore the income distribution is extremely unequal. This implies: only 
a few people could be rich, mostly landowners, while the largest proportion of the 
population lives in poverty.  
3. Positive rate of profit induces the capitalists to accumulate capital. With the 
capital accumulation, the labour force grows. Then both marginal product of 
capital/labour and the rate of profit will fall until the stationary state is reached and 
profit rate is zero (cf. Blaug, 1997, p. 87), which means that there is no more 
investment and no more growth. 
“Interest is regulated chiefly by the profits that may be made by the use of capital ... A 
low rate of interest is a symptom of a great accumulation of capital; but it is also a 
symptom of a low rate of profits, and of an advancement to a stationary state; at which the 
wealth and resources of a country will not admit of increase” (Ricardo, 1821b, p. 474).  
Since in the classical view the stationary state is inevitable, the English writer and 
social critic Thomas Carlyle described the political economics as “dismal science” (cf. 
Carlyle, Traill, 1899, p. 354). Hence, Ricardo thinks that the stationary state is inevitable 
and may therefore be considered a pessimistic liberal.  
 
2.1.2 Exogenous Growth Theory: Robert Solow  
 
The neo-classical growth model is also known as the exogenous growth model or 
Solow growth model. The Solow model was developed by Nobel Prize winner Robert 
Solow. In Solow’s model, there are two factors of production: capital and labour. 
Technology is exogenous and represented by a production function:  
 
Y = F(K,L)     (2-10) 
 
where Y is output or income, F the function of technology, K capital input, and L labour 
input. Output is to be understood as net output (i.e. gross output minus the depreciation of 
capital). Part of the output is consumed and the rest is saved and invested. 
 
ΔK = sY      (2-11) 
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where s is the saving rate. This equation shows that the net investment is equivalent to the 
increase of the capital stock (cf. Solow, 1956, p. 66) and what is saved will be invested. 
Inserting (2-11) in (2-10), we get: 
 
ΔK = sF(K,L).     (2-12) 
 
This means, the net investment depends on saving rate, technological level, capital 
and labour supply (cf. Solow, 1956, p. 67). Like Adam Smith, Solow stresses the 
importance of savings and capital formation for economic development. Solow allowed 
changes in wage and interest rates, substitutions of labour and capital for each other, 
variable factor proportions, and flexible factor prices (cf. Nafziger, 2006, p. 153).  
Technological progress is introduced into the model in a very simple way. For 
simplicity, we can assume the production function as 
 
Q = A(t)f(K,L)     (2-13) 
 
where Q is the aggregate output (GDP), A(t) a function of time that allows for neutral 
technological change, f(K,L) a function of capital and labour (cf. Solow, 1957, p. 312). By 
differentiating this function, we get the growth rate of the GDP: 
 
gq = ga + wkgk + wlgl     (2-14) 
 
where gq = /Q, g
.
Q a= /A, g
.
A k=
.
K /K and gl= /L are the growth rates of the output, 
technology, capital stock and labour respectively; w
.
L
k= Q
K
K
Q
∂
∂  and wl= Q
L
L
Q
∂
∂  are the 
production elasticities of capital and labour which are equivalent to the relative shares of 
the capital and labour in GDP (cf. Solow, 1957, pp. 312-313). Thus, to raise an economy’s 
long term trend rate of growth requires an increase in the labour supply and a higher level 
of productivity (cf. Riley, 2004, p. 30). 
A sustained increase in capital investment increases the growth rate only temporarily: 
the capital/labour ratio goes up (i.e., more capital will be available for each worker to use), 
but the marginal product of additional units of capital will decline (diminishing returns to 
capital). A “steady-state growth path” is reached when output, capital and labour are all 
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growing at the same rate, so output per worker and capital per worker are constant (cf. 
Riley, 2004, p. 30).  
The neoclassical model treats productivity improvements as an “exogenous” variable, 
in other words, productivity is assumed to be independent of capital investment. The 
independence of the rate of technical change from investment and saving activity is what is 
meant by the statement that technical change is exogenous (cf. Riley, 2004, p. 30). 
Neoclassical economics in general and neoclassical growth theory in particular is 
supply oriented and inspired by Say’s ideas. Say’s Law says that supply creates its own 
demand. “It is worthwhile to remark that a product is no sooner created than it, from that 
instant, affords a market for other products to the full extent of its own value … The only 
way of getting rid of money is in the purchase of some product or other. Thus the mere 
circumstance of creation of one product immediately opens a vent for other products” (Say, 
1857, pp. 134-135). Money is employed as a mere intermediary object of exchange 
between an object in possession and the object of desire. Money is desired for the purpose 
of re-sale and re-exchange, after having been originally received in exchange (cf. Say, 
1857, pp. 220-221). Hence, money is completely neutral in its effect on the economy, and 
there is only a transactions demand for money.   
According to Kuznets’ hypothesis, the process of development leads to increase in 
inequality as long as the surplus labour phase remains. Once that phase ends, the increase 
in per capita income will reduce inequality. During development with a perfect credit 
market, inequality will first increase and then decrease automatically. Saving equals 
investment, and inequality stimulates the accumulation of capital and the rate of growth 
(cf. Kuznets, 1955, pp. 11-25). 
Moreover, income inequality is fundamentally favourable for incentives in the 
economic sphere and therefore should be regarded as a growth-enhancing factor: 
• Only the wealth concentration on an individual could be able to cover the large 
costs for the implementation of new fundamental innovations and the setting up of 
new industries. 
• Rewarding the employees with a wage dependent from output performance could 
encourage them to invest any effort (cf. Anand, Kanbur, 1993, pp. 25-52). 
Hayek, the theorist of the free market, called for the rule of laissez-faire capitalism 
with governments’ handling of the monetary system (cf. Hayek, 2001, p. 19). “There is, 
finally, the supremely important problem of combating general fluctuations of economic 
activity and the recurrent waves of large-scale unemployment which accompany them” 
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(Hayek, 2001, p. 125). In Hayek’s view, free competition is in most circumstances the 
most efficient way to solve economic problems. Further, it is the only method with which 
the individuals’ activities can be adjusted to each other without arbitrary intervention of 
authority (cf. Hayek, 2001, p. 75 and p. 37-38). This means, since the market is able to 
regulate itself, the state should intervene in the economy as little as possible. What the 
government should do is just to maintain the rule of law. In order to preserve the free 
competition, the government should limit working hour (cf. Hayek, 2001, p. 39) and 
transfer proper information to the individuals (cf. Hayek, 2001, p. 164). The efficient 
exchange and use of resources can only be maintained through the price mechanism in free 
markets. The price mechanism reflects local and personal knowledge, allowing society 
members to achieve diverse, complicated ends through spontaneous self-organization. 
Price signals are the only possible way allowing economic decision-makers solve the 
economic calculation problem through communication (cf. Peet, 2007, p. 74). Artificially 
low interest rates caused capital misallocation and central bank credit expansion, claimed 
Hayek. Generally, higher interest rates increase savings which enable higher investment in 
the future. “The past instability of the market economy is the consequence of the exclusion 
of the most important regulator of the market mechanism, money, from itself being 
regulated by the market process” (Hayek, 1999, p. 202). The central bank can neither have 
the information which should govern the supply of money nor act in the general interest 
(cf. Hayek, 1999, p. 202). Such an intervention of the central bank through monetary 
policy may cause economic depression, according to Hayek.   
The critiques against the neo-classical growth model focus on the following points: 
the neoclassical model predicts that incomes per capita between rich and poor countries 
will converge. But empirical economists cannot find values for parameters and variables 
that are consistent with the neoclassical equation. The Solow model is a poor predictor.  
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil modified the neoclassical growth model by adding human 
capital as an additional explanatory variable to physical capital and labour (cf. Mankiw, 
Romer, Weil, 1992, pp. 407-437). A society can invest in its citizens through expenditures 
on education, training, research, and health that enhance their productive capacity. 
Although there are diminishing returns to physical capital by itself, there are constant 
returns to all (human and physical) capital (cf. Lucas, 1988, pp. 3-42). 
Despite this salvage, it still has several weaknesses, including the assumptions that 
markets are perfectly competitive (essential for calculating the marginal products and the 
human capital exponent), that technological change is exogenous, and that the level of 
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technology is the same throughout the world. Indeed, according to the neoclassical 
explanation, the technical progress takes place completely independent of decisions by 
people, firms, and governments (cf. Nafziger, 2006, p.155). 
Keynes and Keynesian economists criticized Say’s Law and neoclassical growth 
theory. Keynes pointed out that inequality emerged from the wrong belief “that the growth 
of capital depends upon the strength of the motive towards individual saving and that for a 
large proportion of this growth we are dependent on the savings of the rich out of their 
superfluity” (Keynes, 2007, p. 372). He argued that “measures for the redistribution of 
incomes in a way likely to raise the propensity to consume may prove positively 
favourable to the growth of capital” (Keynes, 2007, p. 373).  
There is not only a transactions demand for money. Wages are, in the long run, almost 
entirely spent on consumption goods; however, large parts of property income are not 
devoted to consumption, but to increasing private wealth: savings may be invested for the 
purpose of speculation which includes buying new shares and petroleum; apart from this, 
savings may be “invested” in non-producible goods, e.g. land, antiquities, historically 
unique buildings and gold. Furthermore, savings may be invested in already existing shares 
and bonds or simply be hoarded which means, the wealth is held in near-money or in 
money form (cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 157).  
Schumpeter derived from the General Theory of Keynes that “who tries to save 
destroys real capital [and that via saving] the unequal distribution of income is the ultimate 
cause of unemployment” (Schumpeter, 1946, p. 517), because more saving reduces 
consumption and then output declines due to the decrease of demand; entrepreneurs in the 
consumer goods sector will invest less and thus employ less labour force (cf. Bortis, 1997, 
p. 276). Rising unemployment induces further decrease of demand. Such a vicious circle 
will cause a crisis. 
And last, but not least, there are the results of the capital-theoretic debate. Indeed, in a 
monetary production economy, with the process of production being a social and circular 
process, capital is not independent of value and distribution: there is no physical measure 
for real capital, it must be measured in terms of money; given this, the money wage rate 
and the rate of profits will inevitably enter the monetary value of capital. Therefore, with 
the conditions of production differing between industries and sectors and with 
complementarities dominating, there are no marginal products and hence no factor 
markets, and even in competitive conditions there is, in principle, no tendency towards full 
employment (Harcourt 1972, Bortis 1997, pp. 281-293). The results of the capital-theoretic 
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debate are devastating for neoclassical theory and have, as such, decisively prepared the 
way for establishing the Keynesian principle of effective demand. 
 
2.1.3 Endogenous Growth Theory 
 
Modern endogenous growth theories attempt to explain the rate of technological 
progress, which the Solow model takes as exogenous. These models try to explain that the 
decisions by people, firms, and governments determine the creation of technology through 
research and development (cf. Mankiw, 2002, p. 227).  
We can use a basic model to illustrate the endogenous growth theory: 
 
Y = AK    (2-15) 
 
where A is a constant measuring the amount of output produced for each unit of capital (the 
problem of measuring capital mentioned at the end of the previous subsection (2.1.2) 
immediately arises here). Notice that this production function does not have the property of 
diminishing returns to capital. One additional unit of capital is associated to A additional 
units of output. The absence of diminishing returns to capital is the key difference between 
endogenous growth model and the Solow growth model (cf. Mankiw, 2002, p. 223).    
Capital accumulation can be described with the following equation, which is also used 
in the Solow model (cf. Mankiw, 2002, p. 223): 
 
ΔK = sY – δ K     (2-16) 
 
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital. This means, the change in the capital stock 
equals gross investment minus depreciation of real capital.  
Combining (2-15) and (2-16), we obtain: 
 
ΔY/Y =ΔK/K = sA - δ .  (2-17) 
 
This equation shows that the growth rate of GDP is determined by the saving rate, 
technology and depreciation rate. As long as sA >δ , the income grows forever, even 
without the assumption of exogenous technological progress. That is to say, in this 
 16
endogenous growth model, saving and investment can lead to persistent growth (cf. 
Mankiw, 2002, p. 223).  
The level of technical change can be influenced by investment in education to 
improve the quality of labour and by investment in research and development to drive 
better use of capital. Furthermore, the success of such investments could induce more 
investment and higher saving to finance it. Therefore, it is possible that an efficient circle 
could develop in which investment creates more knowledge, which in turn creates more 
investment. This endogenous growth theory enhances in a cumulative way national saving 
and investment (cf. Kennedy, 2000, p. 105). 
Robert Lucas pointed out that international wage differences and migration are 
difficult to be explained with neoclassical theory. If the same technology was available 
globally, skilled people with human capital would not move from developing countries, 
where human capital is scarce, to developed countries, where human capital is abundant, as 
these people do now (cf. Romer, 1994, p. 11). Moreover, the neoclassical model implies 
that substantial international capital would move from developed countries, with high 
capital-labour ratios, to developing countries, with low capital-labour ratios. However, 
most developing countries attract no net capital inflows, and many developing countries 
even experience domestic capital flight. 
Neoclassical theorists assume that technological discoveries are global public goods, 
so that all people can use new technology at the same time. However, because individuals 
and firms control information flows, patent protection restricts use by rivals, and charge 
prices for others to use the technology, new growth economists assume a temporary 
monopoly associated with innovation. Neoclassical economists emphasize capital 
formation. New growth economists stress external economies to capital accumulation that 
can permanently keep the marginal product of physical or human capital above the interest 
rate, and prevent diminishing returns from generating stagnation (cf. Grossman, Elhanan, 
1994, pp. 23-44).  
The critiques against the endogenous growth theory focus on the following points: one 
of the main failings of endogenous growth theories is the collective failure to explain 
conditional convergence reported in the empirical literature. Another frequent critique 
concerns the cornerstone assumption of diminishing returns to capital. Some investments 
in research and development (R&D) made net no growth at all. And some developing 
countries have successfully increased capital and labour productivity by using existing 
technologies without any new investment in R&D. The endogenous growth theory and also 
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the neoclassical growth theory could not explain how changes in incentives or institutions 
affect the variables of the model and the rate of economic growth (cf. Nafziger, 2006, p. 
157). And, on the top, there are the results of the capital-theoretic debate alluded to at the 
end of the previous subsection (2.1.3). 
 
2.1.4 Keynesian Growth Theory: Roy Harrod  
 
The Harrod growth model implies that investment must increase so as to bring about 
additional effective demand through the multiplier mechanism.  
Not all kinds of investment increase the effective demand. “When the factories stand 
and the machines are put to productive use, supply increases but effective demand declines 
because less workers are required in the investment goods sectors once the construction of 
the capital goods referred to is terminated” (Bortis, 2008, p. 69).  
The Harrod growth model is also based on the traditional proposition that saving in a 
period (excess of the income in that period over consumption) equals investment, i.e. the 
addition to the capital stock. Let v* stand for the value of capital required for the 
production of one additional unit of output (capital coefficient) and s stand for the average 
saving rate. The total saving is sQ0, the addition to the capital stock is v*(Q1 -Q0). And so 
(cf. Harrod, 1939, pp. 16-18):  
 
sQ0 = v*(Q1 -Q0) = I*.    (2-18) 
 
Therefore:  
 
s/v* = 
0
01
Q
QQ −  = g*     (2-19) 
 
where g* is the Harrod’s warranted rate of growth (cf. Harrod, 1939, p. 18). “The 
warranted rate of growth is taken to be that rate of growth which, if it occurs, will leave all 
parties satisfied that they have produced neither more nor less than the right amount” 
(Harrod, 1939, p. 16).  
But this warranted rate of growth is not stable and the economic system is completely 
unstable, because the “rationality” of the system is different from the “rationality” of 
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individual producers. This can be explained most conveniently by the income effect of 
investment and by the capacity effect of investment as have been derived by E. D. Domar: 
The income effect of investment is based on the Keynesian multiplier:  
 
YΔ  = Y1 - Y0 = (1/s)(I1 - I0) = (1/s)Δ I*  (2-20) 
 
and the capacity effect of investment is associated to the accelerator principle:  
 
QΔ = Q1 - Q0 = (1/v*)I0    (2-21) 
 
where 1/v* is the technically given output/capital ratio (cf. Domar, 1946, pp. 140-146). The 
income effect of investment tells that more investment induces more income and profit, 
whereas the capacity effect of investment implies that the rising output depends on the 
capital productivity and upon the investment volume.  
The relationship between investment and profit represents the income effect of 
investment which interacts with the capacity effect of investment to produce the business 
cycle. In the short term only the income effect of investment is relevant, since capacities 
are given. As a matter of fact, the effective demand Y reacts on the change of the 
investment much more strongly than the output Q. In other words, the income effect of 
investment is much stronger than the capacity effect at the beginning period, i.e. (1/s) is 
much bigger than (1/v*). And later, with high investment volumes the capacity effect of 
investment will gradually work out ever stronger (cf. Bortis, 2008, pp. 76-78). “On the 
basis of the income effect of investment the system links higher volumes of investment 
with higher profits and incomes which, on the behavioural side, induces entrepreneurs to 
invest more; this upward movement is reversed as soon as the capacity effect of investment 
works out and entrepreneurs invest less to avoid underutilization of productive capacities” 
(Bortis, 1997, p. 107). 
Hence we have the Harrod Paradox which implies the instability of the system:  
If the realized growth rate g falls below the warranted rate g*, and then ∆Q > ∆Y, that 
is to say, the additional effective demand is not high enough to absorb the additional 
supply. The reason is that the entrepreneurs have not invested enough to create sufficient 
effective demand which can absorb the additional supply. But the entrepreneurs could 
think that they have invested too much, because the effective demand falls short of output. 
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Consequently, entrepreneurs will reduce investment which means that the gap between g* 
and g widens even more (cf. Bortis, 2008, p. 70). 
On the other hand, if realized growth rate g is greater than the warranted rate g*, we 
have v < v*, i.e. stocks are run down, the output is not enough to satisfy the increased 
demand because the entrepreneurs have invested too much and created too much effective 
demand. But they think that they have not invested enough and must invest even more 
since the demand is greater than the supply. As they invest more, again the gap between g 
and g* will widen (cf. Bortis, 2008, p. 71).  
The instability of the system is reduced if there are autonomous investments. Such 
autonomous investments may have no direct relation to the current increase of output. 
They may be related to a possible long period increase of activity. Or they may be induced 
by new inventions calculated to reduce production cost or change consumers’ modes of 
spending their income (cf. Harrod, 1939, pp. 26-27). Then the equation becomes:  
 
I = a Q + v* ∆Q = s Q.    (2-22) 
 
The modified warranted rate of growth is:  
 
g* = ∆Q*/Q = ∆I*/ I0 = (s – a) / v*    (2-23) 
 
where this v* now stands not for the total increase of capital per additional unit of output, 
but only for the net increase of capital after the capital has been subtracted (cf. Harrod, 
1939, pp. 28-31).   
The warranted rate of growth g* is reduced once autonomous expenditures are 
introduced, implying that the economic system becomes more stable. Temporarily, less 
investment and output growth is required to set an economy on a cumulative growth path 
in the direction of full employment (cf. Bortis, 2008, p. 72). The extraordinary economic 
upswing in Western Europe between the late 1840s and the early 1870s resulted mainly 
from the massive extension of the railway network. The temporary increase in autonomous 
expenditures led to a massive temporary increase in autonomous demand occasioned by 
the building up of the railway structure. “The impact on economic activity is likely to be 
very strong because there is an income effect of investment only, and the capacity effect is 
negligible. Railways and roads do not result in much direct output but provide the 
foundations – the infrastructure – for increased production. The impact on economic 
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activity of autonomous expenditures is strong because the income effect is much more 
important than its eventual capacity effect. As such autonomous expenditures stand in 
direct opposition to productive investment which is directed towards increasing output 
through the capacity effect” (Bortis, 2008, pp. 77-78). 
 
2.1.5 Post-Keynesian Growth Theory: Nicholas Kaldor and Joan  
Robinson 
 
The model of Kaldor begins with the assumption of full employment. Thus total 
output Q or total income Y is given. Income may be divided into two categories, wages W 
and profits P, where Profits P comprise the income of property owners generally, including 
ground rent. The marginal savings of the wage-earners’ is smaller than those of capitalists 
(cf. Kaldor, 1970, pp. 83).  
Then we have the following income identities: 
 
Y = W + P.      (2-24) 
 
Total income contains wages W and profits P. 
 
I = S.     (2-25) 
Investment is equal to saving.  
 
S = Sw + Sp.    (2-26) 
 
Savings in total contain the savings out of wages Sw and profits Sp (cf. Kaldor, 1970, p. 
83).  
Taking investment as given, and assuming saving functions Sw = swW and Sp = spP, 
where sw and sp are the saving rate of workers and property owners. Then we get: 
 
I = spP + swW = spP + sw(Y - P) = (sp - sw)P + swY.  (2-27) 
 
Both sides divided by Y, we get  
 
Y
I = (sp - sw) Y
P + sw    (2-28)    
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P
Y
Iand      = 
wp ss −
1   - 
wp
w
ss
s
− .   (2-29) 
Thus, given the marginal propensities to save of both classes, the share of profits in 
income is only dependent on the investment decision I/Y. The more investment, the greater 
the 
e level of money wages is determined by demand: rising investment 
and 
 (2-30) 
and      
in demand and thus generate a further fall in prices, and a rise in prices will be also 
cum
ange in income 
distr
 
share of profits out of income. In other words, investment determines profits (cf. 
Kaldor, 1970, p. 83).  
Because saving is independent and the economy has full employment, the level of the 
prices in relations to th
thus rising demand will raise prices and profit margins, and thus reduce real 
consumption, whilst falling investment and thus falling demand causes a fall in prices 
(relatively to the wage level) and thereby generates a compensating rise in real 
consumption. The system is thus stable at full employment (cf. Kaldor, 1970, p. 84).  
The model operates only if the two savings propensities differ and the marginal 
propensity to save from profits (sp) exceeds that from wages (sw), i.e., if  
 
sp ≠ sw      
 
sp > sw.      (2-31) 
 
The latter is the stability condition. Because if sw > sp, a fall in prices will cause a fall 
ulative. The stability of the system depends on the difference of the marginal 
propensities to save. 1/(sp - sw) may be defined as the coefficient of sensitivity of income 
distribution, because it indicates the change in the share of profits in income which follows 
on a change in the share of investment in output (cf. Kaldor, 1970, p. 84). 
If the difference between sp and sw is small, the coefficient will be large. This means 
that a small change in investment-output ratio I/Y will cause a large ch
ibution P/Y. In the limiting case, the workers save nothing and thus sw = 0, the profits 
are equal to the sum of investment and capitalists’ consumption:  
 
P = 
ps
1 I.            (2-32) 
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This equation implies that reducing gs capita ts wi in increased 
profits. 
f entrepreneurs choose to spend a portion of their profits on consumption ... the 
effec
sity to invest and the capitalists’ propensity to consume.  
) = gv.          (2-33) 
In a state of full employment  g mu t be e al to 
the rate of the technical progress and the growth rate of the working population (cf. Kaldor, 
1970
savin  of lis ll only result 
Note this is the assumption implicit in Keynes’ famous parable about the widow’s 
cruse: “I
t is to increase the profit on the sale of liquid consumption goods by an amount 
exactly equal to the amount of profits which have been thus expended. This follows from 
our definitions, because such expenditure constitutes a diminution of saving ... Thus, 
however much of profits entrepreneurs spend on consumption, the increment of wealth 
belonging to the entrepreneurs remains the same as before. Thus, profits, as a source of 
capital increment for entrepreneurs, are a widow’s cruse which remains undepleted 
however much of them may be devoted to riotous living” (Keynes, 1930, p. 139). Kalecki 
described this as “capitalists earn what they spend and workers spend what they earn” (cf. 
Kaldor, 1970, p. 84).  
In this model, the workers save nothing, sw = 0, wages are a residue and profits are 
governed by the propen
Following Harrod, the determinants of the investment-output ratio are growth rate of 
output capacity g and the capital-output ratio v:   
 
I/Y = (I/K)(K/Y
 
, the natural rate of growth s qu the sum of 
, p. 86).  
Now recall Kaldor’s relationship, P = 
ps
1 I. Thus:  
P/Y = 
ps
1 (I/Y),                     (2-34) 
recalling I/Y = gv, then we obtain:  P/Y = gv, so that g = 
v
sp
ps
1 (P/Y).  
   (2-35) 
And v = K/Y, then we can rewrite this equation as:  
g = ps (P/K).  
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Note that the ratio P/K is the rate of profit r. Thus we get the profit rate equation:  
r = 
ps
g .     (2-36) 
This equation implies that profit rat ep
rate of capitalists, namely, increasing growth rate and declining saving rate of capitalists 
lead
, 1970, p. 117). Net saving is the excess of net income over 
cons
(2-37) 
The simplest assumption abo
Neumann: there are two classes of income, profits P and wages W; all wages are spent and 
all p
||      ||     ||     (2-38) 
 
where C is the consumption and I is the , and income Y is equal to output Q. 
Profit per year is equal to the net investment and the renters’ consumption. The profit rate 
in the gamble and it makes finance more 
stead
e is d endent on the growth rate and the saving 
 to increasing profit rate.    
According to Joan Robinson, investment in productive capital is entirely governed by 
decisions of firms (cf. Robinson
umption and identical with net investment (cf. Robinson, 1970, p. 121).  
 
Y = S + C = I + C.    
 
ut the relation between income and saving is used by von 
rofits saved (cf. Robinson, 1970, p. 119). Thus:  
 
Y = W + P 
Q =  C + I 
 investment
is determined by the ratio of net investment to the stock of capital (accumulation rate) and 
proportion of profits saved. The level of wages is determined by the technical conditions 
and the profit rate (cf. Robinson, 1970, p. 126).  
To sustain a higher growth rate (i.e. rate of accumulation) requires a higher level of 
profits, because it offers more favourable odds 
ily available (cf. Robinson, 1970, p. 118). The investment decisions by firms depend 
on the expected profit. We can rewrite this assumption as:  
 
I/Y = f(P/Y)  or  g = f(r)   (2-39) 
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where r = P/Y is the profit rate, and P is the profit. Based on Kalecki’s (1937) principle of 
cumulation g and the rate 
of p
f profit on 
inve
emselves in a situation right to the rightmost equilibrium D, i.e. 
the e
igure 2.1 Relationship between growth rate and profit rate 
ulation g 
 
ource: Robinson, 1970, p. 129. 
ccording to Joan Robinson, a steady rate of capital may take place below full 
employment. The stock of plant has the composition appropriate to the desired rate of 
increasing risk, investment is positively related to expected profit, but at a decreasing rate, 
because each additional unit of investment means more debt and thus more risk to the firm 
(cf. Kalecki, 1937, pp. 440-447). Thus this function is concave.  
Robinson argued that the relationship between the rate of ac
rofit r is double-sided. The accumulation going on in a particular situation determines 
the level of profits obtainable in it and thus the rate of profit expected on investment, 
which in turn influences the rate of accumulation (cf. Robinson, 1970, p. 128).  
As shown in Figure 2.1, the curve r=g/s represents the expected rate o
stment as a function of the rate of accumulation that generates it. The curve g=f(r) 
represents the rate of accumulation as a function of the rate of profit that induces it (cf. 
Robinson, 1970, p. 129).  
When the firms find th
conomy generates less profits than planed. Thus the firms will reduce investment and 
hence reducing growth. To the left of this equilibrium, the economy generates more profits 
than planed, the firms will revise expectation upward and invest more, hence increasing 
growth. Thus, the equilibrium D is stable. For the same reasons, the other equilibrium S is 
unstable (cf. Robinson, 1970, pp. 129-130).  
 
F
 
 
                                                                         rate of accum
S
 
A
S 
g=f(r) r=g/s 
D 
rate of profit r 
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accu
nomic Growth 
 
In Schumpet ative activity of 
ntrepreneurs was the major force to sustain long-term economic growth, since dynamic 
entrepr
(3) cap
at the capitalist economic system does not 
automa
mulation (so-called golden age), but there is not enough of it to employ the whole 
labour force (cf. Robinson, 1970, p. 134). The desired rate of growth may fall short of the 
rate of growth of labour force and the growth of output per head due to autonomous and 
competitive innovations (cf. Robinson, 1970, p. 133).  
 
2.1.6 Technological Progress and Eco
er’s vision of economic growth, the innov
e
eneurs introduce new techniques of production and new products which will in part 
destroy actually prevailing situations to create new profit opportunities. New profit 
opportunities are the incentives for new investment, which, in turn, creates new growth. 
This is Schumpeter’s creative destruction, which is based on the rational behaviour of 
producers and consumers in disequilibrium situations, with economic activity fluctuating 
around full-employment positions (cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 277) and also on Say’s Law: each 
supply creates its own demand (cf. Say, 1857, pp. 134-135).  
However, new technology may not be suitable when (1) an industry requires 
virtually unalterable factor proportions; (2) modifying existing technologies is expensive; 
ital-intensive technology reduces skilled labour requirements and creates thus 
structural unemployment; and (4) factor prices are distorted (cf. Nafziger, 2006, p. 46). 
Empirical evidences show us that some developing countries were able to increase capital 
and labour productivity by using existing technologies without any additional investment 
in Research & Development (cf. Nafziger, 2006, p. 157). Furthermore, technological 
progress might tend to overinvestment in the economy because the firm that introduces a 
better design for the production of an existing good forces the competing firms to abandon 
their own methods of production immediately, even when their current equipment is not 
fully depreciated (cf. Valdés, 1999, p. 158).  
Pasinetti’s theory of economic growth, with its emphasis on both technological 
innovation and effective demand, argues th
tically bring about a proper match between growth of technological efficiency and 
growth of effective demand (cf. Köhler, Tausch, 2002, p. 156). “This is the point where the 
‘institutional problems’ that any economic system must face become relevant” (Pasinetti, 
1993, p. 116). Therefore, the institutions of society must intervene in the market in order to 
bring about the proper level of effective demand (cf. Köhler, Tausch, 2002, p. 156), which 
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is the ultimate driver for the investment in innovation and economic growth. Without 
sufficient expectation of the volume of sales, i.e. effective demand, the entrepreneurs will 
not make huge investment in production (see subchapters 2.3 and 6.6-6.8), including the 
investment to acquire new technologies. Pasinetti speaks of “existence of a permanent task 
of pursuing ... effective demand and full employment” (Pasinetti, 1993, p. 59).  
In general, appropriate technologies in developing countries absorb more unskilled 
labour than in industrialized countries. Planners or entrepreneurs of developing countries 
must e
 
Unlike nomi asured by GDP, 
economic development is a more complex process involving not only economic, but also 
man
me. Furthermore, income 
distr
xamine existing technologies for possible substitution of labour for capital and 
might choose a more labour-intensive existing technology (cf. Nafziger, 2006, p. 327-351) 
to ensure the employment and thus consumption market. Indeed, it is the existence of 
sufficient aggregate demand that provides entrepreneurs with incentives to invest in 
technology and innovation, not vice versa. Hence, technological progress is a necessary 
condition for growth, but is not sufficient; it is effective demand, which, together with 
technological progress makes the preconditions for growth necessary and sufficient. 
 
2.2 Economic Growth and Economic Development 
 eco c growth which is quantitative and usually me
y social, political, technological and cultural changes. One could define economic 
development narrowly “as the process of increasing the degree of utilization and improving 
the productivity of the available resources of a country which leads to an increase of the 
economic welfare of the community by stimulating the growth of national income” (Eshag, 
1983, pp. 1-2). Kindleberger and Herrick supplied standard definitions for growth and 
development: “… economic growth means more output … economic development implies 
not only more output but also different kinds of output than were previously produced, as 
well as changes in the technical and institutional arrangements by which output is 
produced and distributed” (Kindleberger, Herrick, 1977, p. 21).  
Economic development is usually measured by the growth in per capita Gross 
National Product (GNP) at constant prices or per capita real inco
ibution must be taken into account. This means, all members of the society should 
benefit equally from a rise in national income. It is impossible to numerically quantify the 
magnitude of utility changes in the individual economic welfare that may result from a 
redistribution of income among the members of a society. But it is clear that for various 
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income groups there are different utilities of a given increment in their real income, 
namely, the lower the income the higher the utility. To take an extreme example, a very 
poor family has to use each increase in real income to buy food so that they can survive. 
Income distribution is an essential part of economic development, since the key aim of 
development is to increase the economic welfare of the community as a whole (cf. Eshag, 
1983, pp. 2-3). 
Thus, economic growth is quantitative and related to the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP); however, economic development is more qualitative and related to living standards 
inclu
 
com
stment cause instability while the long run capacity effect turns 
out 
 money wages in the cyclical 
upsw
ding consumption, employment, income distribution, social insurance, education etc.  
Robinson used the phrase “a golden age” to describe smooth and steady growth with 
full employment: “With a desired rate of accumulation equal to the possible rate,
pounded of the rate of growth of population and of output per head, starting with near 
full employment and a composition of the stock of plant appropriate to the desired rate of 
accumulation, near full employment is maintained” (cf. Robinson, 1970, p. 133). In the 
golden age, tranquility is secured by stable long term expectations. But great number of 
uncertain factors may influence the profitability of each investment project (unexpected 
change of market, uneven technical progress and the changing behaviour of the 
competitors with respect to the pricing, marketing etc.), thus, an economy can never get 
into equilibrium. Consequently, the concept of stable long-run expectations linked with the 
golden age becomes largely meaningless and constitutes a target of neoclassical criticism 
(cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 205).  
In the cyclical process (business cycle-cum-growth theory), the short- and medium-
term income effect of inve
to be a stabilizing factor which attracts realized output towards the trend level (cf. 
Bortis, 1997, p. 211). In the long run, the trend effective demand governs economic 
activity; moreover, investment must be financed by trend saving since each debt at present 
has to be repaid by future incomes (cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 212).  
According to the neoclassical interpretation of the double-sided relationship between 
investments and profits, prices and profits increase relative to
ing and vice versa. Lower wages are associated with higher employment levels and 
vice versa. Unemployment occurs because real wages are too high (cf. Krelle, 1992, p. 76). 
Thus low wages level is good for development. However the classical-Keynesian 
economist argues that high real wages can not be the cause of high unemployment. In the 
downswing of an economy, reduced investment cause diminishing employment and 
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effective demand, which induce lower prices and profits relative to money wages. In the 
long run, an increasing wage share in income (and thus decreasing share of profits) is 
positively associated with normal employment. This directly follows from the 
supermultiplier relation (cf. Bortis, 1997, pp. 213-214), which will be reviewed in the next 
Chapter (2.3).  
 
2.3 Classical-Keynesian Theory of Development 
Keynes analy mous component of 
aggregate demand and focused on its multiplier impact on income. According to the 
Key
nt actually saved 
is of
 
ian sis viewed investment spending as an autono
nesian theory, unemployment occurs because aggregate demand by consumers, 
businesses, and government for goods and services is not large enough to reach full 
employment. The Keynesian prescription for unemployment is to increase aggregate 
demand through more private consumption and investment (by reduced tax rates or lower 
interest rates) or through more government spending. As long as there is unemployment 
and unutilized capital capacity in the economy, production will respond automatically to 
increased demand through higher employment (cf. Todaro, pp. 174-179). 
Keynes was against the opinion that higher interest rates meant higher saving and 
investment. “The influence of changes in the rate of interest on the amou
 paramount importance, but is in the opposite direction to that usually supposed. For 
even if the attraction of the larger future income to be earned from a higher rate of interest 
has the effect of diminishing the propensity to consume, nevertheless we can be certain 
that a rise in the rate of interest will have the effect of reducing the amount actually saved. 
For aggregate saving is governed by aggregate investment; a rise in the rate of interest 
(unless it is offset by a corresponding change in the demand-schedule for investment) will 
diminish investment; hence a rise in the rate of interest must have the effect of reducing 
incomes to a level at which saving is decreased in the same measure as investment. Since 
incomes will decrease by a greater absolute amount than investment, it is, indeed, true that, 
when the rate of interest rises, the rate of consumption will decrease. But this does not 
mean that there will be a wider margin for saving. On the contrary, saving and spending 
will both decrease” (Keynes, 2007, pp. 99-100). In other words, even if a rise in the rate of 
interest would cause the community to save more out of a given income, however, it would 
also cause decrease in investment and income, therefore actual aggregate savings would 
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decrease. Both lower tax rates and lower interest rates would contribute to the income 
increase of workers and thus the increase of private consumption.  
Keynesian-Marxian monetary theory of production is summarised by the sequence:  
M – C ... P ... C’ – M’.   (2-40) 
 
he companies invest the money M to buy means of production C; within the social 
proc
he Keynesian trend model “pictures uniquely the functioning of the system, i.e. the 
inter
 which 
incre
)
 
T
ess of production P the goods C’ are produced, which are sold later against money M’. 
Ricardo and also Marx argue that the social surplus M’-M arises in the social process of 
production P. The surplus must be large enough to make the production happen, in other 
words, the entrepreneurs must benefit. The system of classical-Keynesian political 
economy is derived from the ideas of Ricardo, Quesnay, Marx and Keynes; Ricardo, 
Quesnay and Marx are associated with production, Keynes with money (cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 
142). 
T
play of institutions, and is associated with fully adjusted situations” (Bortis, 1997, p. 
136). Trend or long-period output Q* and employment N* are, in principle, determined by 
effective demand components. And all of these components are governed by institutions 
and technology, i.e. the conditions of production (cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 142, p. 200).  
The autonomous variables (government expenditures G and exports X),
ase derived demand, i.e. consumption and investment, are linked with equilibrium 
output and employment through the supermultiplier (cf. Bortis, 1997, pp. 142-154 and 
Bortis, 2003, pp. 461-67). 
 
( )[ ] ( ) ( vdgbbkz
XGQ
s +−++−
+=
21/11
* π   (2-41) 
 
where Q* is trend or long-period gross domestic product; the star indicates that all the 
e rate of 
grow
magnitudes on the right hand side represent effective demand components associated with 
institutions and with the conditions of production (cf. Bortis, 1997, pp. 199-204). 
The trend rate of growth of output and employment, g, is determined by th
th of the autonomous variables. d is the replacement coefficient (or depreciation rate) 
and v is the capital-output ratio; (g+d)v represents the gross-investment/output ratio. The 
trend investment volume I* = (g+d)vQ* is thus derived demand, depending upon the long-
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period growth of output. The terms of trade π ; b1 is the fraction of output required to buy 
the imports necessary in the social process of production and b2 the fraction of income 
spent upon non-necessary goods associated with consumption. 1-(1/k) is the share of 
property income (k is the realized mark-up), in fact, the social surplus, comprising profits, 
land rents and labour rents associated with special abilities and with privileges of some 
kind. The leakage coefficient zs = 1 – cs = ss+ ts indicates the fraction of the surplus over 
ordinary wages which is not consumed, the fraction consumed being cs. The long-period 
consumption coefficient cs and the long period tax coefficient ts are both determined by 
institutions – consumption habits and tax laws – and the long-period saving propensity ss 
is, fundamentally, a pure residual varying with the normal or trend level of output and 
employment (cf. Bortis, 1997, pp. 166-168).  
zs is the leakage out of property income and zs[1 – (1 / k)] is the leakage out of 
dom
dual. This means that the process of adjustment to the long period 
equi
but on the level of aggregate 
inco
estic income which is negatively associated with output and employment. The leakage 
out of income increases when income distribution gets more unequal, i.e. if the property 
share [1-(1/k)] increases and if property income is itself unequally distributed. The latter 
implies that the leakage out of property income (zs = 1 – cs = ss+ ts) is large, since more is 
saved if property income is unequally distributed. The negative association between 
unequal distribution and the level of output and employment is the crucial feature of the 
supermultiplier relation. 
Saving is a pure resi
librium is principally based upon quantity adjustments (cf. Bortis, 1998, pp. 25-29). 
The institutionally governed autonomous demand components, normal government 
expenditures (G) and normal exports (X), are principally independent of the level of 
economic activity and set the economic system into motion; output and employment 
increase until macroeconomic equilibrium (S=I) is achieved. The economic system is 
stable and the volume of long-period investment represents derived demand governed by 
the functioning of the system (cf. Bortis, 1997, pp. 166-168). 
The aggregate savings depends not on the interest rate, 
me. “Saving is the act of the individual consumer and consists in the negative act of 
refraining from spending the whole of his current income on consumption. Investment, on 
the other hand, is the act of the entrepreneur whose function it is to make the decisions 
which determine the amount of the non-available output, and consists in the positive act of 
starting or maintaining some process of production or withholding liquid goods. The vital 
point to appreciate is this ... the performance of the act of saving is in itself no guarantee 
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that the stock of capital goods will be correspondingly increased” (Keynes, 1930, pp. 172-
175). 
Saving has a negative immediate effect on employment and thus a negative effect on 
econ
 derive the ‘internal’ multiplier based 
upon
omic development because a diminished propensity to consume has a depressing 
effect on employment. Saving “is not a substitution of future consumption-demand for 
present consumption-demand, - it is a net diminution of such demand. Moreover, the 
expectation of future consumption is so largely based on current experience of present 
consumption that a reduction in the latter is likely to depress the former, with the result that 
the act of saving will not merely depress the price of consumption-goods and leave the 
marginal efficiency of existing capital unaffected, but may actually tend to depress the 
latter also. In this event it may reduce present investment-demand as well as present 
consumption-demand” (Keynes, 2007, pp. 190-191). 
From the supermultiplier relation we can directly
 the macroeconomic equilibrium condition ‘saving equal investment’ by postulating 
equilibrium in the foreign balance:  
 
( )[ ] ( )vdgkz
GQ
s
i +−−= /11*    (2-42) 
 
 the long run, investment is derived demand (since S=I and saving is a pure 
resid
ployment mechanism obtains 
from
In
ual), output and employment depend, in principle, upon the relation between 
government expenditures and the leakage (z). The latter is dependent upon income 
distribution: s increases if the distribution of income becomes more unequal (z = 1- c = s + 
t). The negative association between unequal distribution and employment constitutes the 
crucial feature of the long-period ‘saving equal investment’ or ‘internal’ multiplier or 
internal employment mechanism (cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 190).  
The ‘foreign trade multiplier’ picturing the ‘external’ em
 the foreign balance equilibrium:  
 
( )21* bb
XQe += π      (2-43) 
 
 principle, output and employment are larger, the higher the export volume, the 
lower the import dependence and the more favourable the terms of trade are (a low 
In
π  
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indic
onomy is not 
able
ued 
that 
rowth: The Economic Ideas of Mao Zedong 
Karl Marx remar
the Gotha Program, that in the higher phase of communist society, the distribution norm 
ates favourable terms of trade). This effect will be particularly strong if exports 
mainly consist of labour-intensive high-quality manufactures and imports of land-intensive 
primary products and standard manufactured goods (cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 191). 
Keynes thought that monetary policy (adjusting money supply and interest rate) alone 
was not sufficient for encouraging or discouraging investment, because the ec
 to self-regulate. Investment depends ultimately not upon the interest rate, but upon the 
aggregate demand. The key to keep a sustaining economic growth was stimulating 
demand. The government must intervene in the economy through fiscal policy by adjusting 
tax rates, social security, and unemployment benefits, and spending on infrastructure and 
government services to create jobs (cf. Dileo, 2009; cf. Cutler, et al., 1986, pp. 69-71). 
Keynes objected to both inflation and deflation, but for him a very modest level of 
inflation would be preferable in any case to a deflationary contraction of prices. He arg
“it is worse, in an impoverished world, to provoke unemployment than to disappoint 
the rentier” (Keynes, 1924, pp. 44-45). An appropriate light inflation would be good since 
“depreciated money assisted the new men and emancipated them from the dead hand; 
benefited new wealth at the expense of old, and armed enterprise against accumulation ... It 
has been a loosening influence against the rigid distribution of old-won wealth ... By this 
means each generation can disinherit in part its predecessors’ heirs” (Keynes, 1924, pp. 12-
13). Deflation permits the “rigid distribution of old-won wealth” to hinder the investment 
of the new wealth-producing entrepreneur. Under a deflationary policy, an increasingly 
large share of the national income would accrue to the rentier class. An intolerable burden 
would fall on the productive classes, so that the welfare of the community as a whole 
would decrease (cf. Dillard, 2005, pp. 303-304). A modest level of inflation and a constant 
level of wages (in the short term) let the product prices rise, so that the profits increase. 
Consequently the entrepreneurs have great incentive to invest more. The tendency to full 
employment will be promoted and the effective demand rises. Although the middle class 
with the wages as principal source of income will be impoverished slightly, however their 
opportunities to find a job increase greatly. The wellbeing of the middle class moves in the 
same direction as aggregate consumption. 
 
2.4 Socialistic View on G
 
ked the well known theory of socialist distribution in his Critique of 
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wou
te the whole country and avoid creating any further inequality at 
 local and the national level to prevent further 
depe
M
 skills and labour,  
ation of foreign methods in favour of 
deve
In 1954
of roughly one-third of labour power. What required three people in the past can be done 
by t
formation via land 
recla
ld be “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” (cf. Marx, 
Engels, pp. 13-30). Since China is a developing country, the Chinese government always 
claims that China is still in the primary phase of socialism. In practice the Maoist 
egalitarian strategy went beyond this Marxist principle and implemented a new version in 
China: “from each according to his ability, to each according to his work”. The latter part 
is virtually the statement of equality norm. The implementation of the equality norm was 
regarded as the only way to promote the growth of China’s productivity (cf. Kao, Sinha, 
Wilpert, 1999, p. 173). 
The two basic principles of economic development in the 1950s were: 
1. Incorpora
the regional or local level; and  
2. Based on the principle of self-reliance, or self-sufficiency, build up 
economic capacity at both the
ndence on foreign nations (cf. Smith, 1991, p. 157). 
ao’s concept of self-reliance included: 
• Fully using domestic resources, including finance,
• Rejecting indiscriminate imit
loping indigenous technology and 
• Establishing a comprehensive industrial system (cf. Riskin, 1987, pp. 75-
291).  
 Mao said: “Under present conditions of production there is already a surplus 
wo after cooperative transformation, an indication of the superiority of socialism. 
Where can an outlet be found for this surplus labour power of one-third or more? For the 
most part is still in the country-side ...The masses have unlimited creative power. They can 
organize themselves to take on all spheres and branches of work where they can give full 
play to their energy, tackle production more intensively and extensively, and initiate more 
and more undertaking for their own well being” (Mao, 1978, p. 269).  
According to such ideas the government developed a broad overall policy of 
promoting undertakings in the following groups: physical capital 
mation, hill forestation and irrigation; infrastructure (roads, bridges and buildings); 
energy; rural sidelines and industries; and human capital formation (public sanitation, 
clinics and schools). On land reclamation and forestation Mao Zedong stressed the need for 
“state organised land reclamation by bringing plenty of wasteland under cultivation in the 
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course of three five year plans”. He went on to say: “I think the barren mountains in the 
north in particular should be afforested, and they undoubtedly can be. Do you comrades 
from the north have courage enough for this? Many places in the south need forestation 
too. It will be fine if in a number of years we can see various places in the south and north 
clothed with greenery” (Mao, 1978, pp. 197-219). 
Mao Zedong confidently expected that the annual labour days employed per worker 
would rise substantially and that female participation rates would also rise as more rural 
unde
labour power. As management improves and the scope of production expands, 
ever
ighbourhood. Huge efforts on the part of peasants and other 
work
t without 
cons
rtakings were established, existing labour surplus thereby mobilised and increasing 
supply elicited: “Before the cooperative transformation of agriculture, surplus labour-
power was a problem in many parts of the country. Since then many cooperatives have felt 
the pinch of a labour shortage and need to mobilise the masses of the women, who did not 
work before revolution, to take their place on the labour front ... For many places the 
labour shortage becomes evident as production grows in scale, the number of undertakings 
increases, the efforts to remake nature become more extensive and intensive” (Mao, 1978, 
p. 268).  
Further, “things in this country also show us that an outlet can be found in the villages 
for rural 
y able-bodied man and woman can put in more work-days in the year. Instead of over 
one hundred workdays for a man and a few score for a woman as described in this article 
the former can put in well over two hundred workdays and the latter well over one hundred 
or more” (Mao, 1978, p. 270). 
Mao encouraged the establishment of small backyard steel furnaces in every 
commune and in each urban ne
ers were made to produce steel out of scrap metal (cf. Fang, 2007, p. 155).  
However, Mao’s deep distrust of intellectuals and faith in the power of the mass 
mobilization of peasants led him to order this massive countrywide effor
ulting expert opinion. The implementation of such heavy-industry-oriented 
development strategy had induced two major problems: the distortion in the industry 
structure and the ineffective incentive mechanism (cf. Lin, Cai, Li, 2003, p. 91) which 
impeded the economic growth in China.  
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2.5 Deng Xiaoping’s View on Growth – Socialism with Chinese  
Characteristics  
 
Socialism with Chinese characteristics is an official term for the economy of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) since its economic reform in 1980s. This is a form of a 
socialist market economy and means that both state planning and market forces play a key 
role in the economic development. It is an economy with organic integration of a planned 
economy and market regulations (cf. Nehru, Kraay, Yu, 1997, p. 9). 
The main idea of Deng Xiaoping on “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” is that: 
“Planning and market forces are not the essential difference between socialism and 
capitalism. A planned economy is not the definition of socialism, because there is planning 
under capitalism; the market economy happens under socialism too. Planning and market 
forces are both ways of controlling economic activity” (Gittings, 2005, pp. 103-253). 
In his speech at the Twelfth National Party Congress on 1st September 1982, Deng 
Xiaoping pointed out: “In carrying out our modernization we must proceed from Chinese 
realities. Both in revolution and in construction we should also learn from foreign countries 
and draw on their experience. But mechanical application of foreign experience and 
copying of foreign models will get us nowhere. We have had many lessons in this respect. 
We must integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete realities of China, 
blaze a path of our own and build a socialism with Chinese characteristics. That is the 
basic conclusion we have reached after reviewing our long history” (Deng, 1993, pp. 2-3).  
Deng thought that the Chinese were not quite clear about the meaning of socialism 
and Marxism in the past. Poverty is not socialism; to be rich is glorious, declared Deng 
Xiaoping. Marxism attaches utmost importance to developing the productive forces (cf. 
Strother, Strother, 2006, p. 36). Socialism, according to Marxism, is the primary stage of 
communism and that at the advanced stage the principle of contribution from each 
according to his ability and distribution to each according to his needs will be applied. This 
calls for highly developed productive forces and an overwhelming abundance of material 
wealth. Therefore, the fundamental task for the socialist stage is to develop the productive 
forces. As they develop, people’s material and cultural life will constantly improve. One of 
the most important shortcomings after the founding of the People’s Republic was that the 
country didn’t pay enough attention to developing the productive forces. Socialism means 
eliminating poverty, according the new explanation of Deng (cf. De Bary, Lufrano, Chan, 
2000, p. 508).  
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The ruling Communist Party of China argues that socialism is not incompatible with 
these economic policies. Therefore China’s government believes that it has not abandoned 
Marxism, but has further-developed many of the concepts of Marxist theory in order to 
adapt China’s new economic system. Very important: in current Chinese Communist 
thinking, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is at the primary stage of socialism, and 
this redefinition allows the PRC to undertake whatever economic policies are needed to 
develop into an industrialized nation. 
In 1992 Deng Xiaoping gave a series of talks calling for a more vigorous open-door 
and active economic policy. He told the people that the way how China chooses 
development strategies depends no more on whether they are capitalistic or socialistic, but 
only depends on whether or not they are in accordance with the following “three 
favourables”: 
• favourable to developing the productivity in the socialist society, 
• favourable to consolidating China’s comprehensive national strength and 
• favourable to raising the people’s living standards (cf. He, 2000, p. 24). 
The dominant ideology in China today is rather pragmatic rationalism, which is 
reflected by the famous “cat theory” of Deng Xiaoping. As a pragmatist, Deng Xiaoping 
was willing to employ a temporary expedient whenever necessary, which was expressed by 
his well-known saying: “It doesn’t matter whether it’s a black cat or white cat; it’s a good 
cat as long as it catches mice” (Ju, Chu, 1996, p. 44). 
 
2.6 Factors affecting growth  
 
Generally, economic growth depends on increases in the quantity and quality of 
capital and labour (the basic inputs of the macroeconomic production process), and on the 
way how they are combined. The technological progress, which contributes to the 
improvements in the quality of labour and capital, is thought by many economists to be the 
most important determinant of growth (cf. Kennedy, 2000, p.102). 
The following are the five main sources of GDP growth:   
1. An increase in the quantity of the labour force. Examples of supply-side policies are 
immigration regulations, maternity and childcare benefits, retirement benefits, and tax 
incentives.   
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2. An increase in the quality of the labour force. Examples of supply-side policies are 
subsidies for retraining programs and the investment in education oriented closely to the 
needs of industry.   
3. An increase in the quantity of the stock of physical capital. (Physical stock equals 
the number of buildings and the amount of equipment firms have to work with.) Examples 
of supply-side policies are tax incentives for investment and saving.  
 4. An increase in the quality of the capital stock. Examples of supply-side policies are 
tax incentives for research and development, and promotion of competition.   
 5. Improvements in the way in which capital and labour are combined to produce 
output. Such Improvements could be made by better worker and management relations, 
specialization, economies of scale, or the migration of workers from areas of low 
productivity to areas of high productivity, such as movement of farm workers to the cities 
(cf. Kennedy, 2000, pp. 103-104).  
An increasing material standard of living enjoyed by people in the economy is 
associated with the economic growth. The main determinant of this standard is an 
economy’s productivity, usually measured as output per working hour. Growth in 
productivity results from increases in physical capital, higher quality of labour and capital, 
and improvements in how capital and labour are combined. All of these factors are affected 
by institutional features of the economy (cf. Kennedy, 2000, p. 104). 
Chiefly there are four factors, which influence the economic growth essentially: 
1. Population 
The classical economist Thomas Robert Malthus contends that the population growth 
is an obstacle to economic development. However Julian L. Simon argues that population 
spurs innovation and development (cf. Nafziger, 2006, p. 284). 
High fertility rates and rapid population growth induce possible costs which hamper 
economic development. For example, diminishing returns to natural resources, with an 
adverse impact on average food consumption, a higher labour force growth rate and higher 
unemployment, increased urbanization and congestion. 
The fertility decreases with economic development, urbanization, industrialization, 
mobility, literacy, female labour force participation, reduced income inequality. But these 
efforts will not be successful unless socioeconomic development and improved income 
distribution make birth control seem advantageous (cf. Nafziger, 2006, p. 305). 
2. Employment, Migration, and Urbanization 
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Production depends on the flow of natural resources, capital, labour, technology and 
entrepreneurship. In developing countries the labour force usually grows faster than job 
opportunities, thus unemployment grows (cf. Zopf, 1984, p. 347). Rural-urban migration 
contributes to the rapid growth of the urban labour force in developing countries. Farm 
labour migrates to urban areas not only for higher wages, but also for more employment 
opportunities.  
According to the Keynes’s general theory of income and employment, a country’s 
employment increases with GNP. Unemployment occurs because aggregate demand by 
consumers, companies, and government for goods and services is not enough for GNP to 
reach full employment. The Keynesian solution for unemployment is to increase aggregate 
demand through more private consumption and investment (by reduced tax rates or lower 
interest rates) or through more government spending. 
However, there are possible tradeoffs between employment and output from 
inappropriate technology in developing countries. The industrialized countries have a 
relative abundance of capital and scarcity of labour; however the developing countries 
have abundant labour and scarce capital. Technology designed for the industrialized 
countries is often not suitable for developing countries (cf. Nafziger, 2006, pp. 320-330). 
Unemployment can be reduced by discouraging rural-urban migration, in other words, 
improving the rural economic development. Such development can be realized by 
removing price upper limits on food and other agricultural goods, technological change in 
agriculture, locating new industries in rural areas, and providing more schools, housing, 
food, hospitals, health services, roads, entertainment and other amenities. 
Generally appropriate technologies in developing countries use more unskilled labours 
than in developed countries. The use of appropriate technology can be stimulated by intra-
industry substitution, inter-product substitution, greater income equality, government 
purchase of labour-intensive goods, using less-modern equipment (cf. Nafziger, 2006, pp. 
325-326). 
3. Education, Health, and Human Capital 
Investment in human capital includes expenditures on education, training, research 
and health, enhancing future productivity. In developing countries the expansion of 
primary education redistributed benefits from the rich to the poor, however, the growth of 
secondary and higher education redistributes income from the poor to the rich. On-the-job 
training tends to balance demand for and supply of training (cf. Nafziger, 2006, pp. 357-
358). The methods of distance learning through TV and internet can be used to increase the 
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productivity of education systems and dramatically reduce the cost of providing education, 
including teacher training and salary (cf. Perraton, Lentell, 2004, p. 235).  
Educational budgets in developing countries should be more oriented toward primary 
education and technical learning. Many secondary school graduates are trained in the 
humanities and social sciences but lack the scientific, technical, and vocational skills for 
work in a modern economy. Subsidies for secondary and higher education should be 
reduced because they encourage a surplus of educated people, some of whom become 
unemployed. In order to improve income distribution, subsidies might be made for 
scholarships for the poor (cf. Nafziger, 2006, pp. 329-330). 
4. Capital Formation and Technical Progress 
For the rapid economic growth of the West and Japan in the last 150 years, two major 
factors were capital formation and technical progress. But the contribution of capital 
formation and technical progress to economic growth differs in developed countries and 
developing countries. 
Econometric studies of developed countries indicate that the increase in the 
productivity of each worker per unit of capital is more important for growth than the 
addition in capital per worker. The possible explanations for this increase in productivity 
are advances in knowledge, greater education and training, learning by experience, 
organizational improvement, economies of scale and resource shifts (cf. Nafziger, 2006, 
pp. 388-389).  
However, the research in developing countries provides evidence that the contribution 
of capital per worker is more important to economic growth than that of worker 
productivity per unit of capital. Adding capital to an existing labour force makes large 
gains in productivity when there is very little capital. That is, marginal productivity of 
capital in the developing countries is higher than that in the developed countries (cf. 
Kroon, 2007, p. 117). Further, the increase in labour productivity through education and 
training requires also a large amount of capital investment which can not be accomplished 
in the primary phase of economic development.  
Technical progress results from a combination of research & development, invention 
and innovation. Technical knowledge from abroad is costly and usually incomplete. The 
planners of developing countries must examine existing technologies for possible 
substitution of labour for capital. Before taking new technologies, the high cost of adapting 
and modifying should be taken into consideration (cf. Nafziger, 2006, p. 389).   
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3. Major Achievements of China’s Growth since the  
 1980s 
 
China is successfully feeding 22 percent of the world’s population on just 7 percent of 
the world’s arable land (cf. OECD, 2000, p. 255). This might be the greatest achievement 
for China, one of the most densely populated, large economically backward countries of 
the world.  
China has been the fastest growing economy in the world for over three decades, 
expanding at nearly 10 percent a year. As a result, real GDP in 2006 was about 13 times 
the level of 1978 (cf. National Bureau of Statistics CD-ROM, 2007, table 3-1), when Deng 
Xiaoping launched China on the path of economic reform and open door policy. China is 
now the world’s third largest trader and, when measured at market exchange rates, fourth 
largest economy of the world concerning GDP (cf. Bergsten, et al., 2008, p. 106).  
China’s long boom is a major episode in global economic history. The broad outlines 
of China’s growth include enormous expansion of output, employment, productivity, 
exports and incomes; unprecedented progress in poverty reduction and material well-being; 
and the integration of China as a major force in global markets (cf. Brandt, Rawski, 2005, 
p. 1).  
 
Table 3.1: Real annual growth rates of GDP, investment, exports of China and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in China (in percentage): 
 
 1979-1990 1990-2000 2000-2005 2005-2007 
GDP 9.1 9.9 9.6 10.9 
Gross capital 
formation 
8.2 9.8 13.2 12.3 
Exports 7.4 13.6 24.4 22.0 
Nominal FDI 31.05 37.98 6.81 39.8 
 
Source: author’s summary based on data from World Bank, 2006a, p. 7, table 1; 
World Bank, 2008, p. 10, table 2; International Monetary Fund, 2008b, p. 4, Table 1.1.  
 
China is one of the countries with the most ancient civilization and enjoyed long-term 
prosperity in the history. For a considerably long period, China was the most economically 
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advanced country in the world. According to the calculation by Maddison, China’s GDP 
was one-third of the world total in 1820 (cf. Maddison, 2001, pp. 263-264). The economic 
position of China dropped drastically from 1820 onwards and rose again since Deng 
Xiaoping started reforms in 1978 (cf. Hu, 2007, p. 12). 
China was ready for an economic takeoff at the beginning of the 1980s. Since then, 
the average annual growth rate of China’s GDP is nearly 10 percent, far higher than the 
world average. In the 1980s, the world average annual aggregate growth rate of GDP was 
3.3 percent (cf. Hu, 2007, p. 13); in the 1990s, it was 2.9 percent and from 2000 to 2005 it 
was 2.8 percent (World Bank, 2007, p. 190). Calculated by PPP (Purchasing Power Parity), 
China’s GDP in 2007 was 10.8 percent of the world total and ranked second, just behind 
the United States (see Table 3.2). We should note that Purchasing Power Parity is an 
indicator of welfare and can be seen as economic or even political power (cf. Siebert, 2006, 
p. 274). 
 
Table 3.2: The top ten economies of the world in 2007 (GDP calculated by PPP) 
 
Ranking Economy GDP, by PPP 
(Millions of international 
Dollars) 
Share in World GDP 
1 United States  13,811,200 21.1 
2 China 7,055,079 10.8 
3 Japan 4,283,529 6.6 
4 India 3,092,126 4.7 
5 Germany 2,727,514 4.2 
6 Russian Federation 2,088,207 3.2 
7 France 2,061,884 3.2 
8 United Kingdom 2,046,780 3.1 
9 Brazil 1,833,601 2.8 
10 Italy 1,777,353 2.7 
 World 65,435,067 100 
 
Source: World Bank, 2007, p. 190, Table 4.1. 
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Since China jointed the WTO in 2001, it has almost quadrupled its merchandise 
exports while imports have more than tripled. In 2007, its trade surplus reached 262 billion 
USD (cf. WTO, 2008, p. 5). Approximately 45 percent of its trade receipts came from 
Asia, while Europe and North America each received 21 percent of China’s exports (see 
Figure 3.1). 
In 2007, China exported 1,217.8 billion USD worth of goods and ranked second of the 
world, 121.7 billion USD worth of services and ranked seventh of the world; the value of 
import goods to China was 956.0 billion USD and ranked third of the world, the value of 
import services to China was 129.3 billion USD and ranked fifth of the world (see Table 
3.3 and Table 3.4).  
 
Figure 3.1 China – Merchandise exports by region, 2007 
 
 
 
Source: WTO, 2008, p.5, Figure I.8. 
 
From 1980 to 2007, GDP per capita in China has increased from 313 to 2,483 USD, 
almost 8 times (see Table 3.5). Rising material living standards is nearly synonymous with 
rising real per capita GDP, which is calculated by dividing real GDP by the population of 
the country. The level and changes of real per capita GDP are widely used to measure 
economic performance (cf. OECD, 2008, p. 40). 
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Table 3.3: The top ten exporters and importers in world merchandise trade, 2007 
(Billion dollars and percentage) 
 
 
 
Exporters Value Share 
of the 
world 
Annual 
change 
  Importers Value Share 
of the 
world 
Annual 
change 
1 Germany     1326 9.5 20  1 US               2020 14.2 5
2 China          1218 8.7 26  2 Germany     1059 7.4 17
3 US 1163 8.3 12  3 China          956 6.7 21
4 Japan           713 5.1 10  4 Japan           621 4.4 7
5 France         553 4.0 12  5 UK              620 4.4 3
6 Nether-
lands           551 4.0 19
 6 
France         615 4.3 14
7 Italy            491 3.5 18  7 Italy            505 3.5 14
8 
UK 438 3.1 -2
 8 Nether-
lands           492 3.5 18
9 Belgium      431 3.1 17  9 Belgium      413 2.9 17
10 Canada        419 3.0 8  10 Canada        390 2.7 9
 
Source: WTO, 2008, p.12, Table I.8. 
 
Over the past thirty years the rapid development made tremendous changes in China. 
The enormous increase in output represents one of the most sustained and rapid economic 
transformations seen in the world economy in the past 50 years. It has delivered higher 
incomes and a substantial reduction of those living in absolute poverty (cf. OECD, 2005, p. 
16). The world witnessed a very fast economic growth, the accelerated speed of 
industrialization and urbanization, and the acceleration of world economic globalization. 
Unprecedented achievement also took place in methods of production, ways of living and 
ways of thinking, a situation that has never been seen for thousands of years (cf. Hu, 2007, 
pp. 14-15).  
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Table 3.4: The top ten exporters and importers in world trade in commercial 
services, 2007 (Billion dollars and percentage)  
 
 Exporters Value Share 
of the 
world 
Annual 
change 
 Importers Value Share 
of the 
world 
Annual 
change 
1 US  456 13.9 15  1 US  336 10.9 9
2 UK  273 8.3 18  2 Germany  251 8.1 15
3 Germany  206 6.3 15  3 UK  194 6.3 13
4 France  137 4.2 16  4 Japan  149 4.8 11
5 Spain  128 3.9 21  5 China  129 4.2 29
6 Japan  127 3.9 10  6 France  124 4.0 16
7 China  122 3.7 33  7 Italy  118 3.8 21
8 Italy  111 3.4 13  8 Spain  98 3.2 26
9 India  90 2.7 20  9 Ireland  95 3.1 20
10 
Ireland  89 2.7 30
 10 Nether-
lands  87 2.8 10
 
Source: WTO, 2008, p. 14, Table I.10. 
 
With respect to poverty reduction, China has made progress in getting over the 2 USD 
per day line. China’s poverty rate fell from 88 percent in 1981 to 47 percent in 2001. This 
was sufficient to bring down the number of impoverished population from 876 million to 
594 million. As we can see in Figure 3.2, both the numbers of people in China living 
between 1 and 2 USD per day and the people living over 2 USD per day have risen over 
these two decades (cf. Ravallion, Chen, 2004, p. 12). 
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Table 3.5: Comparisons of the GDP per capita2 of the five major economies 
 
Country 1980 1990 
Percentage 
change  
1980-1990 2000 
Percentage 
change  
1990-2000 2007 
Percentage 
change  
2000-2007
China 313.321 341.353 9.0 945.597 177.0 2,483.038 162.6 
Germany 10,749.605 19,592.736 8.2 23,168.072 18.3 40,400.402 74.4 
India 255.03 364.721 4.3 441.501 21.1 941.557 113.3 
Japan 9,073.937 24,559.780 170.7 36,810.985 49.9 34,296.061 -6.8 
United 
States 12,255.081 23,207.898 89.4 34,773.783 49.8 45,725.348 31.5 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, 2008a. 
 
Figure 3.2: Population of China by poverty status 
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Source: Ravallion, Chen, 2004, p. 49, Figure 3. 
                                                 
2 GDP per capita is expressed in current U.S. dollars per person. Data are derived by first converting GDP in national 
currency to U.S. dollars and then dividing it by total population. 
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4. Some Major Challenges China Faces in Economic  
 Development 
 
In spite of all kinds of progress China made in its development, which can be called 
“the China miracle”, many economists wonder whether or not China’s development can be 
sustained. What are the major challenges or obstacles for China’s sustainable development 
in the next decades? In February 2004, China’s Premier Wen Jiabao pointed out that China 
has achieved rapid economic development but also accumulated critical problems, 
including the urban/rural gap, regional disparity and inequality of income distribution. 
These gaps are continuing to enlarge; the pressure of employment and social security is 
mounting; public services are lagging behind; the conflict between population growth and 
economic development on one hand and environment and natural resources on the other 
has been increasing; the quality of the economy as a whole is not high and lacks 
competitiveness. Therefore, Wen Jiabao put forth an approach of “putting people first” in 
order to ensure a sustainable development (cf. Hu, 2007, p. 29). Apparently China realizes 
that only GDP growth is not enough and the quality of the economy must be taken into 
consideration. Generally, China is facing following major challenges (Figure 4.1): 
 
Figure 4.1 Major challenges China faces in economic development 
 
 
Major challenges China faces in  
economic development 
Inside:  
poverty and inequality 
Outside: 
Protectionism due to trade balance deficit 
Uneven development between regions 
Imbalance between economic growth and 
employment growth 
Inadequate social security system 
 
Source: author’s summary based on resources from Hu, 2007, pp. 26-32, Lin, 2003, 
pp. 223-231, Naughton, 2007, pp. 212-221 
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4.1 Poverty and Inequality 
 
The great achievement in development does not mean that the poverty-related threat 
of social instability confronting China could be neglected; in 2006 China published its 
“Resolution on Building a Harmonious Society” and started to allocate increasingly more 
public resources to support measures towards this goal. The first two principles of this 
resolution are coordinated development and social equity and justice (cf. State Council 
Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2006).  
The main reasons for this campaign might be: the income gaps among regions, 
sectors, and especially between urban and rural areas are widening despite rapid reduction 
in the number of people living under extreme poverty; and the common-used criterion in 
measuring poverty, i.e., the rate of poverty incidence, is not sufficient to reveal the true 
relation between social tension and poverty status (cf. Zhong, Liu, Miao, 2007, p. 2). 
China’s Premier Wen Jiabao said in 2010 that China has more than 40 million of 
population living in absolute poverty and 270 million of low-income population 
(Permanent Mission of China to the UN Office in Switzerland, 2010). 
 
Table 4.1 Key indicators of inequality and poverty in China 
 
 1988 1995 2002 
China as a whole 
Inequality of disposable household 
income per capita, Gini coefficient3
0.395 0.469 
 
0.468 
Including 
migrants, 
0.448 
Ratio of urban to rural disposable 
household income per capita 
2.69:1 3.08:1 
 
3.13:1 
Including 
migrants, 
2.77:1 
Contribution of urban-rural income gap to 
national income inequality (%) 
36.6 41.0 46.1 
Inequality in household wealth per capita, 
Gini coefficient 
n.a. n.a. 0.550 
                                                 
3 For the particulars of Gini coefficient, please refer to chapter 5.2.1, especially Figure 5.6. 
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Rural China 
Inequality in disposable household income 
per c
0.325 0.364 0.365 
apita, Gini coefficient 
Inequality in disposable household income 
per capita among the elderly, Gini 
coefficient 
0.248 0.326 0.302 
Inequality in household wealth per capita, 
Gini coefficient 
0.311 0.351 0.399 
Poverty rate (% poor) 
Lower poverty line n.a. 12.8 4.4 
Higher poverty line n.a. 28.6 12.3 
Urban China 
Inequality in disposable household income 
per capita, Gini coefficient 
0.244 0.339 
 
0.322 
Including 
migrants 
0.338 
Inequality of hourly wage earnings per 
work
n.a. 0.325 0.370 
er, Gini coefficient 
Fem ean income as a share of male 
ean income 
n.a. 0.81 0.76 ale m
m
Inequality in household wealth per c n.a. 0.475 apita, n.a. 
Gini coefficient  
Poverty rate (% poor) 
Lower poverty line n.a. 2.7 0.8 
Higher poverty line n.a. 8.0 2.2 
Higher poverty line, including migrants n.a. n.a. 4.4 
Poverty rate, migrants only (% poor) 
Lower poverty line n.a. n.a. 5.5 
Higher poverty line n.a. n.a. 14.4 
 
Source: Björn, Li, Terry , 2008, p. 19, Table 1.2. 
 the key indicators of inequality and poverty in China which are shown in 
 
According to
Table 4.1, inequality in China has been rising in the last two decades, in spite of the 
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booming economy as a whole in the Three key aspects will be discussed: 
co growth a loyment growth, and 
stem. 
lopment between regions 
 ur al gap ha e one of the biggest 
hina’s further development. It is also the most important institutional 
 productivity and social progress. The urban/rural gap can be 
oups: (1) income gap; (2) consumer spending gap; (3) public service 
of poorly educated people live in the rural , especially e rural 
areas of the western part of China. Th aps between urban and rural areas in 
r s, public  resourc dical 
m and postal services; (4) labour productivity gap: the 
proportion of agricultural labour productivity to national average labour productivity has 
dropped. The proportion of per capita income of peasants to per capita G  the 
rming eir total in as also d  (cf. 
apter discusses only the first two points. The point (3) and (4) will 
hi ouseholds ) 
same period. 
uneven development, imbalance between e
inadequate social security sy
nomic nd emp
 
4.1.1 Uneven deve
 
The regional inequality, especially the
challenges to C
ban/rur s becom
obstacle to improving
classified in four gr
gap: a large number areas  in th
ere are huge g
terms of the distribution of educational 
insurance coverage, teleco
esource  health es, me
DP and
proportion of peasants’ income from fa
Hu, 2007, p. 26). This ch
 to th come h eclined
be discussed in chapter 6.  
  
Table 4.2 Income and expenditure of C
 
nese h (yuan
Income and Expenditure                                                 1990 2000  2005  2006 
Annual per capita disposable income of urban 
households  
1510 6280 10493 11759
Annual per capita net income of rural househ    olds  686 2253 3255 3587
Annual per capita consumption expenditure of urban 
households   
1279 4998 7943 8697
Annual per capita living expenditure of rural 
585 1670 2555 2829
households  
Per capita balance of saving deposit                           623 5076 10787 12293
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007 CD-ROM, 2007, table 10-1. 
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We can read the income and consumer spending gaps between urban and rural 
Chinese households in Table 4.2. In 1990 the average income and consumption of urban 
households were both 2.2 times of that of rural households; however, in 2006 these ratios 
were 3.3 times and 3.1 times respectively. This means, in the period of 1990-2006, the 
income and consump useholds have widened 50 
percent and 41 percent respectively. 
tion gaps between urban and rural ho
The Table 4.3 shows us die income difference between sectors. The incomes in the 
manufacturing sector and the production and energy sector, in which the most export 
products are produced, are substantially better than that in the agricultural sector (approx. 
two times and three times respectively).   
 
Table 4.3 Average earning of employees in some selected sectors (yuan) 
 
Year Agriculture Manufacturing Production 
and 
energy 
Construction Scientific 
research 
Education
2003 6884 12671 18574 11328 20442 14189 
2004 7497 14251 21543 12578 23351 16085 
2005 8207 15934 24750 14112 27155 18259 
2006 9269 18225 28424 16164 31644 20918 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007 CD-ROM, 2007, table 5-20. 
gg gio
ds” (see Figure 4.2) The first world covers 
.2 perce f th al; 
n a ntin 1 cen
third world refers to lower middle income areas, with a population 
rth rld r
 poor areas in the middle and western parts of the country, with a population 
 2007, pp -27
 
Furthermore, China is one of the countries with the bi
world and it is known as “one China, four worl
est re nal disparities in the 
high-income areas and its population accounts for 2 nt o e national tot the 
second world covers middle-income areas with a populatio
the national total; the 
ccou g for 2 .8 per t of 
accounting for 26 percent of the national total; and the fou
areas, mainly
 wo efers to low income 
accounting for 50 percent of the national total (cf. Hu, . 26 ).  
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Figure 4.2 “One China, four worlds” – Regional disparities in China 
 
1st world; 2.20%
2nd world; 21.80%
4th world; 50%
3rd world; 26%
 
Source: author’s summary based on data from Hu, 2007, pp. 2
 
 
6-27. 
Table 4.4 Average yearly earning of employees in some selected regions, 2006 
 
Region Average  (yua Earning n) 
Beijing 39,684 
Shanghai 37,585 
Guangdong 26,400 
Sichuan 17,612 
Guangxi 17,571 
Hunan 17,400 
Gansu 16,991 
Shaanxi 16,646 
Heilongjiang 15,894 
Hubei 15,779 
Jiangxi 15,370 
 
Source: author’s summarisation, with data from China Statistical Yearbook 2007 CD-
ROM, 2007, table 5-20. 
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The average earnings in Beijing and Shanghai, two of the wealthiest regions in China, 
amount 2.6 and 2.5 times of that in Jiangxi, one of the poorest regions (Table 4.4). Large 
income gap exists not only between rural and urban areas, but also between big cities.  
 
Table 4.5 Poverty measures and poverty line in China, 1985-2005 (percentage) 
 
Year Poverty incidence Poverty depth Poverty severity Poverty line 
(yuan, adjusted 
by CPI4) 
1985 13.84 23.89 13.05 206 
1986 15.38 23.77 10.11 219 
1987 13.86 23.49 9.79 232 
1988 15.17 24.28 9.39 273 
1989 19.42 26.49 10.86 325 
1990 340 13.39 23.52 8.92 
1991 14.67 25.84 10.61 348 
1992 12.74 25.15 10.16 364 
1993 12.62 414 27.03 11.69 
1994 10.66 27.41 12.03 511 
1995 9.08 600 27.76 12.61 
1996 5.74 648 25.73 11.35 
1997 5.46 664 27.51 12.91 
1998 4.50  657 27.11 12.86
1999 4.46  648 26.49 12.23
2000 5.46   647 30.53 15.65
2001 5.36   652 31.72 17.36
2002 4.79  649 30.85 16.68
2003 5.04  660 32.71 18.32
2004 4.17   692 32.16 18.11
2005 4.01  707 38.16 24.94
 
Source: Zhong, Liu, Miao, 2007, Table 1. 
                                                 
Consumer price index (CPI) is an index that measures changes in the prices of goods and services purchased or 
otherwise acquired by households. It can be used to identify periods of economic inflation or deflation (cf. Turvey, 2004, 
p. 1; cf. Fontanills, 2005, p. 539). 
4 
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About half of the population is still in the low income group. The per capita national 
income shows that China has already reached the level of a well-off society, that is, the 
lower-middle income level in the world. But the distribution is extremely uneven (cf. Hu, 
2007, pp. 27).  
dence, 
poverty depth and poverty severity. Poverty incidence is the share of the population whose 
inco  e ty line, in other words, the share of the 
population that can not afford to buy the goods for basic necessities epth 
provides information regarding how far off households are from the poverty line. It is 
obtained by adding up all the shortf he poor (th
and dividing the total by the population. Poverty severity takes into account not only the 
distance separating the poor from the y line (the po  gap), but also the inequality 
among the poor (cf. World Bank, 2009b). The first index reflects the scale of poverty 
population, comp ith total population in a region. The other two indexes reveal the 
statu overty tion, in term verage level of poverty in relation to poverty 
line, and income distribution among the poverty population, respectively (cf. Zhong, Liu, 
Mia 7, p. 9)
 4.3 T f the poverty res  
For estimating poverty, three measures are most commonly used: poverty inci
me or consumption is b low the pover
of life. Poverty d
alls of t e non-poor has a shortfall of zero) 
 povert verty
ared w
s of p  popula s of a
o, 200 .  
 
Figure rends o  measu
 
 
 
Source: Zhong, Liu, Miao, 2007, p. 7, Figure 3. 
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Table 4.5 shows us the poverty measures and poverty line in China from 1985 to 
2005. Poverty incidence, poverty depth and poverty severity, the three most crucial and 
complementary indicators of poverty measures, are demonstrated. A government may 
choose poverty alleviation measures based on its preference. Poverty depth and poverty 
seve
argest population in the world, and also the largest working population. 
In 2005, the working-age population (15-64) of China was 926 million, 22.3 percent of the 
world total (World Bank, 2006b, table 2.1). China is the country with abundant labour, but 
also a country with the biggest employment pressures. In the 1990s, China’s economic 
growth pattern began to transit from high employment growth to low employment growth, 
with the per capita capital output assuming a downward trend (cf. Hu, 2007, p. 29).  
Unemployment has become a serious problem in China since the beginning of the 
economic reform and open door policy. From 1993 to 2003, an official count of 28.18 
million state enterprise workers were laid off (cf. Naughton, 2007, pp. 185-186). Table 4.6 
shows us the official data of employment in China in recent years. The number of 
registered unemployed persons in urban areas has been rising, one of the most important 
determinants was the migration of the labour force from rural areas to the urban areas 
which resulted in labour surplus in the cities (see also Figure 4.4).  
According to the statistics of Ministry of Labour and Social Security of China, total 
unemployment (the sum of unemployed and laid-off workers) peaked in 1997, and then 
stayed very high through 2002 with over 14 million people unemployed (cf. Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security, 2004, p. 478). Barry Naughton estimated in his book The 
Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth that the unemployment rate peaked at 8 percent 
rity will probably increase by adopting some policies aimed at reducing poverty 
incidence (cf. Zhong, Liu, Miao, 2007, p. 9). 
As shown in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.3, during 1985 to 2005 the poverty incidence 
declined from 13.84 percent to 4.01 percent; however, both poverty depth and poverty 
severity have increased, from 23.89 percent to 38.16 percent and from 13.05 percent to 
24.94 percent, respectively. It is very crucial to notice that while the scale of poverty 
reduced, the degree of poverty and poverty inequality aggravated, especially since 2000. 
Meanwhile, we notice that during 1990 to 1996, poverty incidence quickly dropped, and 
changed more slowly in the years after 1996 (cf. Zhong, Liu, Miao, 2007, pp. 6-7). 
 
4.1.2 Imbalance between economic growth and employment growth 
 
China has the l
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– 10
he end of 2004, according to labour yearbook 
by t
 percent in 1997, much higher than the 3 percent official unemployment rate calculated 
by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (cf. Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 
2004, p. 478), because the laid-off workers, who could obtain the transitional assistance 
and support from the Reemployment Centres for several years, were usually not ranked as 
unemployed officially. After 2002, China’s economic boom finally began to bring down 
the number of unemployed substantially. At t
he Ministry, there were still 10 million unemployed in urban China, including 8.3 
million registered unemployed and over 2 million laid-off workers (cf. Naughton, 2007, 
pp. 186-188). The trend of the registered unemployed workers and laid-off workers can be 
seen in Figure 4.4.  
 
Table 4.6 Employment in China 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
  Economically active  
  population (10,000 persons) 
75,360 76,075 76,823 77,877 78,244
  Total number of employed  
  persons   (10,000 persons) 
73,740 74,432 75,200 75,825 76,400
        Urban employed persons 24,780 25,639 26,476 27,331 28,310
        Rural employed persons 48,960 48,793 48,724 48,494 48,090
  Number of staff and workers      
  (10,000 persons) 
10,558 10,492 10,576 10,850 11,161
        State-owned units 6,924 6,621 6,438 6,232 6,170
        Urban collective-owned  
        units 
1,071 951 851 769 726
        Units of other types of  
        ownership 
2,563 2,920 3,287 3,849 4,264
  Number of registered  
  unemployed persons  in urban    770 800 827 839 847
  areas (10,000 persons) 
  Registered unemployment rate  
  in urban areas (%) 
4.0 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007 CD-ROM, 2007, table 5-1. 
 56
Figure 4.4 Laid-off and unemployed workers in China 1993 - 2004 
 
 
 
yment rate of C
Source: Naughton, 2007, p. 187, Figure 8.2. 
 
Table 4.7 Unemplo hina 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Level - registered (Millions) 6.9   8. .3  n.a . 7.7 0 8 8.4  . n.a n.a. 
Rate - registered in urban (%) 3.6  4.0  4.3 4.2 4.2 4.0 4.1 4.2 
EIU estimates (average in %) n.a. n.a. n.a. 9.9  9.0  9.5  9.2  9.2 
 
Source: Embassy of Switzerland, 2007, p. 14, Table Essential Economic Data; 
 13, Table Essential Economic Data.  Embassy of Switzerland, 2009, p.
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As shown in Table 4.7, according to the estimation of Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU), if we take the laid-off workers into account, the unemployment rate of China in 
recent years was in fact always close to 10 percent, more than doubled as the officially 
registered data. The global financial crisis brought challenges to global employment and 
also hurt China hard who has been facing serious employment difficulties since many 
years. China’s labour minister, Yin Weimin, said in September 2009 that although the 
number of jobs in the second quarter of 2009 had a modest increase, the unemployment 
situation remained “grave” (cf. Dyer, 2009; U.S.-China Commission, 2009, p. 39).  
As he met with the overseas delegates attending the 2010 annual meeting of China 
Development Forum in Peking, China’s Premier Wen Jiabao said that the 2 million 
unemployed citizens make the US government very upset, but China faces the 
unemployment pressure of 200 million (cf. Permanent Mission of China to the UN Office 
in Switzerland, 2010). According to the estimation of International Labour Organization 
(ILO), China has labour force of 812.7 million in 2010 (cf. International Labour 
Organization, 2010). Thus, China has in fact an unemployment rate of 24.6 percent. 
 
4.1.3 Inadequate social security system 
 
All the rapid demographic and institutional changes in China over the past 30 years 
come together to intensify the burden of social security. The combination of early 
retirement, generous pensions and increasing elderly dependency rates will create serious 
econ  establish a suitable 
social security system with sufficient coverage (cf. Naughton, 2007, p. 203).  
 routinely enjoyed social security financed by 
eir employers called work units. But as China has moved toward a market economy, the 
ntire social security system has been mo  e
nistered by govern t a es  th gr as  
cti ci r  n rk is parti ly rta  
s: 
1. Urban workers are accustomed to a pension system; social security must 
omic challenges for China in the coming years, if China fails to
Under the old system, urban employees
th
e ved out of the work unit’s control and shift d to a 
national social program admi men genci . But e pro ess h  been
very uneven. Creating an effe ve so al insu ance etwo cular impo nt in
China for the following reason
reach a minimum level to match expectations and ensure political stability. (Social 
insurance for rural workers will be discussed in chapter 7) 
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2. Due to the one-child family policy China will face population aging with 
unprecedented speed and at a low level of per capita income. After 2020 the share 
of the elderly population will grow very fast.  
3. The financial base of the traditional social security system – the state owned 
enterprises (SOE) and government employers – has been shrinking rapidly, and the 
growing sectors of the urban economy are often outside the scope of existing social 
security mechanisms.  
 
Table 4.8 Basic statistics on social security in China 
 
 1990 2000 2005 2006 
Number of employee joining basic pension insurance 
(10,000 persons) 
6,166 13,617 17,488 18,766
Number of employees joining basic endowment 
insurance (10,000 persons) 
5,201 10,447 13,120 14,131
Num er of retirees joining basic endowment insurance 
(10,000 per
965 3,170 4,368 4,635
b
sons) 
Num er of persons joining basic medical care system 
(10,
b
000 persons) 
n.a. 3,787 13,783 15,732
Number of employees joining unemployment 
insurance (10,000 persons) 
n.a. 10,408 10,648 11,187
Number of employees joining injury insurance 
(10,000 persons) 
n.a. 4,350 8,478 10,268
Number of persons joining maternity insurance 
(10,000 persons) 
n.a. 3,002 5,408 6,459
Revenue of social insurance fund (100 million yuan) 187 2,645 6,975 8,643
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007 CD-ROM, 2007, table 10-1. 
 
4. The downsizing of the SOE created a large number of relatively young 
retired people, and some state workers in their 50s must retire because there was no 
more work for them (cf. Naughton, 2007, pp. 202-203).  
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Curren
SOEs) 
population in the rural areas is not covered (cf. Naughton, 2007, p. 205).  
In Tab
the cha
(cf. Ch
joined basic pension insurance, 20.6 percent of them joined basic medical care system, 
14.6 percent of them were covered by unemployment insurance and 13.4 percent of them 
by i China Statistical Yearbook 2007 
D-ROM, 2007, table 5-1, table 10-1).  
 
f the West 
yments has shown a clear upward trend 
lion USD in 2006 or 9 percent of GDP. Because of the large
trols on outflows, China’s capital 
persistent surplus. The result is that China’s foreign exchange reserves 
.95 trillion in December 2008, the 
rld (cf. Woo, Xiao, 2007, p. 45; State Adm
ent of the U.S. Treasury Department, China 
 U.S. Treasury securities in Sep r 2008, holding as much 
ds 573 billion USD worth. This new status 
 owns nearly 1 USD out of every 10 in U.S. public
the World Bank, the U.S. current account deficit is financed largely by 
ents b jor o hi
ow one of the top 10 economies with the largest reserves holdings (see Table 4.9). 
Rese f. World Bank, 
2007, p. 187).  
Trade 
reserve
precaut f payments crises. Indeed, 
the globalization of financial transactions may have made countries with open capital 
accounts more vulnerable (cf. World Bank, 2007, p. 187). 
tly only urban residents (generally employees of government agencies or 
are offered public pension benefits and health insurance. The majority of the 
le 4.8 we can see the progress China made in social security system as well as 
llenges. The total number of employed persons in China in 2006 was 764 million 
ina Statistical Yearbook 2007 CD-ROM, 2007, table 5-1). 24.6 percent of them 
njury insurance (author’s calculation, with data from 
C
4.2 The Increasing Protectionism o
 
China’s current account in the balance of pa
since 1994, reaching 184 bil  
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and capital con
account is also in 
reached 1.07 trillion USD in December 2006 and 1
largest in the wo inistration of Foreign 
Exchange, 2008). According to an announcem
became the largest holder of tembe
as 585 billion USD, more than Japan, which hol
means, China now  debt (cf. Faiola, 
Goldfarb, 2008). 
According to 
China’s current account surplus and growing investm y ma  oil exp rters. C na is 
n
rves of China accounted for 18 percent of the world total in 2005 (c
surpluses allow many developing countries to accumulate large holdings of 
 assets over the past years. One of motives may be the desire to maintain larger 
ionary reserves to protect against financial and balance o
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Table 4.9 Top 10 economies with largest reserves 
 
 International reserves  
(USD billions) 
Economy 2004 2005 
Share of the 
world total 
2005  
( percent) 
Increase over Reserves 
2004  
( percent) 
2005 
(months of 
import 
coverage) 
Japan 844.7 846.9 18 0.3 16 
China 622.9 831.4 18 33.5 14 
Taiwan, China 247.7 260.3 6 5.1 14 
Korea 199.2 210.6 5 5.7 8 
United State 1 s 190.5 188.3 4 -1.2 
Russian 
Fede
126.3 182.3 4 44.4 11 
ration 
India 131.6 137.8 3 4.7 12 
Hongkong, China 123.6 124.3 3 0.6 4 
Singapore 112.2 115.8 3 3.2 5 
Germany 97.2 101.7 2 4.6 1 
 
Source: World Bank, 2007, p. 187, table 4f. 
 
Table 4.10 US trade with China: 2003 – 2007 (millions of USD) 
 
Year Exports Imports Balance 
2003  28,367.9 152,436.1 -124,068.2 
2004  34,744.1 196,682.0 -161,938.0 
2005  41,925.3 243,470.1 -201,544.8 
2006 55,185.7 287,774.4 -232,588.6 
2007 65,236.1 321,442.9 -256,206.7  
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008. 
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Table 4.10 shows us that both imports and exports of the US-China bilateral trade 
increased very fast between 2003 and 2007. The balance deficit of the US with China in 
2007 has more than d . 
 
 4.11 Europe on trad  China:  2007 f Eu
  
oubled than that in 2003  
 2003 –Table an Uni e with  (millions o ro) 
Year Imports Exports Balance 
2003 106 41,473 -64,748 ,221  
2004 128 48,376 -80,316 ,692  
2005 160 51,825 -108,502,327  
2006 194 63,784 -131,105,835  
2007 231 71,757 -159,759,516  
 
Source: European Commission, 2008. 
 Uni Chin o of the est traders e world. Tab  4.11 
he EU-Chin eral tr reased by 17 percent in 2007; and it has more 
led between and 20 e EU-China trade balance deficit in 2007 was 
almo t 2.5 times that of 2003.  
l trade surplus and the China-EU bilateral 
trade surplus caused great debate on China’s trading practices (deemed as unfair by the 
Wes  to take actions to 
intervene in the matter. In February 2007, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
reported to the World T r  ( ains d subsidies in China. 
This action was followed by two other WT ain  April 2007, one of 
them was challenging et es n p copyright-intensive 
industries, and the oth ch  w in  for protection and 
enforcement of copyrig d t . ion made continuously.  
Peter Mandelson, the ade io  v s of China’s trade 
policy “illogical”, “indefensible” and “unacceptable” and accused China of doing nothing 
to re Xiao, 2007, pp. 45-46). From the US side, on 
14th June 2007, Senators Max Baucus (Democrat from Montana), Charles E. Grassley 
(Republican from Iowa), Charles E. Schumer (Democrat from New York) and Lindsey 
Graham (Republican from South Carolina) introduced legislation to punish China if it did 
 
The European on and a are tw larg in th le
shows us, t a bilat ade inc
than doub 2003 07. Th
s
The constantly increasing China-US bilatera
t) and the undervaluation of the yuan. EU and US are trying
rade O ganization WTO) ag t prohibite
O cases ag st China in
 mark access r trictions o roducts of 
er was allenging eaknesses legal regime
hts an rademarks Similar act s have been 
EU tr  commiss ner, called arious aspect
in in rampant counterfeiting (cf. Woo, 
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not 
he gradually enlarged trade deficit may cause protectionism. Stanley Crossick, 
direc ctionist 
politicians in the West already pointed out that a large trade deficit is bad and China is 
taking jobs from Europ r 08)
Irwin pointed out that altho trad d fo nomy as whole, workers 
will be displaced from b s th ete a ports (cf. Irwin, 2003, p. 
100). Imports may des en h p bs in d States and European 
Union. 
In a survey conduc 1 , 63  
would have made a mistake by entering into the free trade agreement and free trade must 
be a er wages and rising unemployment rate (cf. 
Kletzer, 2002, p. 143).  
o flow to wherever costs are lowest – that is, to pursue 
abso
stop intervening in currency markets to keep the exchange value of the Chinese 
currency, the renminbi, low in order to favour its export sectors (cf. Woo, Xiao, 2007, p. 
47). 
T
tor and founding chairman of the European Policy Centre, said that the prote
e (cf. C ossick, 20 . 
ugh free e is goo r the eco
their jo s in sector at comp gainst im
troy pl ty of hig aying jo  the Unite
ted in 999 in US  percent of respondents said the United States
 bad idea, because it can lead to low
Daly argued that free capital mobility totally undermines Ricardo’s comparative 
advantage argument for free trade in goods, because that argument is explicitly and 
essentially based on capital being immobile between nations. Under the new globalization 
regime, capital tends simply t
lute advantage (cf. Daly, 2007, p. 205). 
High trade surplus subjected China’s foreign trade policy to greater international 
pressure. Many countries launched anti-dumping measures against China’s rapidly 
growing exports. Among all of the anti-dumping cases worldwide in 2006, 37 percent saw 
involvement of Chinese enterprises. Anti-dumping cases launched by European countries 
and the United States in 2006 affected 8,500 Chinese enterprises and 500,000 employees. 
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China is now very busy in dealing with 
these cases, said the Ex-Minister Bo Xilai (cf. Lan, 2007). 
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5. Assessment of the Situation 
 
In this chapter, the author starts out by discussing the affecting factors of China’s 
rapid
growth for nearly 30 
since reform and opening up to the outside 
econom
percent before reform (1952-1978) to 3.3-4.5 percent, with contribution to economic 
growth being 33-47 percent (cf. Hu, 2007, p. 16).  
GDP can be calculated from the expenditure side as the sum of private consumption, 
private investment, government expenditure and net exports (cf. Jones, 2001, p.639). 
Hence the expansion of output is the sum of the change in three components: consumption 
(both private and government), investment, and net exports of goods and services. All of 
these factors are playing a role in GDP growth.  
 
 economic growth and then identifies the problems in the development process and 
their causes.  The analysis of the major challenges China faces in development is the 
central subject of this thesis. Consequences and impacts of the achievements and 
challenges will also be assessed.  
 
5.1 Assessing the Achievements 
 
China entered the economic takeoff stage around 1980 and maintained high-speed 
years (cf. Hu, 2007, p. 15). What were the sources of China’s 
economic growth? Which factors determined and affected China’s economic growth 
significantly?  
Domestic and foreign studies showed that 
world, the key to higher economic growth might be the surge of total factor productivity 
(cf. Hu, 2007, pp. 15-16). Total factor productivity (TFP) is a variable which contributes to 
economic growth (the value may be negative, zero or positive), but which does not directly 
relate to unit inputs. Examples of TFP are economic policy, the role of government in the 
y, attitudes toward work, positive external effects resulting from having an 
educated work force, technological learning etc. (cf. Dietz, 2003, p. 120). According to the 
analysis by Hu Angang, an economics professor at Tsinghua University in Peking, there 
were four major sources of economic growth for China from 1978 to 1995: (1) high-speed 
growth of labour (2.6 percent); (2) high speed growth of capital stock (9.3 percent); (3) 
human capital calculated by the average years of education for employment populations 
above the age of 15 grew at an average annual rate of 2.2 percent; (4) TFP rose from -1.9 
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5.1.1 Investment 
 
Expanding investment has been a major and increasingly important driver of China’s 
growth. As shown in Figure 5.1, investment averaged 36 percent of GDP in the first decade 
of economic reform, which was relatively high by the standard of developing countries 
generally but not in comparison with China’s East Asian neighbours such as South Korea 
and Japan when their investment shares were at their highest. Since the beginning of 
1990s, China’s average investment rate has been even higher. In 1993 and again in 2004-
2007, inves above the experience of China’s 
East Asian neighbours in their high growth periods (cf. Bergsten, et al., 2008, p. 106; 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2007, p. 72). Rising 
tment exceeded 40 percent of GDP, a level 
investment has been financed by a rise in the national saving rate, which reached an 
unprecedented level of more than half of GDP in 2006. Rising investment was particularly 
important in 2001-2005, when on average it contributed over half of China’s economic 
growth (cf. Bergsten, et al., 2008, p. 106; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China 
Statistical Yearbook 2007, p. 75). 
 
Figure 5.1 Investment as percentage of GDP, 1978-2007 
 
 
 
Sources: Bergsten, et al., 2008, p. 107; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China 
Statistical Yearbook 2007. 
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The ec  is ital. New firms are born, 
new technologies are introduced and new products are produced. Investment together with 
expo
een fixed investment5, to which FDI made an increasing 
contribution, with 17.3 percent in 1994 and 10.6 percent in 2001 (cf. OECD, 2003, pp. 38-
49). or 10, 110, and 190 million 
USD respectively, while China’s total capital formation were 394, 1,150, and 3,440 million 
USD respectively. Thus the shares of the FDI in China’s total capital formation accounted 
for 2.5 percent, 9.6 percent and 5.5 percent respectively in these three years (author’s 
calculation, with data from China Statistical Yearbook 2007 CD-ROM, 2007, Table 2-2). 
Foreign direct investment per capita is a driving force in capital accumulation and per 
capita GDP growth. The output share of foreign-owned companies is positively correlated 
with per capita GDP and productivity growth, because FDI is the main source of more 
efficient production and management techniques from abroad, as well as a more extensive 
knowledge base. It also introduced competition into the Chinese economy and encouraged 
local enterprises to allocate available resources more efficiently (cf. Démurger, 2000, pp. 
35-36). Very recently China overtook Germany as the world’s top exporter (cf. New York 
Times, 2010).  
 
onomy restructured through the increased new cap
rts modernizes the economy through learning by doing processes. At the same time, 
labour productivity is raised. Capital accumulation and total factor productivity growth 
contribute about 4.5 percentage points to the GDP growth rate of about 10 percent in the 
early 2000s, with about 1 percentage point coming from employment growth. Rate of 
profits (or marginal capital productivity) has fallen from 16 percent in the 1990s to 13 
percent in 2004. Labour productivity in terms of GDP per worker has increased at an 
annual average of between 7 and 8 percent in the early 2000s (cf. Siebert, 2006a, pp. 273-
299). 
FDI played an important role in China’s GDP growth. During the 1990s China 
became by far the largest recipient of FDI among developing countries. In 1995-2001 
China absorbed about 290 billion USD FDI, more than the most OECD countries. By 
taking the large population of China into account, however, China’s FDI per capita was 
still smaller than that received by any OECD country. One of the main engines of GDP 
growth over the last 20 years has b
 In 1978, 2000 and 2006, the FDI in China accounted f
                                                 
ent in fixed capital, including tangible capital goods (machines and 
buildings) and the replacement of depreciated capital goods. 
5 Fixed investment is the investm
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5.1.2 Consumption (Private and Government) 
 
Both household and government consumption have grown rapidly in absolute terms 
throughout the reform period. But in most years, growth of consumption has lagged the 
growth of the economy. This lag has become particularly noticeable since 2000. Figure 5.2 
shows us that in the 1980s household consumption averaged slightly more than half of 
GDP, and in 1990s this share fell to an average of 46 percent. After 2000, household 
consumption as share of GDP fell sharply and by 2007 accounted for only 35 percent of 
GDP. This was the lowest share of any major economy in the world. In the United States, 
household consumption accounted for 70 percent of GDP in the same year. In the United 
Kingdom, it was 63 percent, and in India, 56 percent (cf. Bergsten, et al., 2008, pp. 107-
109). 
 
Figure 5.2 Household consumption as percentage of GDP, 1978-2007 
 
 
 
Sources: Bergsten, et al., 2008, p. 107; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China 
Statistical Yearbook 2007; IS Emerging Markets, CEIC Database. 
As shown in Figure 5.3, government consumption as a share of GDP has been 
relatively stable, averaging around 14 percent throughout the reform period. But it declined 
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from a peak out ercent in both 2006 and 
2007. 
 of ab  16 percent of GDP in 2001 to under 14 p
As a result of these trends in household and government consumption, the weight of 
consumption as a source of growth during the past two decades dropped substantially, 
particularly compared with that of investment. In the early 1990s, consumption growth 
accounted for about four-fifths of China’s economic expansion, however since 2003, this 
share has fallen to less than two-fifths (cf. Bergsten, et al., 2008, p. 106).  
 
Figure 5.3 Government consumption as percentage of GDP, 1978-2007 
 
 
 
Sources: Bergsten, et al., 2008, p. 108; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China 
Statistical Yearbook 2007; IS Emerging Markets, CEIC Database. 
 
5.1.3 Export-led Growth 
ism, which has been 
mentioned in chapter 2:  
 
GDP growth of a country can be achieved by increasing foreign demand, i.e. growth 
of the exports. Let’s recall the external employment mechan
 
( )21* bb
XQ =      (2-43) e +π
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The volume of employment and output ( *eQ ) depends not only on the size, but also 
on the structure of exports. Exporters of labour-intensive industrial goods and services 
enjo
 the supply side, 
and the required ‘product mix’ on the side of demand. Each trading area exports these 
com in which it is 
structurally deficient … the actual output and employment of individual regions or 
countries and their rate of growth over time, will be limited by their exports and by the 
imports which can be paid for by those exports. In normal circumstances therefore any 
difference between the desired ‘product mix’ on the demand side, and the attainable 
‘product mix’ on the supply side will give rise to a situation, in which exports are the main 
determining factor in the level of output and effective demand” (Kaldor, 1983, pp. 93-94). 
Exports represent an important stimulus to the Chinese economy. As shown in Table 
5.1, China’s real exports to the world increased by 500 percent between 1992 and 2005, 
from 84.94 billion to 525.48 billion USD. Its share of exports to the US increased from 10 
percent to 21 percent over the sample period. As a result, in 2004, China overtook Japan as 
the world’s third largest exporter, just behind Germany and the United States (cf. Amiti, 
Freund, 2008, pp. 2-4).  
 
able 5.1 China’s total exports 
 
y high levels of employment (cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 191). Most of the exports from China 
are concentrated on the labour-intensive industrial sectors.  
Kaldor pointed out that: “… in relation to a particular trading area such as an 
individual country, or a particular region within the country, it is the function of external 
trade to eliminate the discrepancy between the attainable ‘product mix’ on
modities of which it produces a structural surplus and imports those 
T
Year 1992 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 
Total Exports                           
(billion USD
84.94 136.50 160.34 163.81 211.19 334.53 525.49
) 
Total Processing Exports        
(bill
39.92 67.92 87.59 93.23 117.04 184.56 287.24
ion USD) 
Share of Processing Exports 47% 50% 55% 57% 55% 55% 55% 
 
Source: Amiti, Freund, 2008, p. 18.  
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Table 5.1 also shows us that the share  processing trade was more and more 
important in the total exports. Processing trade refers to the business activity of importing 
all or part of the raw materials, parts and components, accessories, and packaging materials 
from abroad in bond, and re-exporting the finished product
 of
s after processing or assembly 
by e
 
appl
t in 1992 to 55 percent in 2005. With great share of processing 
trade in its exports, China is trade giant without global brands.  
miti, Freund (2008), in spite of the change of the 
articular goods, the labour intensity of China’s exports remains unchanged once we 
nt for the processing trad h s,  is uin ec in  
m h n e m
atterns are consistent with traditional trade theories by David Ricardo, who 
o  at a f
f po  go d s h om  th  
me, a major source of economic growth. As shown in Figure 5.4, net exports of goods 
and compared to 2004 to reach 125 billion USD and 
accounted for 5.4 percent of GDP. Exports expanded rapidly and reached 305 billion USD 
in 2007 which accounted for 8.9 percent of GDP. On average, in 2005-2007 the expansion 
nterprises within the producing country. Processing trade includes processing with 
supplied materials and processing with imported materials. Under processing with supplied 
materials, the foreign party which supplies materials and parts is also responsible for 
selling the finished products. The producing enterprise does not have to make foreign 
exchange payment for the imports and only charges the foreign party a processing fee. 
Under processing with imported materials, the producing enterprise makes foreign 
exchange payment for the imported materials and parts, and exports the finished products 
after processing (cf. HKTDC Research Department, 2004, p. 2.8). 
From 1992 to 2007 China’s export structure has transformed dramatically. There has 
been a significant decline in the share of agriculture and soft manufactures, such as textiles 
and clothes, with growing shares in hard manufactures, such as consumer electronics,
iances, and computers. However, a large component of this export growth in 
machinery has been mainly due to growth in processing trade – the practice of assembling 
duty free intermediate inputs. These inputs are generally of high skill content, originating 
in countries such as the United States and Japan (cf. Amiti, Freund, 2008, p. 2). As shown 
in Table 5.1, the processing trade accounts for an increasingly large share of China’s 
exports, from 47 percen
According to the analysis of A
p
accou e. In ot er word  China contin g to sp ialize labour
intensive goods. Further, exp
goods. These p
orts re ained ighly co centrat d in a s all fraction of 
argued the logic of specializat
p. 136). 
ion acc rding to compar ive adv ntage (c . Ricardo, 1951, 
Since 2005 the growth o net ex rts of ods an service as bec e, for e first
ti
services in 2005 more than doubled 
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of net exports accounted for over a fifth of China’s growth (cf. Bergsten, et al., 2008, p. 
108; National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2007, p. 75). The net exports (or balance of 
trade) are the difference between the monetary value of exports and imports in an economy 
over a certain period of time. It is the relationship between a nation’s imports and exports 
(cf. O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, 2003, p. 462).  
 
Figure 5.4 Net exports of goods and services, 1992-2007 
 
 
 
Sources: Bergsten, et al., 2008, p.109; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China 
Stati
nt to GDP expansion had fallen to about 40 percent, substantially less than the 
extra
stical Yearbook 2007. 
 
In sum, although the government decided in 2004 to increase the role of domestic 
consumption demand in sustaining economic growth, consumption as a share of GDP has 
continued to fall and its contribution to China’s economic growth has been modest. A 
slight moderation of the growth of investment has been made. Till 2007 the contribution of 
investme
ordinarily high average of 60 percent in 2003 and 2004. On the other hand, net 
exports of goods and services have been raised both absolutely and as a share of GDP, and 
thus their contribution to economic growth is now unusually large (cf. Bergsten, et al., 
2008, p. 109). 
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Note economic growth mainly driven by foreign trade makes China’s economic 
development unbalanced. The trend of GDP growth shows that contributions by 
investment and consumption are decreasing, while contributions by net exports are 
increasing (see Figure 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4). 
 
5.2 Assessing the Challenges 
s mentioned above, the main challenges in China’s development are inequality of 
development and the increasing tendency of the protectionism of the West.  
 
5.2.1 Inequality of the Income Distribution 
 
As shown in chapter 4, the major internal challenge for China’s development is the 
poverty and inequality, including uneven development, unemployment and inadequate 
social security system. 
 
Income Growth of the Poverty Population Slowed Down since the 1990s 
 
The relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction is not so simple. 
Actually it is not the speed of economic growth but the quality of economic growth, in 
other words, the economic development that is most important. The economic 
deve
ng role in social development, too rapid economic growth will 
produce damaging effects. Since the 1990s, China’s economy has been increasing very 
rapid
an the growth rate of per capita income and per capita expenditure of both 
rural and urban residents. The growth rate of per capita income and per capita expenditure 
 
A
lopment of many developing countries demonstrates that although economic growth 
plays an important supporti
ly, but the quality of its economic development is declining and the income allocation 
is uneven, which results in a decreased proportion of benefits obtained by the poverty 
population. Hence, the achievement of poverty reduction in China is virtually limited, 
though its growth rate of GDP has created the highest record in history (cf. Hu, 2007, p. 
111). That is to say, the poor population has not directly benefited from the high growth 
rate of the economy.  
The growth of per capita income and consumption lags far behind the growth of GDP 
per capita (see Figure 5.5). In the period 1990-2006, the growth rate of per capita GDP was 
much higher th
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of u
GDP was much higher than that of agriculture 
alue (see Table 5.2). That was the reason why the share of the farming income in total 
national inc
rban residents was higher than those of the rural residents, which demonstrates that the 
urban residents have benefited more from the economic growth than the rural residents.  
The proportion of agricultural production value in GDP has been decreasing 
continuously, because the growth rate of the 
v
ome has been declining.  
 
Figure 5.5 Annual per capita GDP, urban and rural income and consumption level per 
capita 
 
 
 
Source: summarised by the author, with data from China Statistical Yearbook 2007 
CD-ROM, 2007, table 10-1, table 3-1. 
 
The proportion of agriculture in GDP was 42.3 percent in 1980 and has decreased to 
20.1 percent in 2006, declining 22.2 percentage points (see Table 5.2). Further, the ratio of 
agricultural labour productivity to national average labour productivity has declined, the 
ratio of farmers’ income per capita to GDP per capita has declined, and the proportion of 
farmers’ agricultural income in their total income has decreased. The ratio between 
farmers’ income per capita and GDP has also been dropping continuously. Generally 
speaking, agriculture is still the main income source of farmers who represent 
approximately 65 percentage of the total population in China (author’s calculation, with 
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data from United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2004, p. 36), but 
the gap between per capita GDP and farmers’ per capita net income and per capita real 
cons
re value in GDP (100 million yuan) 
umption level produces obviously a large negative impact on the increase of 
purchasing power (see Figure 5.5; cf. Hu, 2007, pp. 115-116).  
 
Table 5.2 Proportion of agricultu
 
Year GDP Agriculture Proportion of agriculture 
value in GDP 
1980 4,545.6 1,922.6 42.3% 
1990 18,667.8 7,662.1 41.0% 
2000 99,214.6 24,915.8 25.1% 
2006 210,871.0 42,424.4 20.1% 
 
Source: summarised by the author, with data from China Statistical Yearbook 2007 
CD-ROM, 2007, table 3-1, table 13-6.  
 
Table 5.3 Number of employed persons at year-end in urban and rural areas (10,000 
persons) 
 
 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007 CD-ROM, 2007, table 5-2.  
 
The employment opportunities in rural areas are declining. Since the 1990s, the 
opportunities for employment created in urban areas are far more than those in rural areas 
(cf. Hu, 2007, p. 116). As shown in Table 5.3, in the period 1990-2000, the growth rate of 
urban employment was 35.9 percent, while the growth rate of rural employment was 2.6 
percent; from 2000 to 2006, the growth rate of employment was 22.3 percent in urban 
areas and -1.7 percent in rural areas; and in the whole period 1990-2006, the growth rate of 
Year Total Urban Areas Rural Areas 
1990 64,749 17,041 47,708 
2000 72,085 23,151 48,934 
2005 75,825 27,331 48,494 
2006 76,400 28,310 48,090 
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urban employment was 66.1 percent, while the growth rate of rural employment was only 
0.8 percent. Notice that the number of employed persons in rural areas decreased by a large 
margin, decreasing by 8.44 million just in period 2000 – 2006 (see Table 5.3).  
Because large quantities of employees in the cities had been laid off or lost their jobs 
since the opening and economic reform, there was a limit for rural labour to enter into 
citie er, and the 
remitting income flowing from cities to rural areas declined (cf. Hu, 2007, pp. 116-117). 
Along with ogress of izatio s from the 
rural areas to the urban areas built up more re of employmen ition in the 
cities.  
 
Table 5.4 Composition of gross domestic product  
s. Consequently, the pressure of employment competition became larg
the pr  urban n, the rising 
 pressu
amount of migrant worker
t compet
 
Year Primary 
Industry 
Secondary 
Industry 
Tertiary GDP 
Industry 
1980 30.2 48.2 21.6 100.0 
1990 27.1 41.3 31.6 100.0 
2000 15.1 45.9 39.0 100.0 
2005 12.5 47.5 40.0 100.0 
2006 11.7 48.9 39.4 100.0 
 
Source: China S al Yea 007 CD  2007, ta
 
Further, a great decrease in es of a ral prod ased the loss of 
exchange volume of agricultural products and impeded the reali  income increase 
f the rural population. The broad masses of Chinese farmers have been the most serious 
victi onomy directly 
influences the farmers’ income. Based on the price in 1996, the accumulated decrease rate 
of th
tatistic rbook 2 -ROM, ble 3-2. 
the pric gricultu ucts incre
zation of
o
ms of deflation, because the price fluctuation in the macro-ec
e purchase price level of national agricultural products was 25.6 percent by 2000. In 
the period 1997-2000, the trade volume of national agricultural products suffered a total 
loss of 301.3 billion yuan because of the price decrease (cf. Hu, 2007, pp. 116-118). As 
shown in Table 5.4, the primary industry (i.e. agriculture) share of GDP fell from 30.2 
percent in 1980 to 11.7 percent in 2006. Note primary industry in China only refers to 
agriculture, including forestry, animal husbandry and fishery and services in support of 
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these industries. All mining and quarrying industries belong to secondary industry (cf. 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2003, p. 87). 
 
Inequality in Distribution Continues Increasing  
 
Since 1985, the degree of inequality between urban areas and rural areas, among 
different regions, and even within urban areas has intensified, which produces a great 
negative impact on the welfare of the poverty population and the private consumption. 
Great gaps exist between urban residents and rural residents usually in terms of per capita 
income, per capita consumption, revenue, transfer payments6 and public services (cf. Hu, 
2007, pp. 118-119).  
Table 5.5 Income and transferred income  
(1990-2006) 
 
 
 per capita of urban and rural households
Urban Households Rural Households  
 
Year 
Per capita 
total annual 
income 
(yuan) 
Per capita 
transfer 
income 
(yuan) 
Transfer 
inco tal me / to
inc er ome p
capita (%) 
Per capita 
total annual 
income 
(yuan) 
Per capita 
tran
Transfer 
sfer 
income
income / total 
 (yuan) income per 
capita (%) 
1990 1516.21 328.41 21.7 990.38 n.a. n.a. 
1995 .77 2.8  4279.02 725.76 17.0 2337.87 65
2000 6295.91 1440.78 22.9 3146.21 147.59 4.7 
2005   11320.77 2650.70 23.4 4631.21 203.81 4.4
2006 12719.19 2898.66 22.8 5025.08 239.82 4.8 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007 CD-ROM, 2007, table 10-5, 10-18. 
 
Figure 5.5 demonstrates the proportion between per capita disposable income and per 
capita consumption in urban areas and that in rural areas, from which we can see the great 
gap between urban areas and rural areas. As mentioned in chapter 4, in 1990 the average 
                                                 
6 Transfer payments are payments made by the government for the purpose of redistribution of income in the market 
system. Examples of transfer payments include welfare payment (financial aid), social security, and government 
subsidies for certain businesses. Transfers may be classified into three major types: transfers between rich and poor; 
transfer over time (as with the provision of pensions); and transfers to meet contingencies such as sickness or 
unemployment (cf. Hockley, 1979, p.109; cf. McConnell, Brue, 2004, p. 83). 
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income and consumption of urban households were both 2.2 times of that of rural 
households; however, in 2006 these ratios have increased to 3.3 times and 3.1 times, 50 
percent and 41 percent higher than that in 1990, respectively.  
n system have sharpened income 
inequality between the urban population and the rural population. The ratio of per capita 
inco
bsidies (cf. Hu, 2007, p. 119). As shown in Table 5.5, the per capita 
trans erred income in rural areas is far below the level than that in urban areas. Further, the 
prop
e urban households.  
One of the most important poverty indices is the Engel coefficient, which refers to the 
percentage of expenditure on food in the total consumption expenditure, using the 
fo win
Engel Coefficien
The high inequality effects of the fiscal distributio
me of urban households to that of rural households was 1:0.65 in 1990, 1:0.50 in 2000 
and 1:0.40 in 2006. And rural residents’ total income, the proportion of transfer payments 
acquired from the country and the collective is far lower than that of urban residents (see 
Table 5.5). Moreover, rural residents have to pay tax that is more than fiscal transferred 
income. However, urban households can obtain various types of fiscal allowances and 
profit from the net su
f
ortion of transferred income in total income of the rural households is also much less 
than that of th
llo g formula: 
 
t = %10×∑C
C food 0   01
C  exp  on food
            (5- ) 
 
where food  is the enditure , and ∑C t h nsumpti enditure. A
e increases, the n devoted to food (Engel Coefficient) will decline. Th
is  Ca me Ela  (cf. Spi uizamón rdon, 200
 T ow r capit al incom gel coef om 1978 
006. 
l family 
income spent on food of the urban households, declined from 57.5 percent in 1978 to 35.8 
perc
families. This implies an inequality of income distribution between urban and rural 
e total co on exp s 
incom proportio is 
effect  also called lorie-Inco sticity cker, Leg  and Go 7, 
P. 64). able 5.6 sh s us the pe a annu e and En ficient fr to 
2
As shown in Table 5.6, the urban Engel coefficient, i.e. the proportion of tota
ent in 2006, while the proportion of total family income spent on food of the rural 
households declined from 67.7 percent in 1978 to 43.0 percent in 2006. Rural families still 
have to spend a considerably more proportion of total income on food than the urban 
households.  
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Table 5.6 Per capita annual income and Engel coefficient of urban and rural 
households 
 
Per capita annual 
disposable income of 
urban households 
Per capita annual net 
income of rural 
households 
 
 
Year 
Value 
(yuan) 
Index Value 
(yuan) 
Index 
Engel 
coefficient 
of urban 
households 
(%) 
Engel 
coefficient 
of rural 
households 
(%) 
1978 343.4 100.0 133.6 100.0 57.5 67.7
1980 477.6 127.0 191.3 139.0 56.9 61.8
1985 739.1 160.4 397.6 268.9 53.3 57.8
1990 1510.2 198.1 686.3 311.2 54.2 58.8
1991 1700.6 212.4 708.6 317.4 53.8 57.6
1992 2026.6 232.9 784.0 336.2 53.0 57.6
1993 2577.4 255.1 921.6 346.9 50.3 58.1
1994 3496.2 276.8 1221.0 364.3 50.0 58.9
1995 4283.0 290.3 1577.7 383.6 50.1 58.6
1996 4838.9 301.6 1926.1 418.1 48.8 56.3
1997 51 2090.1 437.3 5.160.3 311.9 46.6 5
1998 5425.1 329.9 2162.0 456.1 44.7 53.4
1999 5854.0 360.6 2210.3 473.5 42.1 52.6
2000 6280.0 383.7 225 483.4 39.4 49.13.4
2001 6859.6 416.3 2366.4 503.7 38.2 47.7
2002 7702.8 472.1 2475.6 527.9 37.7 46.2
2003 8472.2 514.6 2622.2 550.6 37.1 45.6
2004 9421.6 554.2 2936.4 588.0 37.7 47.2
2005 10493.0 607.4 3254.9 624.5 36.7 45.5
2006 11759.5 670.7 3587.0 670.7 35.8 43.0
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007 CD-ROM, 2007, table 10-2 
 
Gini Coefficient is another index of inequality used to measure the distribution of 
income or land holdings, where perfect equality is 0 and perfect inequality, i.e., one person 
has everything and the others have nothing, is 1. The higher the Gini, the higher the 
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inco
Figure 5
 
me inequality; the lower the Gini, the lower the income inequality (cf. Nafziger, 2006, 
p. 745).   
 
.6 Definition of Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient 
 
Source: McConnell, Brue, 2004, p. 388, figure 21.1. 
 
re 5.7 I equal ural and urban areas and nationally Figu ncome in ity in r
 
 
 
Source: Ravallion, Chen, 2004. p. 51, figure 7. 
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Table 5.7 Gini indices of income inequality in China 
 
National  
 
Year 
  
 
Rural 
 
Urban 
Without With 
adjustment for adjustment for 
COL7 COL difference 
difference 
1981 24.73 18.46 30.95 27.98 
1982 24.40 16.27 28.53 25.91 
1983 25.73 16.59 28.28 26.02 
1984 26.69 17.79 29.11 26.89 
1985 26.80 17.06 28.95 26.45 
1986 28.48 20.66 32.41 29.20 
1987 28.53 20.20 32.38 28.90 
1988 29.71 21.08 33.01 29.50 
1989 30.96 24.21 35.15 31.78 
1990 29.87 23.42 34.85 31.55 
1991 31.32 23.21 37.06 33.10 
1992 32.03 24.18 39.01 34.24 
1993 33.70 27.18 41.95 36.74 
1994 34.00 29.22 43.31 37.60 
1995 33.98 28.27 41.50 36.53 
1996 32.98 28.52 39.75 35.05 
1997 33.12 29.35 39.78 35.00 
1998 33.07 29.94 40.33 35.37 
1999 33.91 29.71 41.61 36.37 
2000 35.75 31.86 43.82 38.49 
2001 36.48 32.32 44.73 39.45 
 
Source: Ravallion, Chen, 2004, p. 43, table 9.  
 
orenz curve is a graph used to show the degree of income inequality. The area 
betw  and the Lorenz curve represents the 
       
L
een the diagonal (the line of perfect equality)
                                          
7 Cost of living is the cost of maintaining a certain standard of living. 
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degr  5.6, this inequality is 
measured numerically by the Gini coefficient – Area A divided by area A + B (cf. 
McConnell, Brue, 2004, p. 388). 
In China, both rural and urban inequality showed a trend increase (see Table 5 he 
rise in inequality is even ronounced se a ur  
absolute differences in incomes rather than proportional differences. Figure 5.7 gives the 
absolute Gini index, in which absolute differences are n y the 1990 national 
mean (c allion, Chen  pp. 16-17).
Inequality of incom bution with l regions i enlarging since the 
reform. ding to the tion of Ad Sunding, th  coefficient al 
residents’ income in 1978 was 0.22 (cf. Ade unding, 19 444-461). H r, 
in 2001 eased to 0. ch was 14  more than that in 1978, the beginning 
year of China’s reform. According to Nati ureau of St  of China, ni 
coefficient within rural households was 0.3692 in 2004, up by 0.0012 over the previous 
year, which was lower than the increment of  in 2003 (N  Bureau of Statistics 
of Chin 5). In 200 China’s nat ini coeffic as 0.472 (c n 
Develop Bank, 2007 ), which showed the increasing trend again. 
The preceding analys s that high economic growth annot auto
solve the problems of inc equality. Th s brought b mic growth e 
open-door policy cannot be automatically s y all the pe nequality c y 
the eco growth rest he people’s  
distribution policy of the government plays an essential role in income distribution and 
living standard improvem referential 
to east co reas, but not beneficial to th ent of d areas. O
econom aintain stortion be avoided, 
full exploitation and utilization of human capita
from economic growth as well as income in
124).  
 
m of the West 
 
ee of inequality in the income distribution. As shown in Figure
.7). T
e, based on themore p  if we u n absolute meas
ormalized b
f. Rav , 2004,   
e distri in rura s also 
 Accor  estima elman, e Gini  of rur
lman, S 88, pp. oweve
 it incr 36, whi percent
onal B atistics the Gi
 0.0034 ational
a, 200 4 the ional G ient w f. Asia
ment , p. 119
is show alone c matically 
ome in e fruit y econo  and th
hared b ople. I aused b
nomic ricted t  opportunity to share the fruits of growth. The
ent for all people. Till today, economic policies are p
astal a e developm  inlan nly if 
ic growth with high quality is m ed, can investment di
l be realized, and can all people benefit 
equality be prevented (cf. Hu, 2007, pp. 122-
5.2.2 The Increasing Tendency of Protectionis
 
An allegation is well known that the bilateral US-China and EU-China trade deficit 
represents the export of unemployment from China to the United States and Europe.  
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Table 5.8 US-China trade and job displacement 
 
U.S.-China trade (in billions of dollars) 
 1997 2001 2006 1997-
2001 
2001-
2006 
Percentage 
change 
U.S. domestic exports8 12.5 18.0 51.6 5.4 33.7 520% 
U.S. imports 62.0 102.1 287.1 40.1 185.0 362% 
U.S. trade balance -49.5 -84.1 -235.4 -34.6 -151.3 337% 
Average annual increase in the 
trade deficit 
 -9 -30 250% 
 
U.S. trade-related jobs supported and displaced (in thousands of jobs) 
 1997 2001 2006 1997-
2001 
2001-
2006 
Percentage 
change 
U.S. domestic exports 138.3 189.3 526.3 50.9 337.0 562% 
U.S. imports-jobs displaced 735.6 1,189.6 3,289.7 454.0 2,100.0 363% 
U.S. trade balance-net job lost 597.3 1,000.4 2,763.4 403.1 1,763.0 337% 
Average annual job 
displacement 
 101 353 250% 
 
Source: Scott, 2007, table 1. 
 
A recent study of the Economic Policy Institute by Robert Scott (2007) showed that 
the US-China bilateral trade deficit of 49.5 billion USD in 1997 caused the loss of 597,300 
jobs and the bilateral trade deficit of 235.4 billion USD in 2006 caused the loss of 
2,763,400 jobs in the US. Every state suffered a net loss of jobs from the rise in the 
bilateral trade deficit during 1997-2006 (see Table 5.8). The result of the analysis also 
implied that in 2006 the unemployment rate was 1.21 percent higher than if the bilateral 
trade balance had been zero. China entered into the WTO in 2001. As shown in Table 5.8, 
between 19  20 ; between 
2001 and 2006, the deficit increased 30 billion USD per year on average. Growth in trade 
                                                
97 and 01, the deficit increased 9 billion USD per year on average
 
8 Domestic exports are goods produced in the United States. Re-exports goods, goods produced in other countries and 
shipped through the United States are not included. 
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defic roduced in the United States and has 
led to job displacement in all states (cf. Scott, 2007, pp. 1-5).  
 
Reason for the Trade Defic
 
nalysis by ey ick, tor foun hai  the 
cy Centre, it is natu r a e co nom . E US) 
 a low-cost e t e y (like China); but si e and 
 in areas where Europe and US are generally uncompetitive (e.g. clothing 
and shoes), restrictions on Chinese imports would simply be replaced by imports 
f
• about 60 percent l s f hin c es 
substantially owned by foreign companies. 
d value a  t a i ly im
u ur d US comp
prices of c modities and intermediate products benefit consumers 
ducers in the West. 
• China’s purchase of US debt benefits the US economy and enhance its 
sick, 2008). 
 short, the deficit occurs and keeps growing because on one side clearly, the 
cons
rate that encourages exports and consequently a large bilateral surplus with the United 
States. In order to maintain this policy, China purchased about 200 billion USD in U.S. 
n 
its with China has reduced demand for goods p
it 
According to the a  Stanl Cross  direc  and ding c rman of
European Poli ral fo develop d high- st eco y (e.g U and 
to run a deficit with fficien conom ze of th  deficit 
the rising trend cause concern. W
•
e should note the following facts: 
rom other Asian countries. 
 of al export rom C a are ompani wholly or 
• the adde ccruing o Chin s usual very l ited (probably to the 
order of 20 percent). 
• a high profit accr es to E opean an anies. 
• lower 
and pro
om
purchasing power (cf. Cros
In
umer purchasing power in China is low, so that China needs to sell its products 
abroad, on the other side however, different interest groups in the United States and Europe 
are willing to make deficit happen in order to benefit from it.  
 
Debates on China’s Exchange Rate Policy 
 
According to the analysis by Scott, the mean reasons of the US-China deficit are 
China’s manipulation of the exchange rate and China’s subsidy on exports production. As 
a matter of policy, China tightly manipulates its currency’s value to that of the dollar at a 
Treasury Bills and other securities in 2006 alone. This intervention makes the yua
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artificially cheap and provides an effective subsidy on Chinese exports; according to 
estimations the rate of this effective subsidy is roughly 40 percent (cf. Scott, 2007, p. 1). 
he Nobel Prize winner in Economics Paul Krugman made a similar interpretation in 
his a k Times on 2nd April 2009. He pointed out, if 
China had had a floating exchange rate like e.g. Canada, the value of its currency would 
have
a). Krugman and also 
many other 
in the U
Krugm dollar to help reduce its trade deficit, but this goal can 
not be achie
a weak  the US (cf. Krugman, 2009b).  
Howev
different opinion. In his article No Time for a Trade War he pointed out, China’s Exchange 
Rate is not  the US. Saudi Arabia 
has a multil
billion  GDP, Saudi Arabia’s current-account surplus, at 11.5 
percent of 
surplus  for Japan and Germany; as a percentage of 
GDP
litz, 2010). Even if China 
strengthened its yuan relative to the dollar and eliminated its entire trade surplus with the 
Unit slated into a reduction in the American 
multilateral trade deficit, the United States would simply buy fewer textiles from China 
and 
T
rticle “China’s Dollar Trap” in New Yor
 risen, which would have slowed the growth of China’s exports. But China tried to 
keep the value of the yuan in terms of the dollar more or less fixed. For this purpose it had 
to buy up dollars as they came flooding in. As a result, trade surpluses just kept growing – 
and so did China’s reserve of foreign assets (cf. Krugman, 2009
economists believe that China’s asset-buying helped inflate the housing bubble 
S, setting the stage for the global financial crisis to some extent. In the view of 
an, America needs a weaker 
ved until the value of China’s currency reaches a reasonable level. By pursuing 
-currency policy, China is hurting growth of
er, another Nobel Prize winner in Economics, Joseph Stiglitz, has totally 
the major driver behind the huge trade balance deficit of
ateral merchandise surplus of $212 billion in 2008 in excess of China’s $175 
surplus; as a percentage of
GDP, is more than twice that of China. Moreover, China’s current-account 
 is actually less than the combined figure
, it is 5 percent, compared to Germany’s 5.2 percent. Many factors other than 
exchange rates affect a country’s trade balance. The key determinant, according to Joseph 
Stiglitz, is national savings. America’s multilateral trade deficit will not be significantly 
narrowed until America saves significantly more (cf. Stig
ed States, and even if that immediately tran
more from Bangladesh, Cambodia and other developing countries. There would be no 
significant change in America’s multilateral trade deficit at all. Meanwhile, because a 
stronger yuan would make imported American agricultural products cheaper than that in 
China, the poorest Chinese – the farmers – would see their incomes fall as domestic prices 
for agriculture dropped down substantially. China might be forced to counter the 
depressing effect of America’s huge agricultural subsidies by diverting money badly 
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needed for industrial development into subsidies for its farmers. China’s growth might 
accordingly be slowed, which would slow growth globally (cf. Stiglitz, 2006). 
The US urged Beijing to revalue the renminbi against the dollar. In fact, the Chinese 
currency has appreciated 16 percent in the period of 2005-2008 against the US dollar. 
However, during this same period, the renminbi has weakened some 10 percent against the 
euro, which is damaging to European competitiveness. However, the problem is the weak 
dollar and not the strong renminbi, according to Stanley Crossick. Clearly, the European 
and American workers who lose their jobs due to loss of competitiveness will not be 
comforted by being told that their country overall benefits from importing low price 
merchandise (cf. Crossick, 2008). 
 
Figure 5.8 US imports from China, by use (percent of total) 
 
 
 
Source: Evenett, Francois, 2010, Figure 1. 
 
As he served as the European Commissioner for Trade, Peter Mandelson said in 2007, 
that revaluation of the yuan would benefit the Chinese economy. Mandelson already noted 
the fact that China’s interest clearly lies in a gradual revaluation that takes some of the 
excess heat out of the export sector and strengthens consumer purchasing power. 
Meanwhile, Mandelson implicitly accepted that the EU trade imbalance with China was a 
complex phenomenon and the exchange rate would make little difference since the deficit 
reflects rather the refocusing of European supply chains away from other countries of Asia. 
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Hence, European should not focus on the exchange rate as a way to reduce Chinese 
imports but focus on improving market access to increase European exports to China (cf. 
Free
might boost the competitiveness of US exports to China 
but reduce US competitiveness everywhere else. Such policies would rather worsen 
emp 0, pp. 162-163).  
Correcting the Balance of Trade Deficit is Difficult  
 
The balance of trade deficit between the West and China means the domestic 
customers benefit from imported products from China that are less expensive than locally 
produced products. But the purchase of imported products implies less demand on 
domestic production. Thus, the large deficit of balance of trade between the West and 
China causes a transfer of jobs to China. Consequently, the western governments may take 
actions to correct a balance of trade deficit on the current account (cf. Madura, Fox, 2007, 
p. 54). 
A deficit in a country’s balance of trade suggests that the country is spending more 
funds on foreign products than it is receiving from its own exports to foreign countries. 
Because it is selling its currency (to buy foreign goods) in greater volume than the foreign 
dem e of its currency should decrease. This decrease in value 
shou oods in the future. But this theory does not 
always work, since the negative balance on the current account can be sustained by 
posi
man, 2008). 
As shown in Figure 5.8, most of the US imports from China are not for the US 
consumers, but for the US companies. Joseph Francois has analyzed the 2004-2009 data 
and pointed out that the current pattern of trade between China and the US points to a 
complex relationship whereby US firms gain competitiveness by importing from China, 
because a large and growing share of bilateral trade is in intermediate goods (including 
parts and components). As a result, the Chinese currency appreciation or even a punitive 
US tariff against Chinese products 
loyment conditions in the US labour market (cf. Francois, 201
 
and for its currency, the valu
ld encourage more foreign demand for its g
tive balance on the financial account representing a net inflow of investment into the 
country (cf. Madura, Fox, 2007, p. 55). With the increasing export to the US, China’s 
ownership of U.S. government debt has doubled since July 2005 and it surpassed Japan in 
September 2008 to become the biggest foreign holder of U.S. Treasuries (cf. U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, 2009).  
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The United States normally experiences a large balance of trade deficit, which should 
place downward pressure on the value of the dollar. But there is substantial investment in 
dollar-denominated securities by foreign investors, especially Chinese investors. This 
fore
r both 
countries. The United States is cumulating foreign debt, losing production and export 
capa environment with increasing 
unem loyment. Meanwhile, China has become more and more dependent on the U.S. 
cons
a political adviser to President Hu Jintao, flew to 
Taiwan to take part in a seminar on political systems. It was the first time that a very senior 
ign demand for the dollar places upward pressure on its value and offset the downward 
pressure caused by the trade imbalance. Hence on the international exchanges the excess of 
dollars being offered for foreign currency to pay for imports is met by a demand by holders 
of foreign currency to buy dollars in order to buy US bonds and securities, or hold reserves 
in US dollar, just like China did in recent years. The deficit on the current account due to 
the surplus imports is being met by a positive balance on the financial account due to 
surplus investment into the US. Thus, the US balance of trade deficit can not be corrected 
by a currency adjustment (cf. Madura, Fox, 2007, p. 55). 
Scott pointed out that the current U.S.-China trade relationship is bad fo
city, and facing a more fragile macroeconomic 
p
umer market for its employment creation, has suppressed the purchasing power of 
China’s middle class with a weak currency, and, most importantly, has held hundreds of 
billions of hard-currency reserves in low-yielding, risky assets, instead of investing them in 
public goods that could benefit Chinese households (cf. Scott, 2007, p. 7). 
 
5.2.3 China and Europe: Economic Relations   
 
Has the West Really Got it Right on China? 
 
Since the beginning of China’s open door policy and economic reform in the early 
1980s, there has been a crucial belief in the West that China would become like the West. 
But today the Westerners are surprised to see that with a strong sense of their identity and 
worth, the Chinese have never behaved toward the West in a supplicant manner as 
expected. It seems that China will never be like the West (cf. Jacques, 2009). On 14th 
November 2009, less than 48 hours before Obama’s arrival in Beijing, Xi Jinping, the vice 
president of China, had held a conference in Beijing and recommended studying socialist 
theory with Chinese characteristics and applying the “core values of socialism”. On 13th 
and 14th November, Zheng Bijian, 
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Beij
 it wrong on China for decades” 
(Jac
s were greatly 
exaggerated (cf. Jacques, 2009). Nobody has expected a developing country becoming one 
of the world est
onfucius, the most influential thinker and philosopher in China’s history, has 
cons ly about the “Ways of Former Kings” 
that were supposed to represent the legitimacy of the governance. However, many of his 
idea
ing official had agreed to discuss the differences between the socialist system with 
Chinese characteristics and a Western-style parliamentary system. The two messages 
appear to be that with the current economic crisis China has to renew the doubts about the 
value of the Western system, and will be growing more cautiously. The Chinese are 
significantly loosing their faith in the capitalist system of the West, and China is becoming 
more convinced and self-confident in its trial reforms of the political system (cf. Sisci, 
2009). Contrary to the expectations of the Western press and people, the “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics” will not be ended, but strengthened and become even more 
influential in parallel with its economic growth. Martin Jacques, British journalist and 
author of the book When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the 
Birth of a New Global Order, said: “The West has gotten
ques, 2009). If so, what are supposed to be the reasons? 
Many Westerners have assumed that the process of modernization in China would 
inevitably lead to Westernization; however, modernization is not only shaped by markets, 
competition and technology, but also by history and culture. Chinese history and culture 
are very different from that of any Western nation-state, so that it is no wonder that China 
might have a very different modernization. Also in economic areas, some major Western 
predictions about China have proved wrong: that its economic growth could not be 
sustained and the economy would break down, that its growth figure
’s bigg  economies. But now it really comes true.  
C
idered himself a conservative, talking frequent
s influenced also Western philosophers such as John Locke, who argued that the 
government should serve the people rather than vice versa. Confucius maintained that a 
society organized under the moral “Do not impose on others what you yourself do not 
desire” would be both prosperous and politically stable. The ideas and writings of 
Confucius served as the foundation for Chinese education for some 2000 years until the 
end of the last feudalistic dynasty in 1911 (cf. Lam, Graham, 2006, p. 16). The influence of 
Confucianism on China’s civilization is tremendous. Even today, the Chinese still use 
many sayings of Confucius in their daily life, consciously or in most instances 
unconsciously.  
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China’s sense of identity comes from its long history as a civilization-state. It is 
defined by its extraordinarily long history and its huge geographic and demographic scale 
and diversity. Unity is the nation’s first priority, and plurality is the condition of its 
existence. This is why China could offer Hong Kong “one country two systems” so that 
Hong Kong’s previous capitalist system and its way of life remain unchanged since the 
hand over of Hong Kong from Britain. Utterly different from how the state is seen in 
Western societies, the state is seen by the Chinese as the guardian, custodian and 
embodiment of their civilization, and the duty of the state is to protect its unity. Therefore 
the legitimacy of the state is decisive in Chinese history. Since 200 years, Europe and the 
United States have been dominating the world and have not been required to understand 
others. The emergence of China as a global power marks the beginning of a new era that 
Europe and the United States have to deal with the rest of the world on increasingly equal 
term
com
Trade relations 
s (cf. Jacques, 2009). The Chinese philosophy and history could help us to answer the 
question why the relationship between the Chinese state and society is so different 
compared with the West. Only on this basis, one has the ability to anticipate the behaviour 
of the Chinese and thus the future growth path of China. 
 
Assessing China-Europe Relations, Particularly in Respect of Trade, Energy and  
Currency Exchange Rate 
 
With a steady and overall convergence of interests, Europe and China are at a 
plex crossroad in their relationship. Both sides see value in stronger relations and 
neither side views the other as a main strategic threat. As the role of China grows in a 
globalizing world, the two sides find they have an increasing range of interests in an 
increasing number of places – first of all in economic term – around the world. In the near 
term, the most prominent feature of Europe-China relations will be continuing growth and 
concomitant tensions in their economic and trade relationship. Further, in the medium or 
long term the two sides will find a greater sense of common ground by focusing more of 
their cooperation in the area of energy, environment, and sustainable development. These 
are areas where both sides have placed great priority (cf. Gill, Murphy, 2008, pp. VII-IX). 
Three selected important issues of the China-Europe relations will be discussed: trade 
relations, energy, and currency.  
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 Trade between EU and China has increased dramatically in recent years. China is now 
the EU’s second biggest trading partner after the United States and the biggest source of 
imports. The EU has already replaced the United States and become China’s biggest 
trading partner. EU’s imports from China are mainly industrial goods: machinery and 
transport equipment and miscellaneous manufactured articles. EU’s exports to China are 
also concentrated on industrial products: machinery and transport equipment, 
miscellaneous manufactured goods and chemicals (cf. European Commission, 2009). 
Following is the bilateral trade statistics for the year 2008 between EU and China: 
  
Trade in goods 
• EU goods exports to China 2008:  78.4 billion EUR 
• EU goods imports from China 2008: 247.6 billion EUR 
Trade in services 
• EU services exports to China 2008: 20.1 billion EUR 
• EU services imports from China 2008: 14.4 billion EUR 
Foreign Direct Investment 
stment from China to EU 2008: 0.1 billion EUR 
at Europe needs to adapt to China’s dramatic rise, and 
China needs to meet its WTO obligations and take its responsibilities in the global 
econ e call from European business for fair treatment in China, he pointed 
• Direct investment from EU to China 2008: 4.5 billion EUR 
• Direct inve
 
This statistic shows us the large volume of bilateral trade between Europe and China, 
whereas EU has deficit in the balance of goods trade, but surplus in the balance of services 
trade. European foreign direct investment (FDI) to China has reached 6 billion EUR in 
2005 (cf. Aslund, Dabrowski, 2008, p. 253), and dropped to 4.5 billion EUR in 2008. On 
one side the EU’s open market has contributed to China’s export-led growth, on the other 
side, the EU has also benefited from the growth of the Chinese market. However, the two 
sides still have conflicts in respect of meeting WTO obligations including fair trade and 
protection of intellectual property rights. These unresolved conflicts explain why in spite 
of increasing cooperation, the EU regards China as the single most important challenge for 
EU trade policy (cf. European Commission, 2009).   
EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson argued in his speech at the EU-China 
conference in Brussel in 2006 th
omy. Echoing th
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out that besides benefiting hugely from global trade, China needs to better enforce 
intel
n’t find 
similar figures. China’s initial challenge for Europe has been the low-cost labour-intensive 
manufacturing. China is strengthening its investment in research and development and 
moving into higher ge Europe with 
cars and precision  competition 
between the trade ove to the area of aircraft and marine engineering. 
Europe must acce e. China must 
continue to work to lson called 
this ‘the grand bar ). To create a win-win game for both and 
successfully meet t  sides is 
the key, particularl n the EU 
and China for driving trade and economic policy, which was launched in 2008, will 
cont
rice of energy. China’s fast growth 
resu
lectual property rules and improve access for European investment and European 
imports. The large imports from China are likely to bring the European countries threats 
and utilities. Mandelson used the case of the United States to interpret the situation: Cheap 
imports from China are estimated to have saved US consumers half a trillion dollars in the 
last decade, and saved manufacturers about the same in cheaper inputs for domestic 
production because not only many raw materials but also plenty of intermediate products 
are imported from China. Those savings are either invested or spent elsewhere in the 
United States. The situation might be very alike in the EU, although Mandelson did
-cost production; it is expected that China will challen
manufacturing in the medium-term. In the longer term, the
partners might m
pt, adapt to and compete with the Chinese challeng
 meet its WTO obligations and to play by the rules. Mande
gain’ (cf. Mandelson, 2006
he interests in common, closer collaboration between the two
y in the economic areas. The new strategic mechanism betwee
ribute to the development of the bilateral relations. 
 
Energy 
 
China’s strong demand for energy and raw materials has had significant impact on 
world markets. From 1995 to 2005, China’s demand for energy accounted for 32 percent of 
the energy demand growth of the whole world, whereas Europe accounted for only 11 
percent. According to the International Energy Agency, China’s demand for energy should 
continue to grow in future and more than double between 2005 and 2030. Europe is 
obviously affected by the increase in the relative p
lted not only in a global supply shock for the market for goods but also in a global 
demand shock for the market for energy and raw materials (cf. Aslund, Dabrowski, 2008, 
pp. 261-262). Therefore China’s development is often considered a threat to Europe, not 
only because of the trade deficit but also in the respect of competition in energy market.  
 91
There are two ways to promote the secure access to energy. One is to rely on the open 
markets and on multilateral rules designed to accomplish the proper functioning of these 
markets. The other is to rely on self-insurance through the accumulation of reserves or 
bilateral deals with selected partners. These two solutions are hardly compatible in a tight 
market, because bilateral arrangements reduce the depth of markets9 and therefore the 
security of the countries that primarily rely on it for ensuring their supplies. In the last 
decades, the industrialized countries including Europe have been in the direction of the 
first model and Europe has relied mainly on the global market for its oil supplies. 
However, China relies on bilateral oil agreements as it meets its growing oil demand on the 
open market. The energy security of the European Union is likely to be undermined and a 
significant shift toward bilateral agreements could contribute to changing the pattern of 
world oil supplies. Also this issue deserves a serious forward-looking dialogue between the 
EU and China, in which both sides exchange their views on the future of energy and raw 
material markets (cf. Aslund, Dabrowski, 2008, pp. 262-263).  
Africa is the most resource-laden continent with 10 of the globe’s 84 million barrels 
per day oil production in 2005. The EU imported 18.9 billion EUR of its total oil imports 
of 62.5 billion EUR from Africa in 2007 (cf. Percival, 2008). The United States imported 
22 percent of its total oil imports (2.23 million barrels per day) from Africa and also 22 
percent from the Middle East in 2006. China imported 48 percent of the 7.2 million barrels 
per day from Africa and the amount is still rising. By 2025, China’s imports should reach 
10.7 million barrels per day. More than 60 percent of the output of Sudan, Africa’s third 
largest oil producer, went to China. Angola and Nigeria sent each a quarter of their oil 
production to China. Chinese got better prices in oil trade with Africa because they 
provided Africa with investments and infrastructure loans typically at zero or near-zero 
interest (cf. Sautman, Yan, 2008, p. 92). Contrary to Western countries that always try to 
combine the trade and investment with domestic affairs of their trade partners, Chinese 
leaders have repeatedly stressed the principle of “mutual noninterference in domestic 
affairs” since the Asian-African Bandung Conference in 1955 (cf. Brautigam, 2007). This 
is the main reason why the industrialized countries have been continually criticizing China 
that it makes no contribution to democratic development in these countries, however, this 
is also why China is more popular and more effective in doing business with Africa 
compared with the West.  
                                                 
9 Depth of market is a measure of how much a price has to move in order to execute larger than normal transactions. The 
smaller the price movement and the larger the transaction, the deeper the market (cf. Sexton, 2008, p. 238). 
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China and the EU have a lot to gain by cooperation in the areas of energy and 
environment protection. Governments from the EU and China should coordinate efforts on 
the exploitation of new energy resources. Sharing new technologies in the exploitation of 
new energy resources and experiences on traditional energy use will allow European firms 
to lower the costs of their exploitation and Chinese firms to make progress more quickly. 
EU and China should be engaging in dialogue in order to find a way to facilitate European 
transfer of energy related technologies to China in exchange for easier access to the rising 
Chinese consumption market. The rational choice for the EU and China is to abandon the 
zero-sum game that they have been tending to play. Their relationship is not necessarily 
competitive in terms of energy demand (cf. Ding, 2007, pp. 38-39). The cooperation will 
be great benefit to both sides and reduce the pressure on the world energy market.  
Stronger collaboration in this regard could benefit both the EU and China. For 
instance, China has 11 nuclear power reactors in commercial operation but these are far 
from sufficient for the rising demand. Additional reactors are planned, some applying the 
worl
 reminbi-dollar exchange rate shifts the burden of adjustment to 
the EU whose exchange rate is more flexible. This may cause a damaging overvaluation of 
d will be in favour of the American exports in expense of European exports. 
d’s most advanced technologies, to achieve a six-fold increase in nuclear capacity to at 
least 60 gigawatt electrical by 2020, and then a further increase to 120-160 gigawatt 
electrical by 2030 (cf. World Nuclear Association, 2009). For building nuclear power 
stations China needs the technology from the West. Through offering China technologies 
and knowhow, the EU will benefit from such large projects invested by China. And for the 
issue of Africa, the EU and China should focus on identifying the areas for collaboration in 
developing a partnership that benefits Africa’s development and also the growth of EU and 
China.  
 
Currency exchange rate 
 
The exchange rate of the Chinese currency renminbi has become an important issue 
for Europe in recent years. Headed by Eurogroup President Jean-Claude Juncker, European 
Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet, and European Commissioner Joaquin 
Almunia, the high-level mission to Beijing in November 2007 expressed dissatisfaction 
with the way the Chinese currency was run. The first reasoning starts with the observation 
that the US dollar needs to depreciate to correct the US current account deficit. According 
to this logic, rigidity in the
the euro an
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The 
ally, in 
parti
tates and Japan to put more pressure on China to revalue its currency. However, 
the allies face a great challenge from inside: although the American economists and 
senators keep criticizing China’s currency policy, the American official announcement has 
been repeatedly representing the contradictory standpoint. In 2005, the Treasury 
Dep
second reasoning starts from the capital account. As the depreciation of US dollar will 
reduce the American imports, Chinese investors’ preference for dollar assets will diminish 
and the China’s central bank will make a diversification of reserves that would lead to a 
higher demand for euro-denominated assets and therefore an upward pressure on the euro 
exchange rate. These two approaches rely on the equilibrium exchange rate concept (cf. 
Aslund, Dabrowski, 2008, p. 264). An EU financial delegation, led by Luxembourg Prime 
Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, called on China on 29th November 2009 to revalue its 
currency renminbi that many policy makers in Europe and the US see as undervalued and 
giving a tremendous competitive advantage to Chinese exporters (cf. Falletti, 2009).  
Just like the United States, the EU arguments in favour of appreciation of renminbi 
would also point to the persistence of China’s high levels of trade surplus glob
cular with the member states of the European Union. To deal with this issue, Willem 
van der Geest, research director of the Brussels-based European Institute for Asian Studies, 
pointed out that the EU must take note of the fact that on one side the Chinese policy 
makers and economists are fully aware of the need for greater exchange rate flexibility; on 
the other side however, they are also fully aware of the costs of a substantive revaluation of 
the currency. Therefore they prefer to make progress gradually and favour the following 
strategies: (i) increasing the volume of foreign exchange trading, (ii) developing 
instruments for controlling currency risks through hedging, and (iii) reforming financial 
sector and strengthening its regulations (cf. Geest, 2007, pp. 180-187).  
A routine policy suggestion for Europe in this aspect is to cooperate closely with the 
United S
artment reported that China was not manipulating its exchange rate in violation of its 
obligations under article IV of the IMF charter (cf. Geest, 2007, p. 187). Again, the 
Treasury Department said in April 2009 that China was not manipulating its currency to 
increase its exports. This new report highlighted the political and economic policies that 
the Obama government would choose in dealing with Beijing (cf. Andrews, 2009). The 
interests of the overall US-China relationship might disable the government of the United 
States from concentrating on the currency debate. Without the cooperation of the United 
States, change can not be made in the short term.  
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From the perspective of China, the strongest argument against revaluation is that a 
revaluation only involving renminbi would just transfer China’s trade gain to other 
countries with cheap production cost (cf. Geest, 2007, p. 188). Indeed, the ultimate driver 
for the trade deficit and increasing unemployment of the EU is the motive of the European 
companies to search worldwide the cheapest production. Even if renminbi is appreciated 
sufficiently, the imports from China to the West will decline, but through the quick 
adjustment of the European and American international companies the drop of the imports 
from China will be quickly compensated by the rising imports from other countries that 
can provide cheaper production, e.g. Vietnam, India, Indonesia, Philippine etc.  
Robert Mundell, professor of economics at Columbia University and the recipient of 
the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1999, strongly disagrees with global pressure to 
force China to appreciate its currency, insisting that, “A large yuan appreciation wouldn’t 
help resolve global current account imbalances, but would devastate China, causing drastic 
deflation, impoverishing the rural sector, and cutting its growth rate by as much as half” 
(Mundell, 2006, p. 6). He hopes that China would keep its exchange rate fixed to the dollar 
while continuing to move toward currency convertibility. Mundell thinks that the problem 
of China’s huge buildup of foreign exchange reserves would be solved by more Chinese 
investments abroad and more Chinese consumption of imports (cf. Iley, Lewis, 2007, p. 
226). 
Cyn-Young Park, an economist of the Asian Development Bank, researched the 
global imbalances and exchange rate policies and found that 20 percent revaluation of 
Chinese renminbi could give rise to a reduction in the U.S. current account deficit of just 
about 0.1 percent of GDP. Thus he concluded that renminbi revaluation is not the 
instrument for correcting such high order of global imbalances (cf. Pattanaik, 2007, p. 
312). 
Finally, we come to the conclusion that on one side a revaluation of renminbi which is 
satisfactory to the Europeans will not be realized in the short term, on the other side, even 
if a sufficient revaluation of renminbi is realized, it could not help to correct the trade 
imbalances on the global level. Then, what should be the solution? A suggestion to reduce 
the friction caused by foreign exchange rate, correct the global trade imbalance and control 
international financial stability will be made in chapter 8.3 Suggestion on a new world 
economic and monetary order: Keynes's proposals at Bretton Woods 1944. 
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5.3 Assessing the Impact 
 
Bortis pointed out that since it is difficult to handle the income and distribution 
policies, most economies seem to rely presently upon the external employment 
mechanism10 (see equation 2-43 in chapter 2). Typical cases in point are Germany, Japan, 
Switzerland and Taiwan (cf. Bortis, 2008, p. 80). According to the analysis by Kaldor, 
Japan’s high growth rate in the period 1953-1976 was due both to its success as an 
exporter, with its export volume rising at 16 percent a year, and its low income elasticity of 
demand for imports (cf. Kaldor, 1983, p. 93). However, a successful exporter has to suffer 
certa
ted or even diminished at the world level, and income distribution has, according to 
all s
acturing power and her navigation to such a degree of development that no other 
natio
in disadvantages brought by export-led growth. 
To become or remain a successful exporter, each economy attempts to attract firms 
which produce on its territory and export most of the production. The country may offer 
favourable conditions to such firms, such as a well-trained labour force, but not very high 
wages; a good infrastructure and a high-level education system, but not high taxes; a 
performing social security system with only small contributions to social security 
institutions; and damaging natural environment and not too much incomes policy. State 
expenditures and the general level of taxation are to be reduced through privatization. For 
these reasons, state activity, including expenditures for social security, has presumable 
stagna
tatistics, become more unequal. As a result of the export-led growth, we have now very 
high levels of involuntary unemployment and underemployment worldwide, which now 
affects about 30 percent of the world labour force (cf. Bortis, 2008, p. 80). 
Friedrich List opposed the absolute doctrine of free trade and argued: “Any nation 
which by means of protective duties and restrictions on navigation has raised her 
manuf
n can sustain free competition with her, can do nothing wiser than to throw away 
these ladders of her greatness, to preach to other nations the benefits of free trade, and to 
declare in penitent tones that she has hitherto wandered in the paths of error, and has now 
for the first time succeeded in discovering the truth” (List, 1885, p. 368). 
                                                 
10 Multiplier effect means that an initial change in aggregate spending (foreign and/or domestic) 
aggregate output for the economy that is a multiple of the initial change of spending. The multiplier is the ratio
causes a change in 
 of the 
change in GDP to the change in autonomous spending. There are two types of the Keynesian multiplier relation: the 
saving/investment multiplier associated with the internal employment mechanism where the employment and growth are 
driven by domestic demand and investment, and the foreign trade multiplier linked up with the external employment 
mechanism where employment and growth are driven by exports (cf. Bortis, 1997, pp. 190-198; cf. Lipsey, Chrystal, 
2007, p. 376). 
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In his book The l Economy, Friedrich List pointed out: “I 
saw clearly that free competition between two nations which are highly civilised can only 
be m
 the strong presence of China in the 
worl
 China and the 
adva
d with an adverse 
shift in the terms of trade (cf. Pryor, 2007, p. 208). 
This theory was first proposed by Bhagwati in 1958. He argued that if the traditional 
National System of Politica
utually beneficial in case both of them are in a nearly equal position of industrial 
development, and that any nation which owing to misfortunes is behind others in industry, 
commerce, and navigation … must first of all strengthen her own individual powers, in 
order to fit herself to enter into free competition with more advanced nations. In a word, I 
perceived the distinction between cosmopolitical and political economy” (List, 1885, p. 
xxvi). As we know, the gap of industrial development between China and the Western 
countries is very large. Without strengthening individual powers, especially purchasing 
powers through appropriate industrial development,
d trade is tending to cause great harm for both sides.  
Deng Xiaoping’s reform policies might be inspired by the theory of Friedrich List. 
The reforms of Deng Xiaoping are generally summed up by the ideology of the “Four 
Modernizations” which addressed the modernization of agriculture, industry, technology 
and national defence (cf. Killion, 2006, p. 86). In Deng Xiaoping’s reform era China 
started a technical revolution. In order to develop science and technology, China brought in 
foreign experts from Western nations, and the country also sent many Chinese students 
abroad to acquire the necessary scientific and practical knowledge that would make certain 
expensive foreign personnel unnecessary (cf. Morton, Lewis, 2004, p. 236). Such policies 
would contribute to the success of creating a suitable industrial and economic development 
in China and making China a modern nation. Along Deng’s path which reflects the views 
of Friedrich List, in the future, the free trade between a well-developed
nced industrial countries can be mutually beneficial.  
 
Immiserizing Growth and China 
 
Economic growth could result in a country being worse off than before the growth. 
This immiserizing growth occurs when the gain in a country’s social welfare arising from 
economic growth is more than offset by the loss in such welfare associate
exports of a fast-growing developing country face world demand that are highly priced and 
income inelastic, the relative price of this good (i.e. terms of trade) will fall. If this price 
decline is sufficiently great, welfare falls (cf. Bhagwati, 1958, pp. 201-205; cf. Pryor, 
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2007, p. 211). Thus, there is a paradoxical effect of economic growth since it could bring 
about a decline in a nation’s welfare. 
In international trade, terms of trade (π ) is the price of imports relative to the price of 
exports:  
 
π =
x
m
p
ep       (5-1) 
 
where π  is terms of trade, xP is the price of export and meP is the price of import of a 
country, e is the foreign exchange rate, pm is the imports price in foreign currency. The 
terms of trade determine the quantities of goods and services that may be imported for a 
given quantity of goods and services exported. In other words, the π  could be expressed as 
the number of units of the importable good that can be bought with one unit of the 
exportable good (cf. Khan, Nsouli, Wong, 2002, pp. 309-310; Bortis, 1997, pp. 186-187).  
 
If exports equal to imports,   pxX = epmM    (5-2) 
 
where X and M are the exports and imports quantity.  
 
Then    X = 
x
m
p
ep M.     (5-3)  
Combine (5-1) and (5-3), we get:  
 
π =
x
m
p
ep = 
M
X .     (5-4) 
y is determined by the national income 
in th
 
This means, trade balance occurs when (1) the price of the country’s exports changes 
relative to its imports, that is, its exchange rate appreciates or (2) the quantity of the 
country’s exports demanded changes relative to the quantity of imports it demands. The 
quantity of exports of one country to another countr
e importing country and by the relative price of the exports goods. The quantity of 
imports of one country from another country is determined by its own national income and 
the relative price of the imports goods (cf. MacBean, Nguyen, 1987, pp. 45-46).  
In respect of immiserizing growth, China faces two problems:  
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1. “Surplus with China, profit with the US” and  
2. Losing purchasing power of the Chinese workers.  
plus with China, Profit with the US” 
As China’s Ex-Minister of Commerc lion 
shirts before it earns enough to buy one Airbus A 380 (cf. Lam, 2006, p. ix). That is, China 
holds the trade surplus, not yet the profit. According to the report of BBC News by Steve 
in t o
 
trade. In order to reduce the production costs and increase the profit margins, many 
inter - or 
medium-end manufacturing industries to China. According to the Ministry of Commerce, 
 USD foreign direct investment, 70 
percent of which went to the manufacturing industry. The continuous growth in both the 
scale and number of foreign-funded enterprises enabled them to create a huge production 
capa , w n ’s 
expo oreign-funded enterprises, some countries have 
bene rom China’s trade surplus. Just as Ex-Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai has said, 
in Sino-U.S. trade, the surplus is credited to China while profits go to the United States. In 
Bo’s opinion, the American traders are top winners in business worldwide. They woul  
do business with China if they could not make profits (cf. Lan, 2007). 
ollars for 
Ame s and control inflation. 
 
“Sur
 
e Bo Xilai said, China must export 800 mil
Schifferes, textiles and cloth g accounted for 72 percen f China’s trade surplus in 
manufacturing in 2006. But the overall profit margins in the textile industry were only 3.9 
percent – the lowest of any major industry. Chinese firms feel under increasing competitive 
pressures, with profit margins continually squeezed by rising factor prices, the appreciation 
of the yuan and government increases in interest rates (cf. Schifferes, 2007).  
China’s reform and open door policy have encouraged the development of processing
national companies based in developed countries have transferred their low
by the end of 2006 China had attracted 704 billion
city of manufactured goods in China hich boosted China’s exports. Since Chi a
rts are mainly contributed by f
fited f
d not
According to the analysis by Li Changjiu, research fellow in Center of World Affairs 
Studies of Xinhua News Agency, the largest China’s state-owned news agency, the 
following features in China-US trade are the reasons why most profits go to the US when 
China has a huge surplus. Firstly, China-US trade relations are rather complementary than 
competitive – from which the US benefits more. From 1996 to 2003, China’s trade surplus 
to the US accounted for 229 billion US dollars. Morgan Stanley statistics revealed that 
during this period, Chinese products of low price not only saved 600 billion d
rican consumers; but also helped US manufacturers reduce cost
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Secondly, C  nature. More than 50 percent 
of China’s .3 percent of the overall 
exports to the US in 2006 (worth 204 billion US dollars). Susan Shirk, former Deputy 
Assi administration, reported in an article in 
Washington Post that nearly two-thirds of Chinese exported commodities have foreign 
bran
ee, China has 
beco
hina’s exports to the US are largely processing in
foreign trade is processing trade, which made up 63
stant Secretary of State during the Clinton 
ds by foreign-funded enterprises – mainly Japanese and US enterprises. For each 
Barbie doll priced at 20 US dollars in the US, only about 35 cents stay in China. MIT 
professor Huang Yasheng pointed out that although China takes a salary advantage in 
exports, it has failed to retain the profits brought in by globalization. Thirdly, US direct 
investment in China exceeds China’s investment in the US. By the end of 2006, the US 
direct investment in China had surpassed 54 billion US dollars; while the figure for 
China’s investment in the US was 957 million US dollars – only 1.8 percent of the former. 
Fourthly, “made in China” is actually “made in the world.” To a certain degr
me an international centre for assembling products, the so-called world factory. For 
each iPod priced at 299 US dollar in 2007, the Japanese company Toshiba received 73 US 
dollars by providing the most expensive parts (Apple keeps no production line), other 
countries and regions received 60 US dollars by providing other parts, but China only got 
its share of 3 US dollars for assembly. The remaining 163 US dollars went to the US, 
including 80 US dollars for Apple. As a matter of fact, China only received one percent of 
the selling price. However, along with each iPod exported from China to the US, the US-
China trade deficit increased by 150 US dollars. Professor Lampton from Johns Hopkins 
University said that if Washington imposes barriers on products exported from China, it 
will punish both China and the US (cf. Li, 2007). 
 
Losing Purchasing Power of the Chinese Workers 
 
The price of exports from a country can be heavily influenced by the value of its 
currency. A devaluation or fall in the value of domestic currency will make the currency 
cheaper and make imports denominated in foreign currency more expensive and exports 
less expensive. This will result in a falling in imports and an increasing in exports, since 
the cheaper domestic currency will make exports denominated in foreign currency less 
expensive for foreign purchasers. A fall in imports and an increase in exports will improve 
the balance of payments. But it must be noted that the devaluation of the domestic currency 
has to be set against the increase in national income and as the real income level (adjusted 
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for inflation) falls, so does consumption of goods. A percentage of the fall in consumption 
will most likely reflect a decreased demand for foreign goods (cf. Madura, Fox, 2007, pp. 
51-53). Devaluation of the domestic currency reduces the purchasing power of the workers 
and causes greater inequality of wealth distribution in China.  
As China and other low wage developing countries increase their participation in the 
global economy, there is a squeeze on the incomes of many workers, not only the 
unskilled, but also increasingly of semi-skilled and skilled labour. Globalization may bring 
workers in developing countries into more direct competition with workers in 
industrialized countries. Increasingly, workers in the developing world possess both the 
skills and the industrial experience to compete with rich country labour forces even in the 
industrial sector which was specialized by the rich economies in global trade. Note China’s 
exports grow rapidly and not all of these products are low technology goods produced by 
unskilled workers. Further, even after a period of significant growth, China faces rapidly 
rising open unemployment. Many of them are skilled workers (cf. Smith, 2003, pp. 396-
398). Hence, both unskilled and skilled workers are likely to come under increasing 
pressure. A massive unemployment naturally limits consumer purchasing power. Further, 
in this situation even those who have jobs tend to save instead of spending. 
 
“Comparative Advantage” and Critique 
 
Comparative advantage refers to the ability of one economy to produce a certain good 
efficiently, that is, at a lower opportunity cost than a second economy. This ability is 
derived from the relative economic allocation of resources, technology, and economic 
structures in the two countries (cf. Pearson, Salembier, 1984, p. 7). Ricardo argued that 
unde devotes its capital and labour to 
such employments where it has comparative advantage. It is this principle which 
dete
r a system of perfectly free commerce, each country 
rmines that for example, wine shall be made in Portugal and cloth shall be 
manufactured in England (cf. Ricardo, 1821a, p. 139). Trade can benefit all parties 
involved, as long as they produce goods with different relative costs. This benefit is called 
in the literature gains from trade.  
Note Ricardo explicitly bases his theory on an assumed immobility of capital and 
pointed out that “if capital freely flowed towards those countries where it could be most 
profitably employed, there could be no difference in the rate of profit, and no other 
difference in the real or labour price of commodities, than the additional quantity of labour 
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required to convey them to the various markets where they were to be sold” (Ricardo, 
1821a, pp. 142-143). 
However, our world today is highly globalized, both goods and capital are free to 
move internationally and the mobility of capital between nations is much greater than 
Rica
 conclusion, although there are efficiency gains arising from globalization and these 
will nd an improvement in product availability 
and quality, the trade-led growth makes labour market under threat of unemployment, 
whic
rdo could possibly have imagined. Money can be shifted electronically with almost no 
effort at all. The free capital mobility totally undercuts Ricardo’s comparative advantage 
argument for free trade in goods. Under the new globalization conditions, capital tends to 
flow to wherever costs are lowest, that is, to pursue absolute advantage (cf. Daly, 2007, p. 
205). 
Samuelson argued that good jobs, due to the bilateral trade deficit between US and 
China, may be lost not only in the short run. The argumentation that the total US net 
national product must, by the economic laws of comparative advantage, be raised in the 
long run (and in China, too) is totally wrong. Indeed, the consumers may have real gains in 
consumption and some producers have possible losses. But we must note that the gains of 
the American winners are not big enough to compensate the losses of the losers (cf. 
Samuelson, 2004, pp. 135-136). In the long run, the consumers lose their jobs and the real 
income falls.    
In
be reflected in a reduction in product costs a
h opens up the possibility of:  
1. falling real incomes, 
2. growing income inequality and 
3. increased pressure for protectionism. 
The continued expansion of the supply of skilled labour in China, coupled with 
unemployment among skilled workers in China, opens up the possibility of declining real 
incomes and employment of skilled workers in industrialized countries (cf. Smith, 2003, 
pp. 398-399). 
 
Motive for Protectionism 
 
From (5-2) we know, in trade balance  
 
X=π M.    (5-5) 
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 Let b=b1+b2 be the import coefficient, that is, the proportion of the imports M to the 
total
 certain goods which can not be domestically produced for institutional reasons (e.g. 
the p
 social product Q, 
 
M = bQ= (b1+b2)Q    (5-6) 
 
where b1Q are the necessary imports which must be imported in order to make the 
production happen and can be called imports of basic goods, since each country must 
import
resently prevailing international division of labour) or for natural reasons; b2Q are the 
non-necessary consumption and could be termed luxury imports, e.g. cars, video recorders, 
television sets, certain types of food and drink. The coefficient b2 reflects dependence on 
abroad at the social and cultural level (cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 195).  
Combine (5-5) and (5-6), the foreign balance can be written as  
 
X=π (b1+b2)Q.    (5-7) 
 
If normal output Q is to be raised to approach the full employment level, the import 
coefficient b=b1+b2 must be reduced to keep the equilibrium of the foreign balance with 
exports and the terms of trade given: in the long run, exports must pay for imports because 
steadily increasing indebtedness leads to insuperable difficulties. However the coefficient 
b1 can not be reduced: necessary imports have to be kept for the production. Thus, the 
luxury i employment policy is pursued.  
Hen in  full employment require a certain 
‘offi
oyment, the volume of international trade may expand and thus raising 
welfare everywhere. However, to secure full employment, the ‘employment’ represented 
by t nism has to be accounted; this is a necessary social 
precondition for enjoying the welfare effects of international trade (cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 
196)
pon foreign indebtedness, China is the creditor country and US is the debtor country. 
According to Bortis, there are two pha o se, debt is 
mports b2Q have to be reduced if a full 
ce  an open economy the approach to
cial’ protectionism with respect to luxury imports, or rather the unnecessary imports. 
This may not reduce the international trade volume in the long run. Based upon the 
principle of comparative advantage, once the major trading partners enjoy positions of 
near-full empl
he external employment mecha
.  
U
ses f indebtedness. In the first pha
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gradually built up. Interest payments and repayment of debt are negligible in relation to 
new
ital inflows. In the first phase, creditor country (here China) enjoys 
export surpluses:  
 
X > 
 capital inflows. In the second phase, the debt levels are high and the debt service is 
high relative to new cap
π M.    (5-8) 
The financial means flowed from creditor country (China) to debtor country (US) 
results in an export surplus and in a favourable impact upon output and employment in 
China. The debtor country (US), on the other hand, enjoy in the first phase, the privilege of 
being able to import more than they export:  
 
X < π M.    (5-9) 
 
Hence in the first phase the growth of indebtedness is favourable to both China and 
US. But the situation changes in the second phase as the debt service, interest payments 
and prepayment of debt due domi  hina to US 
are not sufficiently high, US is forced to achieve an export surplus in order to obtain the 
fore
this case China will lose great value of its foreign exchange reserves in US dollar.  
nate the picture. If gross capital flows from C
ign exchange required to service the debt, which means US will import fewer goods 
from China (cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 196-197). Falling off in exports will have persistent 
negative effects on China’s employment and output, if China does not try to find another 
solution.   
 
Threat of the US Dollar Crash 
 
The currency of the United States has a particular unique scenario, because the US 
dollar is not only the currency of a country, but also acting as a world currency. The US 
can print dollars, i.e. expand its money supply when needed, import goods from China with 
that money. However, the printed money is not exchanged but simply deposited back in the 
US by China and used for international trade or refund the debt. This relationship relies on 
the confidence of China in the US dollar. If one day that confidence is gone, the value of 
the dollar could fall very rapidly as happened in the early 1970s (cf. Madura, Fox, 2007, p. 
55). In 
Under the dollar crash threat, for the first time China launched schedule of selling 
yuan-denominated bonds on the international market in September 2009. The 6 billion 
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yuan (about 876 million USD) bond sale will expand the international use of the Chinese 
currency, though it is still not a currency on the global free exchange market. This could be 
a new option for worldwide currency investors, including central banks, who want to 
diversify away from the dollar or to be more precise, evade the risk of potential crash of 
the dollar (cf. Chinese Finance Ministry, 2009; cf. Fernando, 2009). 
China’s large foreign exchange rese in ina’s great 
trade
t the US continuously imports the products 
made in China, China has to spend great part of the earnings from the exports to US to 
purchase US national debt, which means, S roducts and 
on the other hand the Chinese lending. The risk for China is that China is merely a world 
facto
                                   Y = C + S + T                  (5-11) 
whe put), C, I, G, X, M are the consumption, gross 
investment, government expenditure, exports and imports respectively, Y is the national 
inco
rves  US dollar are the result of Ch
 surplus over the last decades. In the bilateral trade relations between US and China, 
China has trade balance surplus, but keeps buying the US national debt and depositing the 
money of “gains of trade” in the US. It looks like a fair deal for both sides, however, this is 
just a distorted view. In order to ensure tha
 the U  has on one hand the Chinese p
ry with almost nothing in hand at present, and its products are paid with foreigners’ 
IOU11, which will be cashed later with the prerequisite that the US economy will never 
break down and the US dollar will never collapse.  
We can use the following equations to demonstrate the above mentioned relations:  
 
Q = C + I + G + (X - M)             (5-10) 
 
          
 
re Q is the social product (out
me, S, T are gross savings and taxes respectively. (X - M) is the net exports. National 
product are comprised of consumption, investment, government expenditure and net 
exports, whereas the components of national income include consumption, gross savings 
and tax revenues.  
In macro-economic equilibrium, the social product Q equals national income Y (cf. 
Meier 1995, p. 215), so that  
 
C + I + G + (X - M) = C + S + T.             (5-12) 
 
                                                 
11 IOU is an acknowledgment of debt. Short for “I owe you”. 
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This leads to 
 
 (I + G) - (S + T) = (M - X).                (5-13) 
 
These two equations demonstrate the relationship between national income analysis 
and 
rcial bank loans, or private foreign 
inve s, 
the only way to validate investment and government expenditures in real terms is through 
importing goods and servi then ling t  dom gap 
and this country has thus trade balance deficit (M > X). This trade balance deficit affects 
the exchange gap, which has to be filled by 
losing foreign exchange reserves or through external financing. The capital inflow to fill 
hina and other great economies. However, China’s situation is just 
conv
 the year of 2004, the value of China’s exports to the US and imports from the US 
accounted for 196,682.0  US . Su ade 
balance (X - M) was 162,254.3 million USD (cf. U.S. Census Bureau, 2005a). The 
government savings (T - G) = 24,165.68 – 28,486.89 = -4,321.21 million yuan (cf. China 
balance of payments analysis. An internal imbalance in the macro economy between 
national expenditure and national saving (i.e. a resource gap) leads to an external 
imbalance in the balance of payments (i.e. a foreign exchange gap). The external financing 
fills the resource gap and the foreign exchange gap, thereby allowing national expenditure 
C + I + G to be greater than the value of products produced domestically C + S + T (cf. 
Meier, 1995, pp. 213-215), which leads to deficit in balance of trade, i.e. X – M < 0.  
When a country spends more on investment I and government expenditure G than it is 
earning from the resources released through private savings S and taxation T, i.e. (I + G) - 
(S + T) > 0, there is a resource gap in the economy, and then imports M will be greater 
than exports X. The foreign exchange gap must be filled by a capital inflow from overseas 
through official development assistance, comme
stment. When a country releases insufficient resources at home by savings and taxe
ces. Foreign resources are fil he estic resource 
balance of payments and creates a foreign 
the foreign exchange gap creates real capital transfer in the form of imports greater than 
exports (cf. Meier, 1995, p. 215). The United States are in the abovementioned situation 
with low private savings and negative government savings (i.e. G > T). Because the 
investment has been high in the United States, the inflow of foreign capital has to be very 
large. For the United States, the source of external financing is mainly the purchase of 
national debt by C
erse to the United States. However, high investment might be the common point of 
both economies.  
In
million USD and 34,427.8 million D rplus in the tr
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Stati 06), which was equal to about -540.15 million USD. That is to say, the 
national debt was very small. The growth was driven by high investment and high exports. 
As a consequence, the dom ve  low d the ry 
high. The demand came mainly from the foreign countries. However, the US government 
savi
Chin
stics 2005, 20
estic consumption rate was ry an  savings rate ve
ngs in the same year (T - G) = 590,413,778 - 1,406,175,267 = -815,761,489 million 
USD (cf. U.S. Census Bureau, 2005b). The US national deficit was about 188,790 times 
that of China. The high national debt, especially foreign debt has been playing an 
important role in US economic growth by providing the American households consumer 
loans, with low savings rate and high consumption rate in the US as consequence. 
 
Table 5.9 Selected economic indicators for the comparison between the economies of 
a and the United States in 2007 (in billion USD) 
 
 China the United States 
Gross national income  3,120.9 13,886.5 
Gross domestic product 3,280.1 13,811.2 
Household final consumption 
expenditure in % of GDP 
 
34 
 
71 
General government final consumption 
expenditure in % of GDP 
14 16 
Gross capital formation in % of GDP 44 19 
External balance of goods and services  
in % of GDP 
 
8 
 
-6 
Exports (Merchandise) 1,217.9 1,163.2 
Imports (Merchandise) 955.8 2,017.0 
Current account balance 249.9 –738.6 
Domestic credit provided by 
banking sector in % of GDP 
 
136 
 
240 
 
Source: World Bank, 2009a, pp. 356-359, Table 3, Table 4. 
 
The data in Table 5.9 shows us that household final consumption expenditure in 
percent of GDP was very high in the United States (71 percent), but very low in China (34 
percent). The government expenditure to GDP ratios of both economies were very close to 
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each other. The imports of the United States were much more than its exports, however, 
China was just at the opposite pole. Domestic credit provided by banking sector in percent 
of GDP in the United States was nearly 2 times that in China, which indicated that the 
American were used to consuming with consumer loans, however, the Chinese still 
preferred to consume with cash.  
For the reason of the global financial crisis started in 2007 in the US, some American 
analysts said that the credit and housing bubbles which caused the financial crisis were fed 
by the constant flow of large sums of money into U.S. securities markets from China. The 
Chinese capital inflows helped reduce conventional mortgage rates to record low and 
helped create a subprime mortgage industry. Both China and the US have made mistakes 
(cf. 
uilt excess dollar reserves that have 
the potential to create American financial bubbles, whereas the US has spent beyond its 
eans, saved too little and went deeply into debt to pu ll kinds o  
 (cf. Hill, 2009). With total ebt outstanding of 11,978.60 
ation of 307.86 million in N r 2009, the average debt per 
d for 39,000 USD (cf. U.S. Census Bureau, 2009; cf. 
is record high amount of debt might be a sign of pending 
ury Secretary, Lawrence Summers, who served under President 
f Obama’s National Economic Council, called the 
wer creditors, such as China the “the balance of 
r”. In the year of 2008, foreign countries owned nearly a quarter, about 2.6 
l US national debt. They also owned more than 14 trillion USD in 
re than the total US national output. According to the statement of 
f the reasons they had to rescue Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac12 
government that US securities were really secure. If China 
he new debt, or just keep existing debt, then the outlook for 
the US bail-out plan is positive. New investors will be attracted by the increasing interest 
rates arkets, then it will hurt its 
own investments. It is a zero sum game (cf. Pagano, 2008). 
Hill, 2009).  
China has emphasized too much on exports and b
m rchase a f goods from China
and the rest of the world  public d
billion USD and a popul ovembe
American individual accounte
Treasurydirect, 2009). Th  im
economic collapse. 
The former US Treas
Bill Clinton and is now the head o
relationship between the US and its ne
financial terro
trillion USD, of the tota
US assets – which is mo
the US authorities, one o
was to reassure the Chinese 
decides to buy any more of t
. However, if China really pulls out from the US security m
                                                 
12 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are The Federal National Mortgage Association and The Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation, enterprises sponsored by the United States federal government for purpose of purchasing and securitizing 
mortgages in order to ensure that funds are consistently available to the institutions that lend money to home buyers (cf. 
Walker, Vatter, 1997, p. 114).  
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Lawrence Summers regarded the current arrangement as a risk to prosperity since it 
leaves each major economy a hostage of the other’s policies. World leaders, meeting in G-
20 in Pittsburgh in September 2009, adopted a framework in order to combat the worst 
crisis since the Great Depression and keep more durable economic growth. The aims are to 
reduce U.S. dependence on overseas capital to finance consumption on one side, and cut 
the r
t not support this trend as effectively as expected. Even if China 
appr
ating jobs in the United States. We have to note that large companies 
of th
eliance of China and other creditor nations on American consumers to buy their goods 
on the other side (cf. Miller, Kennedy, 2009). 
According to the neoclassical economics, if the Chinese currency RMB will be 
appreciated, the exports from China will fall and imports will rise. Then the equilibrium of 
the balance of trade will be reached in this way. In reality, however, the price and quantity 
adjustment migh
eciates its currency, the American trade deficit and hence China’s foreign exchange 
reserve in dollar could rise further until the Chinese production is no more cheaper than the 
American production. It must take a great many years until China’s average wage level 
rises to the same level of that of the United States, and thus China’s labour-intensive 
products completely lose their comparative advantage compared to those of the United 
States. We can use a famous phrase to describe this process: Rome wasn’t built in a day. 
Thus, the appreciation of the Chinese currency is not the ultimate solution for reducing the 
trade deficit and cre
e United States have been benefiting a lot from the exports from China, or rather from 
the trade deficit. There is no question that the exports of low cost merchandise from low 
wage countries like China accelerate the loss of American jobs. Wal-Mart, which in the 
early 1990s advocated the ideology of “Buy American”, doubled its imports from China in 
the period 1997 – 2002. In the next two years, Wal-Mart increased Chinese imports by 50 
percent so that Chinese-made goods in the United States through Wal-Mart accounted for 
18 billion USD in 2004 (cf. Fishman, 2006, pp. 102-103). In the battle for winning jobs, 
the enemy of the United States is not Chinese people, but rather the policies of large 
American companies (cf. Spotts, 2005, p. 133). 
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6. Government Expenditure, Private Consumption and  
 Employment 
 
All the analysis above shows us, China’s growth through exports has become more 
and more difficult. New solution is principally that China must rely on domestic demand 
for further economic development.  
The classical doctrine – known as Say’s Law – which suggested that ‘supply creates 
its own demand’ involves a special assumption that the aggregate demand price of output 
is equal to the supply price for all volume of output, so that there is no obstacle to full 
employment (cf. Keynes, 2007, p. 26); in contrast, Keynes argued with the principle of 
effective demand that the equality between supply and demand is conditional and 
equilibrium between supply and demand does not necessarily command full employment 
(cf. Fontaine, Jolink, 1998, p. 40). Keynes wrote in The General Theory: “The aggregate 
supply price of the output of a given amount of employment is the expectation of proceeds 
which will just make it worth the while of the entrepreneurs to give that employment” 
(Keynes, 2007, p. 24). Then we have the aggregate supply function: Z = ɸ(N), where Z is 
the aggregate supply price of the output from employing N men (cf. Keynes, 2007, p. 25).  
On the other hand, the aggregate demand price is the “proceeds D which entrepreneurs 
expect to receive from the employment of N men, the relationship between D and N being 
written D = f(N), which can be called the aggregate demand function. Now if for a given 
value of N the expected proceeds are greater than the aggregate supply price, i.e. if D is 
greater than Z, there will be an incentive to entrepreneurs to increase employment beyond 
N and, if necessary, to raise costs by competing with one another for the factors of 
production, up to the value of N for which Z has become equal to D. Thus the volume of 
employment is given by the point of intersection between the aggregate demand function 
and the aggregate supply function; for it is at this point that the entrepreneurs’ expectation 
of profits will be maximized. The Value of D at the point of the aggregate demand 
function, where it is intersected by the aggregate supply function, will be called the 
effective demand” (Keynes, 2007, p. 25).  
The principle of effective demand is linked to a theory of income distribution, where 
profits are a redistributed share of factor income, which is transferred to firms when prices 
exceed factor cost. Thus the identity and the equilibrium condition relate to separate 
measurements of income and output, factor cost and prices. We should note that the 
equality of supply and demand prices is conditional: the aggregate demand price does not 
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necessarily 
claim (cf. Fontaine, Jolink, 1998, p. 41).  
This chapter and next chapter will handle the essential affecting factors of the 
dom and in China: government expenditure, private consumption and social 
secu
ing to save today and consume tomorrow.  
son why many Chinese feudalistic dynasties 
enjo
recoup the factor cost and simultaneously pay entrepreneurs the profits they 
estic dem
rity system. An effective social security system is especially important to stimulate the 
private consumption in China, where the people are strongly affected by insecurity of the 
future expectations, and thus are will
 
6.1 Government Expenditure is the Key for Development 
 
François Quesnay, the founder of Physiocratic School, believed that trade and industry 
were not sources of wealth. He regarded the produce of land, the most natural and original 
of the factors of production, as the only true generator of wealth (cf. Perlman, McCann, 
1998, p. 178). This is why he argued in his writing on the Chinese State in ancient times: 
The stability and duration of the Chinese system of government indicated that it was 
founded by itself on the natural order. The Chinese institutions were in accordance with the 
natural principles of a prosperous government and deserved to be a model for all 
governments (cf. Seitz, 2004, p. 74). Note in ancient times China didn’t have the great 
trade surplus like today, but an agricultural economy of self-sufficiency. Quesnay pointed 
out in his book China – A Model for Europe: “Agricultural nations alone can establish 
fixed and lasting empires under a general and invariable government, subject directly to the 
immutable order of Natural Law” (Maverick, Quesnay, 1946, p. 282).  
In the broader sense, an agriculture-oriented economy that Quesnay advocated several 
hundreds of years ago can be interpreted today as domestic-oriented economy without 
exports dependence in general. In the following introduction of Quesnay’s theories, we 
will see why only such a domestic-oriented economy could enrich the whole country, 
especially the poverty population, thus more equitable income distribution would be made. 
Note reducing poverty and overcoming income inequality play decisive role in stability 
ensuring of a country. In the view of Quesnay, the agriculture-oriented economy of self-
sufficiency in ancient China was the rea
yed very long political and social stability for hundreds of years (cf. Needham, 
Harbsmeier, 1998, p. 480). As mentioned and assessed above, the rapid growth of foreign 
trade and exports oriented industry in China over the last 30 years caused great inside and 
outside challenges that forced China to change. Just like China’s government announced, 
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the further development must be principally domestic-oriented development by increasing 
government expenditure in infrastructure, poverty reduction, agriculture, public services 
etc. 
 the nation 
can cause its revenue to expand through proper employment of labours and in conformity 
with the pec  adva
bout the functions of the government and of private enterprise, Quesnay suggested a 
strat
 government should 
not 
The ideas of François Quesnay are of great significance to China’s current economic 
transition from exports depending to domestic demand depending.  
The nations which sell the most necessary or most useful goods have an advantage 
over those which sell luxury goods, because when bad times come, trade in luxury goods 
slackens, then in the nations which sell luxury goods, workers lose job. Further,
uliar ntages of the country (cf. Quesnay, 1962, pp. 88-89).  
A
egy based on a combination of private enterprise and state policy.  Private investment 
is the key to economic development, and this “key” only works well if the state performs 
certain important functions. Firstly, the government has to improve the general economic 
climate by desisting from policies of mercantilism (cf. Mueller, 1978, pp. 154-155). 
Mercantilism is an economic theory which advocates that the most important way for a 
nation to become rich and powerful is to export more than it imports. The difference would 
be settled by an inflow of gold. More gold represented more wealth and more power of a 
nation. Thus mercantilists advocated that government should play a protectionist role in the 
economy by stimulating exports and restricting imports, notably through the use of tariffs 
and subsidies. Since not all nations could have an exports surplus simultaneously and the 
amount of gold in existence was always fixed, a nation had to gain only at the expense of 
other nations (cf. Salvatore, 1995, pp. 1-2). According to Quesnay, the
only introduce free trade but it should also terminate its policy of providing special 
privileges to certain manufacturers, because such a policy caused an artificial diversion of 
investment from agriculture to industry, and industrial subsidies came directly out of the 
net product of agriculture. Further, excessive dues and tolls along the transport routes, 
regional restrictions on economic activities in a country should be abolished or reduced. 
Finally, the whole tax system should be formed so effectively that it could remove the 
disincentive effects of the existing system (cf. Quesnay, 1846. pp. 295-297; cf. Mueller, 
1978, p. 155). 
As mentioned in chapter 2, the growth of the output *iQ  and employment can be 
made by increasing the government expenditure G: 
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In the view of Keynes, government spending financed by national debt is an effective 
mea
 deficits have 
rema
ns to stimulate the economy in recession. When government expenditure exceeds tax 
revenues, there is a government budget deficit, which is financed by selling bonds. The 
sum of all outstanding government bonds is the national debt. The bonds are sold to the 
central bank (government national debt), the public (private national debt) and other 
countries (foreign debt). According to the Keynesian economics, budget
rkable effect to keep an economy operating at full employment because public 
investment financed by government spending create jobs and enhance the consumption. 
National debt required to stimulate the economy in recession would be paid back from 
rising tax revenues in boom times.  That is to say, the budget deficits in recession will be 
set off by budget surpluses in times of full employment – ensuring that in the long run the 
national debt would not continually grow (cf. Kennedy, 2000, p. 243). 
Let’s recall the equation of terms of trade to demonstrate Keynes’ idea formally. In 
equilibrium where imports are equal to exports,  
 
pxX = epmM     (5-2) 
 
 
π =
x
m
p
ep = 
M
X      (5-4) 
 
where π  is terms of trade, xP is the price of export and meP is the price of import of a 
country, e is the foreign exchange rate (cf. Khan, Nsouli, Wong, 2002, pp. 309-310; Bortis, 
1997, pp. 186-187). X and M are the exports and imports quantity.  
This equation can be reformulated as 
 
X=π (b1+b2)Q     (5-7) 
the necessary imports which must be 
imported in order to make the production happen and can be called imports of basic goods, 
because each country must import certain goods which can not be domestically produced 
 
where b=b1+b2 is the import coefficient, b1Q are 
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for institutional reasons (e.g. the presently prevailing internat
for natural reasons; b2Q are the non-necessary consumption and could be termed luxury 
imports, e.g. cars, video recorders, television sets, certain types of food and drink. The 
coef
boom times. A very 
impo
roducts and might add nothing to the 
dom ent. Hence, the state has to intervene in the management of imports so 
that the non-necessary luxury i  the 
protectionism comes usually in the global crisis and recession.  
or the purpose of employment, the main form of government expenditure which the 
Physiocrats favoured was a large-scale im ve port 
by road, river and canal. Public investment in these fields would be an essential 
ccompaniment of the private sector’s effort to increase the production of its products (cf. 
r, i
balance, both US and China could make efforts 
to improve the situation. China could gradually shift to consumption-driven economic 
growth instead of the current e r  the 
Government (delivered at the Fourth Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress on 
ional division of labour) or 
ficient b2 reflects dependence on abroad at the social and cultural level (cf. Bortis, 
1997, p. 195).  
The government revenues are comprised of savings and tax revenues:  
 
zQ = sQ + tQ     (6-1) 
 
where zQ is the non-consumed proportion of national income, sQ is the savings and tQ is 
the tax revenues, z, s & t are the rate of government revenues, savings and tax respectively.  
In recession, the state can expend government spending in public investment through 
selling bonds (national debt), effective demand will be promoted, which leads to rising 
employment and consumption. Thus the economy will go upwards. In a business cycle, the 
national debt can be paid back later through higher tax revenues in the 
rtant remark is that the rising domestic demand financed by national debt can also 
enhance the purchasing power for imported p
estic developm
mports will be as little as possible. This is why
F
pro ment in communications and in trans
a
Muelle 1978, p. 155). This m ght be the key solution for China’s development in the next 
decades. In this respect, Quesnay’s ideas are of particular relevance for the economic 
development of China. 
For the solution of the current trade im
xpo t-driven type. In the Report of the Work of
March 5, 2006), Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council, stated that the Chinese 
government “will adhere to the strategy of expanding domestic consumption and focus on 
increasing consumption demand and strengthening the role of consumption in fueling 
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economic development.” He urged nationwide efforts to raise urban and rural incomes, 
encourage immediate consumption, in particular consumption in rural areas, and improve 
the consumption environment and consumption-related policies. China could also make 
other efforts to narrow the trade imbalance, such as upgrading its industry structure, 
encouraging its enterprises to invest in the US and reducing certain export incentives (cf. 
Nati
he US must also do more to change the situation, such as relaxing some export 
restrictions and adjusting certain ic polices. Acco ing t a rep  the 
Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the relative growth of imports 
that 
4 trillion USD, with annual 
impo
sputes between China and the US, instead of being resolved, might 
shift
onal People’s Congress of China, 2006; cf. Li, 2008, pp. 113-114). 
T
 macroeconom rd o ort by
and exports – and thus the trade imbalance are affected by macroeconomic factors outside 
of trade such as interest rate, exchange rate, inflation rate. In particular, economists note 
differences between the US and US trading partners in national economic growth rates 
and patterns of saving, investment and consumption are primary reasons U.S. imports 
exceed exports (cf. USTR, 2006, p. 11). 
 
An Overview of China’s Domestic Market 
 
China’s domestic market scale in 2006 was equivalent to 2.7 trillion USD and its 
imports were over 792 billion USD, becoming the world’s third largest importer. It is 
estimated that China’s domestic market scale will be soon over 
rts of over 1 trillion USD. Domestic market potential of China is very large. In 
promoting the bilateral economic relations, the West and China should focus on the long-
term benefits (cf. Li, 2008, p. 114). 
The trade imbalance will not be resolved in the short term. Japan is the second largest 
developed country and has enjoyed a trade surplus with the US for over 40 years in the 
stage of development. China is still in a preliminary development stage. It is imaginable 
that one day the trade di
 from the current textiles, shoes, and toys to automobiles (cf. Li, 2008, p. 114). 
 
6.2 Inequality of Income Distribution and Consumption 
 
As shown in chapter 4 and 5, China is experiencing increasing inequality in income 
distribution. Great gaps exist between urban residents and rural residents in terms of per 
capita income and per capita consumption. In 2003, the per capita income averaged RMB 
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2,622 for people living in rural areas and RMB 8,472 for those living in cities. Urban 
households constitute the major portion of the “middle class” in terms of consumption and 
are able to enjoy much more fruits of the economic development and industrialization than 
the rural population (cf. Yusuf, Brooks, Zhao, 2008, p. 285). 
 
Table 6.1 Percentage distribution of expenditure in categories for urban and rural 
households in China, 1995-2003 
 
Area/Expenditure category 1995 2000 2003 
URBAN  AREAS 
Food 50 39 37 
Clothing 14 10 10 
Household facilities and services 7 7 6 
Medicine and medical services 3 6 7 
Transport and communication 5 9 11 
Edu 13 14 cation and culture 9 
Housing 8 11 11 
Other items 3 3 3 
RURAL  AREAS 
Food 59 49 46 
Clothing 7 6 6 
Household facilities and services 5 5 4 
Medicine and medical services 3 5 6 
Transport and communication 3 6 8 
Education and culture 8 11 12 
Housing 14 15 16 
Other items 2 3 2 
 
Source: Yusuf, Brooks, Zhao, 2008, p. 292. 
 
atter of fact, urban areas in any country have automatically advantages for 
econom
As a m
ic development, but in China the whole structure of budget preferences, ownership, 
and legal advantages has favoured cities even more at the expense of the countryside. City 
residents had 2-3 times the income level or consumption level of rural residents in China, 
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whether using per capita income or per capita household consumption measures. As shown 
in Table 4.2, these differences have a rising trend if we consider the last 30 years as a 
whole. The ratio between the per capita annual disposable income of urban households and 
the per capita annual net income of rural households in China was 2.6:1 in 1978 and then 
declined to 1.9:1 in 1985. In the next two decades it rose to 2.9:1 in 1994 at first, declined 
there
an and rural per capita annual living expenditures for 
consumption rose from 2.1:1 in 1985 to 2.7:1 in 1995. After that, it fell slightly in 1996 
ased to 3.0:1 in 2000, and reached 3.3:1 in the period of 2002-
2004 (cf. Banister, 2007, p. 147). Th monstrated in Table 4.1, Table 5.6 
gure 5.7.  
, Zhou have analyzed the urban uality of China in the 80s and 90s. They 
h of urban come inequality is marked by the effect of 
t the beginning of the 1980s, the urban econom system 
cient of urba ncome inequality was very low a nearly 
nce urban economic system reform started in 1985 the income 
 began to rise up. Gini coefficient increased by 12.55 percent from 0.21 to 0.24 
 and annual increase rate was ju 1.32 percent, that is to say, the increase was 
quite gradual and relatively station 980’s. However, in the 1990s the 
 became faster. In 1992 China definitely began to establish socialist market 
system, urban Gini coefficient increased by 42.76 rcent from 0.24 to 0.34. 
ent of Gin efficient, urban come inequality came up 
, p. 30).  
of Yifu Lin, the Chief Economist and Senior Vice President 
tire income ing expenditures, but 
ust spend part of their ne e on production. The share of rural 
ption in the whole consumption decreased, whereas that of the city 
residents increased (cf. Lin, Cai, Li, 2003, p. 224). Although both groups have more 
incom nts are generally worse positioned in the 
society than in the stage before reform and rapid growth.  
after to 2.5:1 during the period 1996-1998, then increased to 3.2:1 in 2003 and also in 
2004. The ratio between the urb
and 1997, then further incre
is trend could be de
and Fi
Chen ineq
summed up that the variation pat  in
the different stages of reform. A ic 
reform didn’t start, Gini coeffi n i nd 
stable before 1984; si
inequality
in 1981-1990 st 
ary in the whole 1
change
economy pe
With annual growth rate 4.03 perc i co  in
obviously (cf. Chen, Zhou, 2004
According to the analysis 
of the World Bank, urban people can spend their en  on liv
rural residents m t incom
population’s consum
e and consumption, however, rural reside
Household expenditure increased in both urban and rural areas in China. However, the 
rate of increase in urban areas was close to 7 percent per annum between 1995 and 2003, 
while increase rate in the rural areas was just over 3 percent (cf. Yusuf, Brooks, Zhao, 
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2008, p. 291). Again, in Table 4.2 we can see the great difference between the household 
expenditures of urban and rural population in China from 1990 to 2006.  
 
Table 6.2 Number of selected consumer durable goods per 1000 households in urban 
and rural China 
 
Area/Item category 1995 2000 2003 
URBAN  AREAS 
Air conditioners 81 308 618 
Cameras 306 384 454 
Colour TV 898 1,166 1,305 
Computers n.a. 97 278 
Hi-fi stereo component systems 105 222 269 
Mobile phones n.a. 195 901 
Motor cars n.a. 5 14 
Motorcycles 63 188 240 
Refrigerators 662 801 887 
Video recorders 182 201 179 
Washing machines 890 905 944 
RURAL  AREAS 
Air conditioners n.a. 13 35 
Cameras 14 31 34 
Colour TV 169 487 678 
Computers n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Hi-fi stereo component systems n.a. 78 105 
Mobile phones n.a. 43 236 
Motor cars n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Motorcycles 49 219 318 
Refrigerators 52 123 159 
Video recorders n.a. 33 35 
Washing machines 169 286 343 
 
Source: Yusuf, Brooks, Zhao, 2008, p. 293. 
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Table 6.1 shows us the household expenditure in eight categories. One of the most 
dramatic changes is the drop in the proportion of expenditure for food. Both urban and 
rural households spent less on food. Expenditure on all item categories, except clothing 
and 
n from a socialist to an increasingly market economy, the government and 
employer have reduced the coverage and level of subsidies for many items which were at 
sequently, expenditur edical services 
increased substantially (cf. Yusuf, Brooks, Zhao, 2008, p. 291).  
ple that demonstrates the ome inequality between urban and rural is 
 electronic and household applica  By 2003, thr oducts – mobile phones, 
achines – were  owned by around 90 percent of all urban 
useholds, while the correspon  proportion f rural househo aried 
. The own  rate for colour TV was in excess of 130 
 areas, but only half of this rate in rural areas (see Table 6.2).  
 the consumer durable goods listed in Table 6.2, all items had a higher 
e in the urban areas compared to the rural areas except motor cy otor 
 is still quite low in China. n that Chin  a booming automobile 
 ownership rates may seem rising. Num f new registrations grew 
illion in 2000 to 2.16 million in 200  average grow te of 
34.3 percent per year. This was a v f car consumption in such a large 
suf, Brooks, Zhao, 2008, 2). 
 6.3 shows us the average inco and expenditure of both urban and rural 
by each income quintile. For each quintile the ave income and expenditure 
ore or less twice that of the rural households. If we com re the 
eholds with that of urban households, the 
r. The cash component of e and total expenditure inc eased 
e rural areas. Table 6.3 shows us also the high propensity of Chinese 
 the rural households in th est incom  who most pr
ave. The propensity med to increase substantially am  
e more they earn, the greater proportion they save. Analysis 
atterns by income level shows us that the as a positive iation 
between income and expenditure for most items except food; and at each income level the 
household facilities and services, increased during the period of 1995-2003. During 
China’s transitio
public expense. Con e on housing, education, and m
Another exam  inc
the use of tions. ee pr
refrigerators and washing m  each
Chinese ho ding or lds v
between one-sixth and one-third ership
percent in urban
Among
ownership rat cle. M
car ownership  Give a has
industry, the low  surp ber o
from just over half a m 4, an th ra
ery small number o
population (cf. Yu p. 29
Table me 
households rage 
of urban households was m pa
cash income and expenditure of the rural hous
gap was even large
for each quintile in th
 total incom r
households to save. Chinese households save a significant proportion of their earning, the 
only exception being e low e quintile obably 
lack the resources to s  see ong the
high-income earners, that is, th
of the expenditure p re w assoc
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rural households spent proportionally more on food but less on other items (cf. Yusuf, 
Brooks, Zhao, 2008, pp. 293-296). 
 
Table 6.3 Income, expenditure, and savings of urban and rural households by income 
quintiles 13, China, 2003. (in yuan) 
 
Income quintile Characteristic/Area 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Average annual household income: 
urban 11,808 19,742 25,433 32,751 56,694 
rural (total income) 7,253 10,094 12,844 16,467 28,288 
rural (cash income) 4,990 7,334 10,049 13,624 25,565 
Average annual household expenditure: 
urban 10,360 15,770 19,182 23,623 36,468 
rural (total expenditure) 8,312 9,316 10,973 13,019 20,382 
rural (cash expenditure) 6,197 7,140 8,903 11,032 18,737 
Savings as % of income: 
urban 12 20 25 28 36 
rural (total) -15 8 15 21 28 
rural (cash) -24 3 11 19 27 
 
Source: Yusuf, Brooks, Zhao, 2008, p. 294. 
 
6.3 Factors Affecting Inequality in China 
 
In order to find a solution for the problem of inequality in China, we should try to 
investigate the prominent factors affecting the income and consumption inequality of the 
Chinese residents. Policy implications might base on consideration of these factors.  
It is clear that the relationship between the inequality and development depends on a 
couple of factors. Some play an essential role at lower levels of economic development 
while others are more important at the later stages of development (cf. Wan, 2008, p. 20). 
Chen, Zhou pointed out in their book that China has been experiencing the so called “dual 
                                                 
13 Income quintiles: 1st quintile = low income; 2nd quintile = lower middle income; 3rd quintile = middle income; 4th 
quintile = upper middle income; 5th quintile = high income. 
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transition”. That is, in view of the economic development situation, Chinese economy is in 
the transition from low income to middle income; in terms of the economic system pattern, 
Chinese economy is experiencing the change from the planned economy to the market 
econ
 inequality (cf. Chen, Zhou, 2004, p. 128).  
ay affect income and consumption inequality in China: 
ncome redistribution and social security system, infrastructure and 
other public goods, institutional arrangements (cf. Wan, 2008, pp. 20-22
 
6.3.1 Economic Growth 
of factors s to e ic growth and include economic growth 
rate, investment ratio (in oportion of GDP), trade 
ence (rate of import a rt v GDP izatio (the f 
), lab ratio (the r ural nt w  
 reg urba ploym te. T off  
economic efficiency and equity When efficiency is the central 
n, economic growth may faster, bu equality m be enlarg and vice sa. 
ther hand, econom owth bri  also jobs ich raise the incomes of the 
and help alleviate p ty. Thus s difficult to evaluate the overall im  of 
growth on inequality (cf. Wan, 2008, p. 20). 
 exports, China is known for having low 
labour costs and has the world’s largest manufacturing workforce for more than 100 
million. Ma rnational levels (see Figure 
6.1) but high relative to rural levels (see Table 6.4). Employees in China’s city 
man
is stable at best, the difference tends to widen because per capita productivity in urban 
 more rapidly than ure. Hence, inequality in the total in e 
omy. The dual transition causes all great challenges in the Chinese society and 
contributes essentially to the income
 Four groups of factors m
economic growth, i
).  
 
The first group  relate conom
vestment to GDP), level of FDI (as a pr
depend nd expo alues to ), urban n ratio  share o
urban population in total our mig n ratio atio of r immigra orkers to
urban employment) and istered n unem ent ra he trade between
 is commonly assumed. 
concer  be t in ay ed,  ver
But on the o ic gr ngs  wh
poor people over it i pact
With economic growth highly depending on
nufacturing wages in China are low relative to inte
ufacturing enterprises received a total compensation of 0.95 USD per hour, while the 
workers in rural manufacturing enterprises earned averagely 0.38 USD per hour, less than 
half that of their city counterparts (cf. Banister, 2005, p. 22).  
With respect to urbanization and rural-urban migration, Kuznets pointed out that the 
increasing weight of urban population means increasing unequal distribution. The relative 
difference in per capita income between the rural and urban populations will not drift 
downward in the process of economic growth. Although there is evidence to suggest that it 
pursuits increases  in agricult com
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distribution should increase at the primary stage of growth (cf. Kuznets, 1955, p. 8). As a 
matter of fact, the internal migration of rural surplus labour from villages to cities created 
even higher urban unemployment rate which has been a serious problem in China since 
economic reform.  
 
Figure 6.1 Average hourly compensation costs of manufacturing workers in selected 
economies and regions, 200214 [U.S.=100 (21.11 USD)] 
        
 
 
Source: Banister, 2005, p. 32, Chart 1. 
 
It is the large reserve of surplus labour in China’s agricultural sector that drives 
internal migration, which in turn creates rising unemployment in the cities, that is, more 
inequality in the cities and also more inequality between cities and villages. In 2004, the 
labour force in China was approximately 768 million workers and the surplus labour 
accounted between 15 and 85 million. This means, between 2 percent and 11 percent of the 
labour force were driven to migrate to the cities in order to enter the export oriented sector 
with higher wages (cf. Lipschitz, Rochon, Verdier, 2008, p. 7). 
                                                 
14 EU (15) are the European Union member countries prior to the expansion to 25 countries on May 1, 2004. 
Asian NIE’s are the newly industrialized economies of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. 
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Table 6.4 Compensation of urban manufacturing employees and TVE15 industry 
employees in selected regions in China, 2002 
 
Annual labour 
compensation 
Monthly labour 
compensation 
Hourly labour 
compensation 
Province Annual 
earnings 
(yuan) yuan USD yuan USD yuan USD 
Urban manufacturing employees: 
Nati
average 
173 7.87 0.95onal 11,125 17,152 2,071 1,429
Shanghai 21,957 33,770 4,078 2,814 340 15.50 1.87
Zhejiang 13,435 20,663 2,496 1,722 208 9.48 1.15
Jiangsu 11,731 18,042 2,179 1,504 182 8.28 1.00
Guangdong 14,958 23,005 2,778 1,917 232 10.56 1.28
TVE industry employees: 
National 
average 
6,891 7,442 899 574 69 3.13 0.38
Shanghai 11,939 12,894 1,557 1,075 130 5.86 0.71
Zhejiang 10,188 11,003 1,329 917 111 5.00 0.60
Jian 2 733 89 4.00 0.48gsu 8,143 8,794 1,06
Guangdong 8,345 9,013 1,088 751 91 4.10 0.49
 
fectiveness depends on the 
rationality and efficiency of the fiscal transfer and social security systems (cf. Wan, 2008, 
p. 20). Social security can be seen as a kind of redistribution.  
The current fiscal transfer system in China is not well designed and its function is not 
clearly defined. This might weaken its effectiveness in reducing inequality. China 
introduced Tax Sharing System in 1994, which fundamentally overhauled the revenue 
sharing system by shifting to tax assignments, under which taxes were levied by central 
Source: Banister, 2005, p. 33, table 4. 
 
6.3.2 Income Redistribution and the Social Security System 
 
The second group of factors relates to income redistribution and the social security 
system. Income redistribution can reduce inequality, but its ef
                                                 
15 TVE's are town and village enterprises. 
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gove
ith local governments at a flat rate by origin, the Tax Sharing System is creating more 
 (cf 00
As show re rence b sfers p  rich 
regions and those to the poor regions in China was very large. For instance, in 1998 
transfers per capita to Shan hina, accounted for about 
, whi i, o e poo ovinces in China, had 200 yuan transfers per 
e ratio was 7.5:1.  
e 6.2 a t  in C  1998  
 
rnment, local government, or shared. However, the Tax Sharing System in China had 
made the system more favourable to rich regions. By sharing value-added tax revenues 
w
inequality . Wong, 2
n in Figu
5, p. 9). 
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Source: Wong, 2005, p. 9, figure D.  
 
Tax rebates from the central government to local governments comprise the bulk of 
central-local financial transfer payments. For instance, in 2003, the total tax rebate in the 
eastern region, the rich region of China, accounted for more than 50 percent of the total tax 
rebate of the country. Rebates for value-added and consumption tax made up 52.6 percent 
of the total rebate; and the rebate for income tax took up over 70 percent of the total. Even 
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after the financial transfer payment, the per capita financial capacity in the western region, 
the poorer region in China, was only about 48.3 percent of that in the eastern region (cf. 
United Nations Development Programme, 2008, p. 106). 
Other variables in the second group include the rates of coverage of the social security 
syste
 us the trend of China’s social security from 1990 to 2006. The 
Government has increased year-on-year spending in health, but the public share is still low, 
at o age is 2.6 percent (cf. United 
Nations Development Programme, 2008, p. 107). To establish an effective social security 
system, China still has a long way to go. 
 
6.3.3 Infrastructure and Other Public Goods 
 
The third group of factors is the provision of infrastructure and other public goods. 
Public education can increase the stock of human capital within middle and low income 
groups and improve their employment and income earning ability. Thus, inequality might 
be reduced. Public infrastructure, such as transport and telecommunication, may also 
benefit this group by offering them more opportunities for employment and self-
development. The average years of schooling, the density of highway and railroad network 
and the telephone coverage rate can be used to interpret these variables (cf. Wan, 2008, pp. 
20-21). In general, it is estimated that the average annual cost of public works in a country 
accounts for 3-5 percent of its GNP (gross national product), but in developing, highly 
urbanizing countries such as China, expenditure in infrastructure can easily reach 9 percent 
of GNP per year (cf. Judd, 2002, p. 23). 
or the rural basic public services, self-reliance has always been stressed and state 
financing plays only a secondary role. This has been partly institutionalized by the hukou 
system16, a household registration system which creates inequalities in basic rights and 
oppo
m, including the basic pension system, the basic medical insurance system and the 
unemployment insurance system which are operational in urban areas, while most rural 
areas are not covered. The government has been launched the project to establish these 
systems in recent years, and their effectiveness still needs to be examined (cf. Wan, 2008, 
pp. 20-21). Table 4.8 shows
nly about 0.82 percent of GDP, while the world aver
F
rtunities between urban and rural populations. In recent years, household registration 
(hukou) has been eased, and consequently rural-to-urban labour flows have grown. 
                                                 
16 Hukou system is a household registration system in China which classified all households as either urban or rural 
residents. Assigned at birth, Hukou registration was fixed to a particular locality and virtually impossible to change. Its 
chief purpose was to limit the size of cities by preventing rural leakage into urban society (cf. Campanella, 2008, p. 175). 
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However, the dual mode of public service delivery has not fundamentally changed. Health 
care, social security and many other essential services still distinguish between “urban” 
and “rural” systems, that is, the former still receive more public funding and the latter is 
mor
 on cities. During the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-
2005), the absolute amount of rural investment from the state budget increased greatly, but 
the proporti pen  2000, the proportion was 
around 9.3 percent, and for 2001 to 2005 was about 8 percent. Lack of clarity on the 
spen
 in income distribution (cf. Wan, 2008, p. 21).  
responsibility instead of collective responsibility of a community) and of township and 
ent 
e self-financed. This slows the process of narrowing disparities between rural and 
urban areas (cf. United Nations Development Programme, 2008, p. 104). 
Generally, the development of rural areas has lagged behind that of urban areas. 
Policy to improve health, education, and infrastructure services especially in rural areas 
will likely help those who are worst off, both by encouraging rural activity (agricultural or 
otherwise) and by facilitating migration to the cities (cf. Winters, Yusuf, 2007, p. 27). 
However, migration of the rural workers to the cities as a solution is debatable, because the 
additional accommodating capacity of the Chinese cities, which are already densely 
populated, is not unlimited.  
State financial support is still focused
on of s ding in rural areas decreased. From 1996 to
ding responsibilities of each level of government resulted in weak funding 
mechanisms which restricted the development of rural compulsory education. This is the 
major reason why education funding per student in urban areas is still much higher than in 
rural ones (cf. United Nations Development Programme, 2008, pp. 104-105). 
 
6.3.4 Institutional Arrangements 
 
The fourth group of factors relates to institutional arrangements. As often the case for 
a transitional economy, China has experienced privatization of public properties. In a 
market economy, private property is an important means for earning income. However, 
privatization can lead to larger inequality
However, a World Bank report in 2003 shows us that there are also cases showing a 
reduction of income inequality arising from market development. China’s enormous 
structural transformations included shifts from central planning to markets, from 
agriculture to manufacturing and services, and from a closed to a globally-integrated 
economy. The establishment of household responsibility system (individual household 
village enterprises (TVE), accompanied by sharp increases in agricultural procurem
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prices, supported agricultural productivity and allowed farmers to move away from 
agriculture to pursue better paid off-farm jobs. All of these contributed to the lifting of 
about 400 million people out of poverty at the 1 USD a day expenditure level and 
contributed to the job creations and poverty reduction (cf. World Bank, 2003, p. 2).   
However, unemployment has become an important source of poverty and inequality in 
som
e ratio of central and local financial revenues and 
expe
e less market oriented areas. Further, Wan pointed out that inappropriate government 
intervention in the operations of enterprises, unjustified government levies, corruption, and 
similar institutional problems may cause income inequality. Without adequate monitoring, 
political power will be used to allocate resources and induce rent-seeking behaviour, and 
this leads to unfair income distribution consequently (cf. Wan, 2008, p. 21).  
 
Figure 6.3 Changes in th
nditures (1990-2006) 
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Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2008, p. 105, Figure 3.3.4. 
 
Uneven fiscal relationships between central and local governments have produced 
widening regional fiscal disparities. Since the tax-sharing reform in 1994, local financial 
revenue has mainly depended on the performance of the local economy. The central 
Government continues to collect the bulk of the country’s revenue. To support 
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equalization, central government transferred certain transfer payment of the revenues to 
local governments, but the scale was too small. As shown in Figure 6.3, the proportion of 
central financial revenues accounted for around 53 percent of total revenues in 2006, but 
expenditures at the central level only accounted for about 25 percent of the country’s total 
expe
 yuan in 1978 
to 5.1 trillion yuan in 2007. The scale of the increase is indicative of the magnitude of the 
stren e not been 
ices. In spite of marked expansion of the absolute amount of 
government inputs, the proportion of spending on science and technology, culture, 
education and health did not grow in the period 1992 – 2005. The education budget 
accounted for 14.9 percent of total expenditures in 2005, a slight decrease from the 
previous year. The Government wished to boost education spending from 2.8 percent to 4 
percent of GDP, but this wish has gone unrealized, and the current spending level remains 
far below the average of developing countries (cf. United Nations Development 
Programme, 2008, pp. 106-107). 
In 2006, the Government decided to define the responsibilities of central and local 
governments more clearly, and establish tax and fiscal systems that balance the 
responsibilities and financial capacities of local governments. This project is still under 
readjustment. The main responsibility for providing basic public services lies with local 
governments, but many of them lack the resources to fulfil the terms of their obligations. 
The central and provincial governments have strong financial positions, but responsibilities 
are often relegated to lower level governments. This mismatched financial capacities and 
responsibilities of local governments expand regional disparities in basic public services 
(cf. 
nditures. Local revenue was only 47 percent of the total, but financed 75 percent of 
the total expenditures (cf. United Nations Development Programme, 2008, p. 106).   
Public finance institutions determine the inputs in the gradual equalization of basic 
public services across the regions. Though China has made important progress in 
establishing fiscal institutions in line with the market economy, inputs for basic public 
services are still insufficient. China’s tax revenues increased from 113 billion
gthening of the government’s fiscal position, although these numbers hav
adjusted for changes in pr
United Nations Development Programme, 2008, p. 107). 
 
6.4 Policy Suggestions: Government Expenditure as Basis 
 
By using a panel data modelling method, Wan (2008) examined the trend and causes 
of income inequality in China. The result of his analysis does not support an unconditional 
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Kuznets Curve17, indicating that economic growth alone will cause a trend of rising 
inequality in the future in China. Most growth factors can help reduce inequality via their 
effects on employment. But China’s fiscal transfer and social security systems are found to 
contribute to higher inequality because of unequal distribution of transfer payment and low 
coverage of the social security systems of the poor. Possibilities exist for enhancing these 
systems to reduce inequality and increase economic efficiency. For instance, education 
oppo
c service, provide conditions for learning, absorbing and 
appl
u pointed out that government expenditure aimed at increasing domestic demands 
should ben ural which can 
reduce the income gap between urban and rural areas, alleviate living pressure of poverty 
popu
rtunities are unequally distributed in China, thus improving the education in 
underdeveloped areas can certainly help reduce the urban-rural gap of income distribution. 
Further, Wan concluded that marketization is negatively related to urban and rural 
inequality (cf. Wan, 2008, p. 30). Therefore, policies and government expenditure aimed at 
better governance and benefiting the poor will not only contribute to China’s sustainable 
growth in the long run, but also help reduce inequality. 
In his book, the economics professor Angang Hu (2007) at Tsinghua University listed 
China’s five targets of anti-poverty project in the future: “further increase average income 
of poor peasants by 60-65 % by the year 2010, eradicate poverty population under national 
poverty line – abject poverty population, make great strides to eradicate poverty population 
under international poverty line, at least reduce by 2/3; ensure poor peasants’ normal meals 
and basic food needs; create more opportunities of employment for poverty population, 
break barriers of systems against labour floating; enhance investment of human capital for 
poor population, offer basic publi
ying knowledge, extend development scopes, promote the development ability of poor 
people radically; realize the objective of environment protection and infrastructural 
construction” (Hu, 2007, p. 125). Such advices are in line with Keynes idea of effective 
demand, which implies that employment and thus economic development are supported by 
effective demand (aggregate demand) that is determined by income distribution and can be 
improved by government expenditure.  
 
Combining Government Expenditure, Domestic Demand and Poverty Reduction 
 
H
efit r inhabitants especially rural poverty population firstly, 
lation, promote the adjustment of rural structure and increase the ability of rural 
                                                 
17 Kuznets curve is the graphical representation of Kuznets’s theory that economic inequality increases at the 
primary stage of the growth, then at a critical point decreases automatically (cf. Buckley, 2008, p. 265). 
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inhabitants to develop themselves so as to ease poverty. It is suggested to provide basic 
facilities to rural poverty population by realizing the objective of “seven provisions”, 
namely: 
1. Water provision (clean drinking-water, necessary water supply for living 
and producing),  
2. Electricity and electric net provision,   
3. Post provision,   
4. Road provision (country roads or simply roads),   
5. Cable provision (broadcasting and TV),   
6. Telephone provision (especially public telephone), and   
7. Network provision (internet especially public internet in county and 
village).  
All these seven provisions will help farmers accelerate adjustment of the agricultural 
structure and have access to technology, fund, information, qualified personnel and 
policies to adjustment of agricultural structure; help farmers develop commodity base of 
agricultural products with high quality; to encourage poor farmer families to establish 
contractual relationship with large-scale agricultural enterprises and provide technical 
guide and planting information to the poor farmers; to encourage selling system of 
agricultural products and support farmers to store, process, transport and sell agricultural 
products; to increase employment opportunities of farmers; to promote the rural basic 
education and basic public health (cf. Hu, 2007, pp. 128-129). Such government 
expenditures in public services will improve the employment for the poor and thus increase 
the purchasing power of them.  
As a matter of fact, the Keynesian way of stimulating aggregate demand by increasing 
government expenditure, especially in infrastructure, had been once adopted by China in 
1990s. We can review Keynesian employment theory again with the supermultiplier 
relation (2-41) and internal employment mechanism, relation (2-42) in chapter 2. Its value 
has 
Asian financial crisis in 1998, China increased government investment in construction of 
infra
been proved by China’s practice. As a reaction to the slower exports caused by the 
structure to stimulate domestic demand. From 1998 to 2000 the total government 
investment accounted for 1.2 trillion USD. Many infrastructure projects were underway, 
including the introduction of state-of-the-art technology to agriculture, and a new railway 
linking the north-eastern and southern regions. Thus the growth rate of GDP in 1998 
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reached about 7.8 percent (cf. Chow, 2007, p. 139). Promoted by government expenditure, 
the employment growth in China during the Asian financial crisis remained stable.  
 
Promo
Budgetary Funds and Loans for Poverty Alleviation 
 
The mo ty of income distribution in China is the disparity between 
rural and ur y Reduction reported that 
the Chinese d means in its poverty alleviation 
work up to 
“-- Pr
require industrialized operation, farm products with resources advantages and 
mark
lief projects and, in line with the practical financial 
diffi
 
ting the Industrialized Operation of Agriculture and Increasing 
st essential inequali
ban areas. The White Paper on Rural China’s Povert
 government will adopt a couple of ways an
2010. Two of them can be seen as projects in the long run:   
omoting the industrialized operation of agriculture. In line with the 
ments for 
etability should be produced or planned and developed according to an integrated 
plan, so as to develop a characteristic, regionally leading industry. Great efforts will be 
made to develop ‘cooperation between farmers and companies’ and a made-to-order 
farming. Large and medium-sized agricultural products processing enterprises capable of 
developing new markets should be guided or encouraged to build raw material production 
bases in the poor areas and provide serialized, pre-production, in-production and post-
production services for impoverished peasant households, so as to form an industrialized 
operation featuring the integration of trade, industry and agriculture and the coordinated 
management of production, supply and sale. 
-- Increasing budgetary funds and loans for poverty alleviation. The state will further 
increase the scale of work-re
culties of the poor areas, strengthen financial transfer payments and implement the 
control of budgetary poverty relief funds with the household as the basic unit. The 
increased relief loans shall be used for developing crop cultivation, aquiculture, poultry 
raising, labour-intensive enterprises, farm produce processing enterprises, market 
circulation enterprises and infrastructure construction, which will help raise the incomes 
of the poverty-stricken people. Small amount credit loans will be extended in an active 
and steady manner to help needy peasant households develop their production” 
(Information Office of the State Council of China, 2001).  These projects will increase the 
farmers’ productivity and help them have effective access to an agricultural market. 
Income of the rural population will increase.  
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Employment Creation for Low Income Population 
 
The main property of urban or rural low-income population is labour ability, while to 
be e  income or 
d give them priority of obtaining 
employment opportunities, including temporary, short-term, and flexible informal 
emp
bility to increase 
farm
 
ment of the TVEs is certainly one of the main 
appr
ngaged in formal or informal employment is their main source of obtaining
increasing income. Employment-oriented polices shoul
loyment. The transference of agricultural labour force in large scale should be actively 
promoted and regarded as both the core content of China’s economic developing strategies 
and an important measure of China’s anti-poverty strategies. With the supply of 
agricultural exceeding demand and China’s entry into WTO, the a
ers’ per capita income becomes smaller and smaller, hence, farmers’ labour service 
income and non-agricultural income should be increased and the proportion of that in 
farmers’ per capita net income should also be increased. The central government should set 
down employment policies allowing farmer workers to compete justly and encourage the 
orderly flow and transference of rural labour force (cf. Hu, 2007, p. 130). 
Up until the mid-1990s, the township and village enterprise (TVE) sector was the 
engine that drove employment for the peasant workers. From 1980s to 1990s TVEs 
provided employment for some 100 million peasants, thus easing unemployment in the
countryside greatly. In the mid-1990s TVEs began dismissing workers. The slow growth of 
TVEs in China brought one of the most serious social problems: increasing unemployment 
(cf. Howell, 2004, pp. 26-27). The re-develop
oaches for the employment growth of the peasant workers. Financing emerged as a 
major constraint to TVE development, and prevented TVEs from getting new opportunities 
that came with greater trade integration. According to a survey of TVEs in four cities in 
China, 90 percent of initial equity was self-financed, while less than 5 percent came from 
bank loans. 80 percent of these firms listed finance as the most essential constraint, 
whereas the weak market demand was seen as a constraint at the secondary level (cf. 
OECD, 2001, p. 190). In order to promote employment for low income population, 
government expenditure should contribute to establish an effective rural finance institution 
to develop and regulate the credit market in rural areas. TVEs and big firms in the cities 
should have equal opportunities to access to the credit market.  
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Investment in Promoting the Abilities of the Poor People and Building Human  
Capital 
t in 1995 and 8.8 
perc
s in people’s health and 
education, enhances developing abilities of poor people to support themselves, knowledge 
poverty and human poverty can be alleviated and the high degree of inequality of income 
distribution can be eliminated (cf. Hu, 2007, pp. 131-132). 
 
Hu pointed out that educational investment in poverty population should be increased 
by a large margin; 9 years of compulsory education should be taken as a prior objective to 
be realized. National educational fund should be directly used to assist poverty population, 
such as the cost of books, living subsidy of teachers in rural areas, the input fund of 
constructing schoolhouse and buying equipments. The government provides funds to 
subsidize the children of poor families at least to accomplish 9 years of compulsory 
education or 12 years of education, which make them able to obtain further education and 
employment opportunities with the same level as those children in cities by means of 
“educational migrant” and get rid of poverty completely (cf. Hu, 2007, p. 131).  
The importance of education in generating income has been recognized and increased 
significantly in China. According to the research of Xin Meng, the rate of return to an 
additional year of schooling in China was 3.8 percent in 1988, 5.2 percen
ent in 1999, which is more than double the rate in 1988. If poor households are unable 
to pay enough educational expenditure, their children receive worse education than 
children from rich households. This difference in educational investment will bring even 
larger differences in future income. This means, investment in education is related to 
intergenerational income mobility. Therefore, the government should provide poor 
households assistance to smooth their educational expenditure (cf. Meng, 2006, p. 103).   
Another important content of anti-poverty project is to invest in people’s health and to 
diminish health poverty, directly provide basic public health service to poverty population.  
What the government should do is: directly establishing medical treatment salvation fund, 
giving subsidy to clinical service expenditure, family planning expenditure and women’s 
childbearing expenditure of poverty population, and adopting assisting projects with low 
cost, high income, high social benefits and wide coverage. The government should also 
widely spread knowledge of public health care, meal and nutrition, enhance the ability of 
poverty population to get population health capital and prevent diseases, subsidize the 
doctors who work in poverty areas irregularly or for a short term and provide medical 
service to poor people. Only when the government invest
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Strengthening the Incentives of Government Officials to Effectively Deliver Basic  
rvices 
deed, only 
quan
d 
effic
Public Se
 
Institutionalized systems to evaluate the effectiveness of public services, and link the 
promotions of government officials to their performance in service delivery, can serve as a 
powerful incentive mechanism to equalize access. According to the Human Development 
Report China 2007/08, the current transparent and rules-bound government performance 
assessment systems are still at an experimental stage. In China, there has been a 
widespread tendency to evaluate the officials’ performance based on economic indicators 
(like GDP) rather than on targets and indicators measuring the quality of basic public 
services. The Government should set targets, which can frequently capture important 
distinctions in quality that is directly related to outcomes of the public goods. In
titative measures such as inputs, number of staff, number of buildings etc., with which 
China is used to reporting the success, can not effectively reflect the real improvement of 
public services (cf. United Nations Development Programme, 2008, p. 111). 
A functioning performance appraisal system can be instrumental in equalizing services, 
improving efficiency, encouraging government staff to fulfil their responsibilities and 
establishing a foundation for enhanced government accountability, said Premier Wen 
Jiabao in 2006. Hence, it will be a powerful incentive guiding the behaviour of government 
departments responsible for basic public services. The system should be based on 
incentives for public servants to do their duties, a precondition for the effectiveness an
iency of public policy implementation. A well-functioning accountability system 
assures the quality of policy decision-making. The government is to link appointment and 
promotion of cadres to assessment of their performance in basic public service provision, 
through creating indicators of public service provision that will form the basis for 
evaluating the performance of the officials in public service. This will change their 
perception of GDP as a hard indicator and the provision of public services as a soft one, 
and let them be responsible to meet the needs of the general public (cf. United Nations 
Development Programme, 2008, p. 131). 
Evaluation of the Government’s performance should give a prominent position to 
performance in basic public service delivery. As shown in Figure 6.4, targets set in public 
service provision should increasingly be outcome oriented. Evaluation methods should be 
innovative, open and transparent, and involve the participation of local users of basic 
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publ
, p. 131). 
ic services and civil society organizations (cf. United Nations Development 
Programme, 2008
 
Figure 6.4 Performance assessment indicator system of basic public services 
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Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2008, p. 132, Figure 4.1. 
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6.5 Promoting Consumption-driven Development 
 
In the Keynesian consumption function, a certain proportion of current income the 
peop rease of 
government expenditure does not have the multiplied effect on the increase of national 
inco would support 
“all sorts of policies for increasing the propensity to consume. For it is unlikely that full 
employment can be maintained, whatever we may do about investment, with the existing 
propensity to consume. There is room, therefore, for both policies to operate together; – to 
promote investment and, at the same time, to promote consumption, not merely to the level 
which with the existing propensity to consume would correspond to the increased 
investment, but to a higher level still” (Keynes, 2007, p. 325). Thus, rising consumer 
spending and increasing government expenditure are both of decisive importance to the 
further economic development in China.  
It is true that almost all the highly developed East Asian economies, such as the Four 
Asian Tigers (Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong), have been maintaining 
exceptionally high growth rates and rapid industrialization through exports of products and 
services, but for a gigantic “continental” economy such as China, the level of consumption 
is ultimately the main determinant of economic growth in the long term (cf. People’s 
Daily, 2000). As analyzed in the chapters above, if China continues its economic growth 
mainly through exports, on one side, the income growth of China’s workers must be 
slowed down in order to ensure the export advantages, the domestic consumption growth 
will be impeded, the income distribution will be more unequal; on the other side, the 
industrialized countries have a rising unemployment problem. Even supposing the 
industrialized countries don’t implement the policy of protectionism, but production 
sectors of these economies would be soon totally damaged by cheap Chinese-made 
products that flood the domestic market.  
On the contrary, if an economy is more consumer-centric and less export-dependent, 
capital and resources will be allocated more efficiently, employment will be promoted, and 
the benefits of growth would spread more equitably (cf. Devan, Rowland, Woetzel, 2009). 
Good employment and a relative fair income distribution will, in turn, increase domestic 
cons economic 
ent.  
le spend gives the multiplier its power. Without this proportion, the inc
me (cf. Nattrass, Wakeford, Muradzikwa, 2003, p. 43). Further, Keynes 
umption. Being led by private consumption is the healthy way of 
developm
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6.5.1 Keynesian Theory of Consumption  
ndstill before full employment has been reached. 
In a 
onsumption.  
 
Keynes summed up the principle of effective demand that income depends on the 
volume of employment in a given situation of technique, resources and costs. Consumption 
depends on the level of aggregate income and, therefore, on the level of employment, when 
there is no change in the propensity to consume. The effective demand is the sum of the 
amount which the community is expected to spend on consumption and the amount which 
it is expected to devote to new investment. The amount of labour which entrepreneurs will 
employ depends on the effective demand. The volume of employment in equilibrium 
depends on the aggregate supply function (note the aggregate supply is equal to effective 
demand in equilibrium), the propensity to consume and the volume of investment. Keynes 
called this principle “the essence of the General Theory of Employment” (Keynes, 2007, p. 
26).  An insufficiency of effective demand will inhibit the process of production and may 
bring the increase of employment to a sta
community where the major income is wage income, the community has a tendency to 
consume the most part of its output, thus the marginal propensity to consume18 is very 
large, so that a modest measure of investment will be sufficient to provide full 
employment; whereas a wealthy community where the major income is no longer wage 
income, but property income, it is no more the case. Instead of purchasing more ordinary 
consumer goods, the wealthy people would try to save money or find other investment 
opportunities which make them keep rich (e.g. purchase of antiques or luxury villas) but 
add nothing to employment. Thus the marginal propensity to consume will be weaker. The 
working of the principle of effective demand will reduce the actual output as well as the 
employment (cf. Keynes, 2007, p. 26-28). This means, consumption quote of wage income 
is greater than consumption quote of property income, however, saving rate of wage 
income is less than saving rate of property income. Thus, a relative equal income 
distribution may promote the individuals’ c
Formally, we can see the conclusion above in the supermultiplier relation again 
(details see chapter 2):  
( )[ ] ( ) ( )vdgbbkz
XGQ
s +−++−
+=
21/11
* π .  (2-41) 
 
                                                 
ity to consume is the change in consumption that produced by one unit change in disposable income. 
Keyn ed it as dCw/dYw, where dCw is the change in consumption in terms of wage units, dYw is the change in 
disposable income in terms of wage units (cf. Keynes, 2007, pp. 102-105). The increase in wage income will be 
consumed rather than be saved. 
18 Marginal propens
es defin
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The lea oef  fraction of non-consumed part 
of the income and 
kage c ficient zs = 1 – cs = ss+ ts indicates the
( )[ ]k/11−  is the share of property income. If the income distribution is 
very unequal, the consumption coefficient cs is small, zs is great and also the property 
income ( )[ ]k/11− , thus the output will decline (cf. Bortis, 1997, pp. 142-154, pp. 166-168; 
Bortis, 2003, pp. 461-467). With declining output, more workers lose their jobs, the 
individuals’ have less purchasing power, then the aggregate consumption decreases.  
The internal employment mechanism, which is derived from the supermultiplier 
relation,  
 
( )[ ] ( )vdgkz
GQ
s
i +−−= /11*              (2-42) 
 
shows us that the state can enhance the output and employment by increasing government 
expenditure G. In the long run, investment is derived demand (since S=I and saving is a 
pure residual). Output and employment depend, in principle, upon the relation between 
government expenditures and the leakage (z). The latter is dependent upon income 
distribution. There is a negative association between unequal distribution and employment 
(cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 190). The individual’s purchasing power and household consumption 
depend strongly on the level of employment, because principally the wage income will be 
consumed but the property income will be saved. More unequal distribution means less 
consumption, less production, thus less employment and even less consumption. Such a 
chain reaction will put the economy into recession.  
 
6.5.2 Purchasing Power and Consumption Market in China 
 
Overview of China’s Private Consumption 
 
With a population of 1.3 billion people, China’s nominal GDP accounted for US 1.9 
trillion USD in 2005. However, according to the purchasing power parity adjusted 
estimate, China’s real purchasing power could exceed 8 trillion 
and Japan, as the largest economy and the second-largest economy, stand at a total 
purchasing power of about 12 trillion USD and 4 trillion USD. That is to say, in terms of 
USD. The United States 
real purchasing power, China could now rank as the second-largest economy in the world. 
But China’s purchasing power is strongly concentrated in major cities in the East Coast of 
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Chin
cent of t
ent has
f the 
popu
s of the whole population lives in rural areas without retirement pension and 
unem loyment benefits (cf. Kotabe, 2007, pp. 27-28). The lack of social security has a 
negative and significant effect on total rural consumption in China. Indeed, the households 
with great uncertainty are more likely to consume less and sav more. This would impede 
the further economic development of China.  
a, such as Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen etc. The amount of consumers from the top ten 
cities is only 4 per he total population, but they have 22.6 percent of the total 
purchasing power. The impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on China’s economic 
developm  been recognized, but owing to the fact that most of FDI flows to the 
coastal areas, the inland population can hardly increase their income. The income 
inequality is the major reason for the purchasing power disparity. A small share o
lation living in costal areas benefited from the large part of China’s growing income. 
Two-third
p
e 
 
Table 6.5 Household consumption expenditure  
 
Year Level (yuan) 
 
Index 
(Preceding 
Year=100) 
Index 
(1978=100) 
 All Rural Urban 
Urban/Rural 
consumption 
ratio 
All Rural Urban All Rural Urban
1980 238 178 489 2.7 109.0 108.4 107.2 116.5 115.4 110.2 
1985 446 349 765 2.2 113.5 113.3 111.1 185.2 195.7 141.3 
1990 833 560 1596 2.9 103.7 99.2 108.5 229.2 215.4 190.9 
1995 2355 1313 4931 3.8 107.8 106.8 107.2 345.1 282.9 303.2 
2000 3632 1860 391.1 6850 3.7 108.6 104.5 107.8 491.0 371.3 
2001 104.5 103.2 518.8 388.0 403.6 3869 1969 7113 3.6 105.7
2002 4106 2062 7387 3.6 106.5 105.2 104.2 552.5 408.1 420.5 
2003 4411 2103 7901 3.8 106.5 100.3 106.3 588.5 409.5 447.2 
2004 4925 2301 8679 3.8 107.4 103.4 106.4 632.3 423.5 475.7 
2005 5463 2560 9410 3.7 107.9 107.6 105.7 682.3 455.7 502.8 
2006 6111 2848 10359 3.6 109.3 108.6 107.6 745.8 494.9 541.0 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007 CD-ROM, 2007, Table 3-22.  
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The average Chinese family saves astonishingly 25 percent of its discretionary 
income, about six times the savings rate of US households and three times the rate of 
Japan’s. Indeed, China’s savings rate is 15 percentage points above the GDP-weighted 
average of the whole Asia (cf. Devan, Rowland, Woetzel, 2009). As a matter of fact, the 
Chinese tend to low private consumption and low private investment. Both major 
consumers and major investors for ‘Made in China’ mass-produced goods come from 
industrialized countries. Thus, China clearly has a long way to go from the “world factory” 
to the “world market”.  
Table 6.5 shows us that both rural and urban consumption expenditures have grown in 
the last 30 years. But averagely the urban consumption expenditure grew faster than the 
rural consumption expenditure. The urban/rural consumption ratio (i.e. the average urban 
consumption expenditure divided by the average rural consumption expenditure) reflected 
also the severe inequality of the income distribution in China. In the year of 1980, the 
urba , the consumption level of the urban 
households was averagely 2.7 times that of  
 hous ng in  was 3.6 t at of the rural ho s.  
According t the Classi theory ir income distribution will 
have a positive effect on the improvement of private consumption, to be more precise, 
ad ition ff d is created if pr s rise. Consequently 
a m ise cause t ropen  c e g r
n u ut operty me (c t 7, ) r n
distribution m e and less property incom onom
development is governed ultimately by effective demand, which, according to the internal 
emplo m i pends gover e it c i o
c is, 199 . 170) d n i o
 c ption-driven g th pat h
ption in China accounte 8 io 7 n
 f gest consumer ,  i t a
d any. I 07 C a m w l
econom
population and level of econom
m  far a  In 20 e ry u P
was 36 percent, which is only half that of th United States and about two thirds those of 
Euro ure 6.5, even 
n/rural consumption ratio was 2.7, that is to say
 the rural households. However, in 2006 the
urban eholds’ spendi  consumption
cal-Keynesian 
imes th usehold
o , a more fa
d al e ective emand ofits decline and wage
aggreg te de and r s, be he p sity to onsum  of wa e-earne s exceeds the 
fractio  cons med o  of pr  inco f. Bor is, 199  p. 165 . A mo e fair i come 
eans more wage incom e. The ec ic 
yment echan sm, de  on nment xpend ures, in ome d stributi n and 
investment activity ( f. Bort 7, p . Indee , the u equal income d stributi n is a 
barrier to the onsum row h for C ina. 
Private consum d for 90 bill n USD in 200 , maki g the 
country the world’s ifth-lar market behind the Un ted Sta es, Jap n, the 
United Kingdom, an  Germ n 20 hina h s beco e the orld’s second- argest 
y in terms of purchasing power parity (see
ic developm
 table 3.2). However, relative to China’s 
ent, the purchasing power of its most 
consu ers has fallen behind way. 08, th  count ’s cons mption-to-GD  ratio 
e 
pe and Japan (cf. Devan, Rowland, Woetzel, 2009). As shown in Fig
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compared the other three largest developing economies – Russia, India and Brazil, China 
still has the lowest level of domestic private consumption ratio.  
 
Figure 6.5 Private domestic consumption as percentage of GDP, 2008 
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Source: Devan, Rowland, Woetzel, 2009, Exhibit 2.  
 
At the same time, the share of domestic investment and net exports to GDP has 
increased steadily (see Figure 6.6). Typically, in the initial stages of development of an 
economy, investment and net exports are the main driver of growth. Hence it is not 
surprising that consumption share declined in the early stages of China’s development (cf. 
Aziz, Cui, 2007, p. 5). Along with the rapid growth, China’s consumption-to-GDP ratio 
has dropped by nearly 15 percentage points since 1990. It continues to shrink since the 
global financial crisis in 2008. Although falling consumption rates are common in 
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developing economies, the speed of this decline is much faster than in any developing 
economies in the history. In the United States, private consumption was always above 50 
percent of GDP, even during the full-scale industrialization drive of World War II. In 
Japa ring periods of 
rapid industrialization after the World War II (cf. Devan, Rowland, Woetzel, 2009).  
 
Figure 6.6 Consumption, investment and net exports in percent of GDP 
 
n and South Korea, consumption also remained above 50 percent du
 
 
Source: Aziz, Cui, 2007, p. 5.  
 
There are both behavioural and structural reasons that cause uneven consumption in 
China. Rural Chinese tend to save a higher share of their incomes than urban Chinese 
beca owever, most urban residents are 
secured by the social insurance. As rural residents continue to migrate to the cities, the 
savi
use rural residents have almost no social safety net. H
ngs rate might decline (cf. Kalish, 2006, p. 7). The majority of the Chinese population 
is now still living in rural areas with low average income levels. Even in urban areas, the 
discretionary spending power of the residents is not very big except a relatively small 
amount of elites. Chinese savings rates have been very high, meaning that the rapid GDP 
growth has been driven primarily by investment and exports rather than by consumer 
spending (cf. Hawksworth, 2007, p. 21).   
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As mentioned above, one of the major driving powers of the Chinese consumers’ low 
consumption and high saving behaviour is the lack of social safety net. The country’s 
consumers oversave and underspend because they are not sufficiently secured by the social 
insurance system. As a common sense, economists believe that consumers save in order to 
smooth their lifetime consumption. If they expect that their income will diminish 
substantially during retirement, they have to save today in order to maintain their living 
stan  bear certain 
extraordinary expenditures such as healthcare by themselves. In urban China, state-owned 
enterprises were traditionally responsible for pensions and healthcare. But today it is no 
more the case. As many of state-owned enterprises have been privatized, the social safety 
net financed by the companies has been reduced or even eliminated. The individuals feel 
more insecure and what they can do is nothing else than to save. It is very crucial to note 
that Chinese consumers had virtually no savings at the beginning of the economic reform 
in 1980s (cf. Kalish, 2006, p. 7). According to a survey by China’s Ministry of Health, 
only 49.6 percent of urban and less than 20 percent of the rural population was covered by 
health insurance in 2003 (cf. OECD, 2005, p. 185). In the same year, only 14 percent of 
China’s workforce was covered by unemployment insurance. In 2003 the pension scheme 
covered totally 116 million workers, which accounted for 16 percent of all employed 
workers, plus 39 million retirees (cf. Bergsten, et al., 2008, p. 116). In this aspect, the high 
savings rate in China today can be considered as a strong reaction to the rising insecu  
expectation of the consumers for their future.  
 of the high savings rate in China, McKinsey’s China 
Consumer Center conducted a survey of 6000 consumers at random in 2005 (see Figure 
6.7)
ple, in relation to old age, family education, or 
the maintenance of dependents; (iii) To enjoy interest and appreciation, i.e. because a 
dards in the future. In addition, consumers must save if they have to
rity
In order to quantify the reasons
. The result showed us that concern about health care costs was the largest driver of 
China’s high private savings rates (50 percent of respondents), followed by the need to 
save for retirement (43 percent) and the need for purchasing real estate (36 percent). The 
Chinese cultural factor played still an important role so that 30 percent of the respondents 
regarded saving as a virtue.  
Keynes (1936) made a very similar conclusion of eight main motives of individuals to 
save in his book The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money: “(i) To build up 
a reserve against unforeseen contingencies; (ii) To provide for an anticipated future 
relation between the income and the needs of the individual or his family different from 
that which exists in the present, as for exam
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large
d uncertainty over pensions, health, and 
educ
ns made up only 13 percent of total loans outstanding in 2006 
(cf. 
r real consumption at a later date is preferred to a smaller immediate consumption; 
(iv) To enjoy a gradually increasing expenditure, since it gratifies a common instinct to 
look forward to a gradually improving standard of life rather than the contrary, even 
though the capacity for enjoyment may be diminishing; (v) To enjoy a sense of 
independence and the power to do things, though without a clear idea of definite intention 
of specific action; (vi) To secure a masse de manoeuvre to carry out speculative or 
business projects; (vii) To bequeath a fortune; (viii) To satisfy pure miserliness, i.e. 
unreasonable but insistent inhibitions against acts of expenditure as such” (Keynes, 2007, 
pp. 97-98). 
The government has now begun to invest more in the social safety net. But even if the 
social safety net is improved dramatically, it must take time to make the deeply ingrained 
behaviours change. It might take a generation for Chinese citizens to trust in a strengthened 
social safety net and consequently save less and consume more (cf. McKinsey Global 
Institute, 2006, p. 62).  
The frugality of the Chinese consumers is also produced by structural features that 
restrict consumptions’ share of the national income. As shown in Figure 6.8, Chinese 
households income accounted only for 56 percent of the GDP. However, this share is 60 
percent in Europe and more than 70 percent in the United States (cf. Devan, Rowland, 
Woetzel, 2009). The saving rate has been rising especially since the late-1990s, when the 
state owned enterprises started to reform to reduce drastically their burden of providing 
social welfare for their employees. Increase
ation may have been a factor in the fall in consumption share (cf. Aziz, Cui, 2007, p. 
6). But there is still no estimation, how significant the influence of this factor is.  
Further, the consumer finance is quite new in China. The Chinese consumers have 
only very limited access to credit market and they are still used to borrowing money 
through the networks of families and friends instead of banks. Large-ticket purchases, such 
as automobiles, are usually paid for with cash. Despite the large size of the Chinese 
banking sector, consumer loa
McKinsey Global Institute, 2006, p. 63). The major customers of the Chinese banks 
were still the enterprises. Traditionally, the lack of consumer credit market in China forced 
the Chinese families accumulate savings to finance the purchase of consumer durables. 
Savings rate (especially for younger households) will decline if the growing demand for 
consumer durables is going to be financed through the development of consumer credit (cf. 
Winters, Yusuf, 2007, pp. 116-127).  
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Figure 6.7 Reasons for saving in China (2004) 
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Source: McKinsey Global Institute, 2006, p. 62, Exhibit 3.4. 
 
Compared to all other major economies, China has the lowest household income to 
GDP ratio. Low relative private income discourages Chinese consumers from spending and 
the p
in the Chinese financial system starting in December 
eople who are living in a society without sufficient health and retirement protections 
must logically save a lot to secure their future by themselves.  
In recent years, however, the situation has begun to change. Along with the progress 
of urbanization, more and more rural residents are moving to urban areas. Population in 
urban areas accounted for around 43 percent of the total population in 2005, compared to 
just 23 percent in 1985. The average income levels have risen rapidly in the cities, leading 
to the emergence of a sizeable and fast-growing urban middle class. Further, the Chinese 
government is aiming to boost the contribution of consumer spending for a sustainable 
economic development, supported by rapidly developing consumer finance markets (cf. 
Hawksworth, 2007, p. 21). China’s consumer market has an enormous potential. 
Moreover, foreign banks participated 
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2006 , it is possible that Chinese consumers 
will spend more share of their income to consume. In the Chinese history, people had to 
save l estate. Yet as consumer credit becomes widely 
available, consumers will be able to smooth purchases of real estate thereby reducing the 
necessity of saving (cf. Kalish, 2006, p. 7). But it is still too early to detect a trend.  
 
Figure 6.8 Household income as percentage of GDP  
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properly. As a result labour income is badly underestimated by the employee compensation 
 
Source: Devan, Rowland, Woetzel, 2009, Exhibit 3.  
We should also note that China’s household income is, to some extent, 
underestimated. Thus the consumption rate of the Chinese can not be calculated very 
precisely. Gollin (2002) explained why, as shown in statistics, poor countries are more 
likely to have low shares of employee income in GDP than rich countries. Principally, 
there are two significant affecting factors. First, bad technology of the developing countries 
in agriculture results in low output, which slows down the income increase of the farmers 
in large quantities. Second, in some countries, the self-employed account for a huge 
fraction of the workforce, but their non-wage compensation is not easy to be considered 
 146
measure (cf. Gollin, 2002, pp. 462-466). These two factors really exist in China. The 
agricultural technology in China is still underdeveloped, so that many farmers are 
cultivating the land with traditional tools or even with hands. In the past twenty years, a 
large amount of farmers moved from the agriculture to the manufacturing sectors. 
Compared the past, more and more people are self-employed (see Table 6.6). Without 
professional survey across the board, it is impossible to calculate the compensation of the 
migr fore, it is conceivable that the 
household income to GDP ratio might not be as low as the data in statistics.  
 
Table 6.6 Total labour force and self-employed persons at year-end in urban and rural 
areas in 2006 (10,000 persons) 
 
ant workers and the self-employed precisely. There
Urban Areas Rural Areas   
Year Total 
 
Subtotal Self-employed Subtotal Self-employed 
1980 42,361 10,525 81 31,836  
1990 64,749 17,041 614 47,708 1,491
2000 72,085 23,151 2,136 48,934 2,934
2003 74,432 25,639 2,377 48,793 2,260
2006 76,400 28,310 3,012 48,090 2,147
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007 CD-ROM, 2007, Table 5-2.  
 
erformance of Consumer Finance in China 
Consumer finance is still relatively new in China. Along with rapid economic growth, 
risin
P
 
g incomes, falling birth rates and household sizes, a consumer revolution had taken 
place in China. All real estates are on the market for sale after the welfare distribution of 
houses ended in July 1998. Accompanying the housing reform, the People’s Bank of China 
launched the personal consumer credit policy and introduced “consumer credit” to Chinese 
households. Consumer credit for auto ownership has also been introduced in 2002. Today 
the ability to buy on credit is transforming China and meanwhile the consumer finance 
creates a challenge for China’s economic policy makers (cf. Zhang, Sun, 2006, p. 79). 
Since 1997 China’s consumer finance has been growing rapidly, with the total amount 
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outstanding of consumer loans increased 250 percent annually in the period 1997 – 2001. 
The consumer finance market in China is likely to remain fast growing in the foreseeable 
future. Home mortgage loans are still the most dominant one of the variety of consumer 
finance products in China. Large national commercial banks still play the leading role in 
consumer finance market. Just like the income distribution, the regional distribution of 
consumer finance was also uneven in present China. Consumer finance businesses were 
mostly concentrated in large cities and developed coastal regions (cf. He, Fan, 2002, p. 17). 
This suppressed the increase of the effective demand generated by the consumption of the 
farm rs and seriously impeded economic development.  
sumer credit growth in China (billion yuan) 
                        
e
 
Figure 6.9 Outstanding con
 
 
Source: Shen, Yan, 2009, p. 52, Graph 1. 
 
As shown in Figure 6.9, the outstanding consumer loans accounted for only RMB 0.14 
trillion at the end of 1999, by the end of 2007, it reached RMB 3.28 trillion, representing 
an average annual growth rate of 48 percent. With the rising household incomes, consumer 
loans became an increasingly important asset class for commercial banks. The proportion 
of consumer loans outstanding in total RMB bank loans in China rose to 12.5 percent at the 
end of 2007, from 1.5 percent in 1999 (cf. Shen, Yan, 2009, p. 51). The main lenders to 
consumers in China today are commercial banks and several auto financing corporations. 
Mortgage loans are still the dominant consumer credit, whereas auto loans, student loans 
and loans for the purchase of large durable goods have been growing rapidly in recent 
years. In order to promote the development of the household credit market, the People’s 
Bank of China has launched a series of credit policies. The basic framework of supporting 
 148
and regulatory measures has been spelling out to promote the development of consumer 
finance (cf. Shen, Yan, 2009, p. 52). 
China’s outstanding residential mortgage loans increased averagely 64 percent 
annually and at the end of 2007 reached RMB 2.7 trillion, which was 142 times that of 
1997 (see Figure 6.10). By the end of 2007, mortgage loans accounted for 82.5 percent of 
total outstanding consumer loans. According to the mortgage survey of 20 big cities 
conducted by the People’s Bank of China in 2007, the average size of a home mortgage 
loan was RMB 274,000 (about 40,000 USD), the average maturity was 15.6 years and the 
average down payment was 37.4 percent. Today, state-owned commercial banks, joint 
stock commercial banks, local banks and foreign banks in China all provide mortgage 
loan ndustrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, Agriculture  Bank of China and China 
Construction Bank) still dominate and account for about 68 percent of total mortgage 
lending by banks. Commercial banks provide 79.4 percent of total housing loans, while 
local Housing Provident Fund Centers provide 11.9 percent (cf. Shen, Yan, 2009, pp. 52-
53). Housing lending from commercial banks has become the main channel of raising 
funds for housing reform in China. Very important, it also becomes an important macro-
monitoring means of the government over real estate markets (cf. Zhang, Sun, 2006, p. 80). 
Today, the housing loan interest is very flexible in China. The central bank has adjusted 
the housing loan interest several times in order to ease the tension of the overheated real 
estate market. Further, China is very prudent with the housing loan and has a very high 
hous ng reform. At the end of 2008, the housing 
loan interest in China was 6.53 percent for the mortgage loan with a maturity more than 5 
year
s to homebuyers. However, the four main state-owned banks (I
Bank of China,
ing loan interest since the reform of housi
s (cf. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, 2008).  
According to the analysis by Yanchun Zhang and Guofeng Sun, a consumer credit 
expansion can make a central bank’s monetary policy more effective. Without consumer 
credit sector, monetary policy must rely on the relatively narrow and indirect interest rate 
channel to affect consumption. The development and expansion of the consumer credit 
sector increases the effects of monetary policy on the consumption demand and total 
output effectively. The consumer credit sector improves the efficiency of the interest rate 
adjustment. After introducing the consumer credit sector into the economy, the changes in 
the interest rate directly affect consumers’ behaviour and subsequently stimulate aggregate 
consumption demand and aggregate output. Further, the existence of the consumer credit 
sector provides more scope for central bank to affect real economy by using monetary 
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policy (e.g. adjusting the interest rate). When all consumers are purchasing by cash, the 
central bank is only able to affect firms’ borrowing through the credit channel. The 
cons
e financial market is not able 
to se
umer credit sector improves the efficiency of the monetary transmission mechanism 
through both the interest rate channel and the credit channel. The consumer credit causes 
more monetary injection so that credit service producers must hire more labour and 
increase the production of consumer credit. Thus monetary injection increases both 
consumption and production (cf. Zhang, Sun, 2006, p. 87). With a well-controlled 
consumer credit market, the central bank can effectively implement monetary policies to 
stabilize economic fluctuations.  
In order to control both consumer credit and business credit, the People’s Bank of 
China should encourage the development of the consumer credit sector. The main 
monetary policy instruments for a central bank are money supply and interest rates. When 
the People’s Bank of China injects money to the economy to stimulate the aggregate 
demand, it may face the problem that the increase in loan availability does not necessarily 
lead to a significant increase in the investment demand. Furthermore, the investment 
demand is much more volatile than the consumption demand. The development of 
consumer credit sector can help to relieve such concerns since the consumption demand is 
complementary to the investment demand and usually less volatile than the investment 
demand (cf. Zhang, Sun, 2006, p. 88). It is convincible that without expectation of enough 
consumption demand the investors will not invest, no matter how good the interest rate is. 
Although monetary policy affects the consumption demand directly through the consumer 
credit sector, China must be very careful with the liberalization of consumer finance 
market, or more precisely, the liberalization of the interest rates. The financial crisis 
starting from 2008 in the United States shows us again that th
lf-regulate. That should be a good lesson for China.  
New regulations issued by Chinese banking regulators in 2009 give local and foreign 
banks and consumer finance specialists greater access to the market, in the form of 
consumer finance companies. At the beginning, such financial companies are restricted to 
offering instalment loans to retail customers, they will probably participate in the 
unsecured consumer-lending sector quickly and at a great scale. The further deregulation 
of credit cards allows overseas banks to issue RMB-based ones. These banks have now a 
chance to develop the ability to serve the broader market. To assure responsible lending 
and borrowing, the government must strengthen credit bureaus, improve financial 
education, support “new to credit” products (for instance, low-limit or collateralized credit 
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cards) etc. It is recommended by McKinsey Global Institute that regulators and lenders 
must work together to improve risk management, especially the ability to identify 
organized credit card fraud; the government must become better at spotting national and 
local credit bubbles to reduce the risks of a financial crisis; further, China must have the 
ability to manage the risks and get ample room to expand consumer credit safely (cf. 
Bellens, Bosshart, Ewing, 2009, p. 7). 
 
Figure 6.10 Mortgage loan growth in China 
 
 
 
Source: Shen, Yan, 2009, p. 53, Graph 2. 
 
Prognosis of the Trends for Consumption 
 
China’s consumer loans growth has accelerated. First, the growth in disposable 
income pushed the development of consumer loans forward. From 2003 to 2007, the 
average annual GDP growth accounted for about 10.6 percent. In the same period, the 
average disposable income of Chinese citizens living in urban areas increased by RMB 
5,314 to RMB 13,800, or 62.7 percent. Second, the development of the social security 
system, including the pension system, the public health system as well as low-income and 
disability support system is stimulating consumer demand. The social security fund has 
expanded significantly since 2001 and reached 70 billion USD by the end of 2007, an 
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increase of more than 600 percent. Third, the credit environment improved gradually with 
the development of market infrastructure. The People’s Bank of China has been 
developing the National Corporation and Individual Credit Information Database since 
2003. By the end of 2007, the number of corporations in the database reached 6 million, 
and the number of individuals was over 600 million. Based on a borrower’s credit record, 
commercial banks can price loans appropriately and meet different consumers’ financing 
needs effectively (cf. Shen, Yan, 2009, pp. 56-57). 
Figure 6.11 Aggregate private consumption, 2005-2025  
 
 
 
 
9, Exhibit 3.13. Source: McKinsey Global Institute, 2006, p. 6
 
Powered by the spending of its rising urban middle class, China will grow into one of 
the largest consumer markets in the world. As the combined share of the lower and upper 
aspirants in the urban population increases from 39 percent in 2006 to 57 percent in 2010, 
their aggregate disposable income will increase from 54 percent to 69 percent by 2010 (cf. 
McKinsey Global Institute, 2006, p. 66). China’s overall consumer market ranked in 2006 
at about equivalent size to Italy’s, making it a fairly mid-size market, although China had 
22 times the population of Italy’s. Per capita spending in China was less than 5 percent of 
the Italian level. By 2015, rising per capita incomes and China’s enormous population will 
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cause it to surpass Germany at the aggregate level, and by 2025 become the third-largest 
consumer economy in the world, just behind Japan and the United States (see Figure 6.11). 
However, per capita spending will still be at levels well below those developed countries. 
The urban population in China on its own will be one of the world’s largest markets – with 
3.7 trillion RMB (approximately 447 billion USD), in consumer spending it has overtaken 
South Korea and by 2025, with 19.2 trillion RMB (approximately 2.3 trillion USD) 
annually (cf. McKinsey Global Institute, 2006, p. 70).  We should note that the McKinsey 
Global Institute made this prognosis in the year of 2006 without consideration of the global 
finan cial crisis and its different 
impacts on different economies, the economic development of both the developed world 
and China will perhaps have great variation compared with the prognosis.  
 
Figure 6.12 Tools for raising consumption (Private domestic consumption as 
percentage of GDP) 
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Source: Devan, Rowland, Woetzel, 2009, Exhibit 1. 
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As shown in Figure 6.12, McKinsey Global Institute considered three scenarios for the 
growth of Chinese consumption rates over the next 15 years: (1) Without any new action to 
raise consumption, China’s consumption will rise to 39 percent of GDP, which means 
three percentage points more than the current level, leaving the country heavily dependent 
on exports and government-led spending for continued growth. (2) By implementing the 
policy to encourage consumer spending and improving social safety net, consumption 
could account for nearly 45 percent of GDP. This level is still well below consumption 
levels in other major economies. (3) If China’s leaders successfully rebalance the 
investment and raise the private income, the private consumption will reach 50 percent of 
GDP by 2025. This could bring China’s consumption rate in line with those in the 
developed nations and China’s economy would enter a new phase. According to the 
estim y McKinsey Global Institute, China’s such comprehensive reform would also 
cont
w consumption (cf. Devan, Rowland, Woetzel, 2009). Indeed, it is not 
easy to reach the goal of the third scenario. China’s government must encourage private 
spending with improvement of the employment and a fundamental reform of the social 
security system. 
 
6.5.3 Strategies to Boost Consumption 
 
Promoting domestic consumption demand requires that the growth of household 
spending and/or government expenditure increase faster than the combined growth of 
investment and net exports (cf. Bergsten, et al., 2008, p. 115). The Chinese citizens have 
today a very low consumption rate because of the unstable revenue expectations which 
result mostly from employment pressure and expected reform on social security, housing, 
and education. Employment and the reform of social security system will affect China 
extensively. Promoting stable growth and enhancing consumption should begin with 
optimizing social security system and expanding employment (cf. Shi, 2001, p. 196). The 
government needs to increase the share of income going to households – by increasing 
transfers and subsidies – and to increase infrastructure to promote development of the rural 
areas (cf. Lim, Hausman, Spence, 2006, pp. 3-4).   
ption: 
(1) Create jobs by providing good market access conditions for unemployed and laid-off 
workers. In the course of economic development, the agricultural sector has a great surplus 
ation b
ribute substantially to global growth and enrich the global economy with 1.9 trillion 
USD a year in net ne
The following two steps are important for China to effectively enhance consum
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labo
zed and the benefit which they deserved should be ensured; laid-off 
workers should obtain enough compensation for living expenses. The fiscal authorities 
must ensure the solve social security taxes effectively, 
expand social security coverage to all enterprises and institutions, and provide stable and 
relia
nefit from the rapid economic growth. 
Dom
ur and many employees are laid-off from state owned enterprises. These rural 
redundant labourers and laid-off employees need to be gradually transferred and 
reemployed. This problem is a kind of reform cost, which affects social stability. During 
employment reform, policies must be implemented to develop small and medium-sized 
enterprises and to encourage communities and individuals to establish small businesses. 
Meanwhile, the labour market should be developed further, by setting up professional 
advisory agencies. (2) Accelerate the pace of improving social security system with focus 
on elderly workers in state-owned sectors. To establish employment mechanisms and 
social security system is an objective of China’s market economy during the course of 
transition. In the last years, various welfare and security reform measures have been 
adopted because of the rising instability of revenue and employment system, and the rising 
prices of medical care, education, and housing, which are the major causes for the low 
consumption rate and high savings rate in China. Again, the expectations play a decisive 
role in the economy since without positive expectations the consumer would not consume 
enough and consequently the investors would not invest. In order to stabilize expectations, 
the country has to ensure social security reform so that historical contributions of retirees 
must be recogni
ncy of social security system, levy 
ble funding sources for social security of citizens (cf. Shi, 2001, pp. 196-198). 
Bergsten, et al. (2008), the authors of the book China’s Rise –Challenges and 
Opportunities suggested that the government could promote consumption via fiscal, 
financial and exchange rate policy. In the fiscal policy aspect, the government could cut 
personal taxes, increase government consumption expenditure, or introduce a dividend tax 
on state-owned companies. Financial reform could increase interest income received by 
households, thus raising household disposable income and consequently consumption. 
Appreciation of the yuan would simultaneously reduce net exports and give the 
government possibility to promote the inland economic development. As mentioned, the 
export-oriented enterprises are mostly located in the east coast and big cities in China, so 
that most of the Chinese farmers can not really be
estic development will promote the living standards of the farmers and generate more 
effective demand. The government has greater flexibility in use of the interest rate policy. 
When required, the central bank can raise the real interest rates on bank lending so that 
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China’s excessive rate of investment will be reduced, and a successful transition to a more 
consumption-driven growth path will be made (cf. Bergsten, et al., 2008, pp. 115-116).  
The increasing government expenditures on health, education, welfare and pensions 
could add to domestic consumption demand. The very limited share of the population 
covered by health, unemployment, and workers’ compensation insurance reflected the low 
level of social expenditures on social security system. Being one of the largest holders of 
foreign exchange reserves of the whole world, China has considerable potential to increase 
its social expenditures without raising taxes on households. As mentioned above, one of 
the major reasons for the rise in the savings rate was the reduction in the social welfare 
services provided by the government and state-owned enterprises. Increased government 
consumption expenditures in health, education, welfare and pensions would contribute 
indirectly to increasing household consumption as a share of GDP by reducing the 
household savings rate, which rose significantly in the past 20 years and accounted for 
about 25 percent of disposable income since 2000. If the government could provide more 
of these services, the families would gain confidence and thus reduce their own saving 
voluntarily and increase consumption as a share of their own disposable income (cf. 
Bergsten, et al., 2008, pp. 116-117). Taiwan might be a good model in this respect. The 
introduction of National Health Insurance in Taiwan raised the share of the insured 
population from 57 percent in 1994 to 97 percent in 1998. Since the uncertainty about 
future medical expenses has been reduced substantially, households began to save less and 
consume more. Hence the consumption demand has been stimulated. Saving felt by an 
average of 8.6 – 13.7 percent and private consumption increased by 2.6 percent in 
households where only one spouse worked and by 5.7 percent in households where both 
spouses worked (cf. Chou, Liu, Hammit, 2002, pp. 1887-1892).  
In many economies, governments can increase personal consumption through fiscal 
stimulus by cutting personal taxes on household income, especially for the low income 
population. Thus their disposable income and personal consumption expenditure are raised. 
But we should note that the tax cutting as a fiscal stimulus may have almost no effect on 
consumption in China, where direct taxes on households are relatively too small to start 
with, thus the government has no enough scope to implement this policy (cf. Lardy, 2006, 
p. 6). A well functioning economic policy in many economies might be not suitable for an 
economy with unique features like China.   
In China there are opportunities for efficiency gains and growth through greater 
internal integration, i.e. to develop the poor regions and increase income of the low income 
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population. It is comparable to the process that China has been benefiting greatly from its 
integration in the global economy since the reform. The government should improve the 
qual
 essential to the proper 
func
s the socioeconomic position of the middle 
class
ity of the transportation and communication infrastructure in the poorer interior 
regions, as well as agricultural research and extension, rural infrastructure, and greater 
access to farm inputs and markets via transport and information. Investment in urban 
infrastructure such as transport, water and sanitation, should also be of high priority in a 
public expenditure program because China might be going through a rapid urbanization in 
the coming years (cf. Lim, Hausman, Spence, 2006, p. 4). However, the author is in the 
opinion that an effective solution for the development of the poor regions and thus 
increasing consumption of the rural population is not through urbanization but to create 
employment opportunities locally for the surplus labour force from rural areas. In the 
second half year of 2009, many export-oriented enterprises which employed great amount 
of migrant workers from poor rural regions were astonished at the shortfall of workforce, 
although they have raised the wages gradually. With the development progress of some 
rural areas, the level of wage income in hometown of those migrant workers increased. 
Plenty of migrant workers are now employed by the small enterprises in their villages 
which are founded and carried on by some formal migrant workers who successfully 
gained technique of production and even management experiences in big cities (cf. Shu, 
2009). In addition, the governmental improvement policy for the purpose of developing 
small and medium-sized enterprises and encouraging individuals to establish small 
businesses, which was launched in recent years, contributes also effectively to the 
employment of the workers in rural regions locally.   
Of vital importance, high inflation has to be avoided when the government uses fiscal 
policy to promote employment. “A stable value of money is
tioning of a monetary production economy and hence of society as a whole. The 
reasons are economic and sociological: economically, money is a promise made by society 
to individuals, whose work is paid for in money, on the tacit understanding that – normal – 
money prices are given and, hence, that money may be exchanged against a definite 
quantity of goods. Inflation implies a break of this promise. Sociologically, the wealth of 
the middle classes mainly consists of money, deposits and bonds. These get devalued – in 
terms of some real numéraire, for example a bundle of necessary consumption goods – if 
there is inflation. Hence inflation worsen
es” (Bortis, 1997, pp. 347-348). When high inflation occurs, the middle classes with 
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falling real wage income and shrinking value of wealth have to reduce their real 
consumption.   
Exchange rate policy should be an important element supporting China’s transition 
from export-led growth to a consumption-driven growth path. Appreciation of the yuan 
will reduce the growth of exports and increase the growth of imports, reducing China’s 
external imbalance. China’s highly undervalued exchange rate constrains the independence 
of monetary policy. China’s central bank has successfully sterilized large foreign capital 
inflows several times. For this purpose China was generally not willing to raise the interest 
rates, since that would reduce the carry costs19 of foreigners moving money into China in 
anticipation of further RMB appreciation. Lower carry costs increase profits of the 
international speculators from any RMB appreciation, therefore the authorities fear that 
raising domestic interest rates could cause foreign capital inflows to become uncontrollable 
large. In the period of 2002-2004, the domestic price inflation was rising but the nominal 
domestic interest rates on loans were fixed, this made the real interest rate on loans fall by 
13 percent points, from 9 to -4 percent. A more appreciated exchange rate would allow the 
central bank greater flexibility in setting domestic interest rates and thus increase the 
potential to avoid overheating investment booms by raising lending rates (cf. Bergsten, et 
al., 2008, pp. 119-120). If the imbalance of the foreign trade will be offset, the dependence 
of China’s reserves on US dollar will be substantially reduced. Further, with appreciation 
of the undervalued yuan, the real income of Chinese workers will increase, consequently 
their consumption demand rises.  
 
6.6 Investment as Derived Demand in the Long Run 
 
Keynes suggests a long-period theory of employment: on the one hand, a high level of 
the own-rate of interest20 of money, that is, the liquidity premium, may prevent the 
additional production of reproducible goods before full employment is reached (cf. Bortis, 
1997, p. 133). On the other hand, the characteristics of money which satisfy liquidity-
preference will in most cases “cause the rate of interest to be insensitive, particularly below 
a certain figure, even to a substantial increase in the quantity of money in proportion to 
                                                 
19 For most investments, the carry cost generally refers to the risk-free interest rate that could be earned by investing 
currency in a theoretically safe investment vehicle such as a money market account minus any future cash-flows that are 
expected from holding an equivalent instrument with the same risk (cf. Inc Icon Group International, 2008, p. 335). 
20 Own rate of interest is the percentage change in a current commodity price compared with its known future 
price in the market. Every commodity has its own rate of interest, which can be affected by other commodity 
interest rates (cf. Sraffa, 1932, 205-208). 
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other forms of wealth. In other words, beyond a certain point money’s yield from liquidity 
does not fall in response to an increase in its quantity to anything approaching the extent to 
whic
ends to consider this problem in terms of a moving 
equilibrium rather than adopting an approach similar to that applied in the theory of 
business cy The d on the impact 
of the effective demand generated by investment upon profits and the national income; and 
the 
growth trend is just calculated ex post on the basis of the movement of the business cycle 
h the yield from other types of assets falls when their quantity is comparably 
increased” (Keynes, 2007, p. 233). Once the own-rates of reproducible goods, valued in 
terms of money, equal this (minimum) own-rate of money, no more products will be 
produced (cf. Bortis, 1997, 133); specifically, “no further increase in the rate of investment 
is possible” (Keynes, 2007, p. 236). “Unemployment develops, that is to say, because 
people want the moon; men cannot be employed when the object of desire (i.e. money) is 
something which cannot be produced and the demand for which cannot be readily choked 
off. There is no remedy but to persuade the public that green cheese is practically the same 
thing and to have a green cheese factory (i.e. a central bank) under public control” 
(Keynes, 2007, p. 235). 
Income distribution might play an important role to determine the own-rates of 
interest of capital goods and to determine the unemployment equilibrium. “A more equal 
distribution might be linked up with a higher volume of purchasing power and increased 
demand for consumption goods, which, in turn, may raise the own-rates of interest of the 
capital goods employed in the consumption goods sector” (Bortis, 1997, p. 134).  
According to Robinson and Kalecki, the only way to extend Keynes theory to the long 
run is provided by a trade cycle-cum-growth theory based upon a classical-Marxian two-
sector model (cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 135). Kalecki summarised: “The contemporary theory of 
growth of capitalist economies t
cles. latter consists of establishing two relations: one base
other showing the determination of investment decisions by, broadly speaking, the 
level and the rate of change of economic activity… I do not see why this approach should 
be abolished in the face of problem of long-run growth. In fact the long-run trend is but a 
slowly changing component of a chain of short-period situations; it has no independent 
entity, and the two basic relations mentioned above should be formulated in such a way as 
to yield the trend cum business-cycle phenomenon” (Kalecki, 1971, p. 165). Hence the 
(cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 135).  
Keynes saw three possible ways to define the long-period equilibrium: “The first 
suggestion conveyed by the term ‘long-period’ is that it relates to a position towards which 
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forces spring up to influence the short-period position whenever the latter was diverged 
from it. The second suggestion conveyed is that the long-period position differs from short-
period positions in being a stable position capable cet. par. unstable and cannot be 
sustained. The third suggestion is that the long-period position is, in some sense, an 
optimum of ideal position from the point of view of production, i.e. a position in which the 
forces of production are disposed and utilized to their best possible advantage” (Keynes, 
1983, p. 54). According to Keynes, the equilibrium in the long run is not unique: “For the 
root of the objection which I find to the theory under discussion, if it is propounded as a 
long-period theory, lies in the fact that, on the one hand, it cannot be held that the position 
towards which the economic system is tending or the position at which it would be at rest 
or the optimum position ... whichever of these tendencies we have in view, is entirely 
independent of the policy of the monetary authority; whilst, on the other hand, it cannot be 
main
rue, that, 
whe
 their perceptions and decisions towards a consistent, stable 
long
tained that there is a unique policy which, in the long run, the monetary authority is 
bond to pursue” (Keynes, 1983, pp. 54-55).  
The old fashioned view that saving always involves investment is incomplete and 
misleading. “The error lies in proceeding to the plausible inference that, when an 
individual saves, he will increase aggregate investment by an equal amount. It is t
n an individual saves he increases his own wealth. But the conclusion that he also 
increases aggregate wealth fails to allow for the possibility that an act of individual saving 
may react on someone else’s savings and hence on someone else’s wealth … attempt to 
save more by reducing consumption will so affect incomes that the attempt necessarily 
defeats itself … there cannot be a buyer without a seller or a seller without a buyer. 
Though an individual whose transactions are small in relation to the market can safely 
neglect the fact that demand is not a one-sided transaction, it makes nonsense to neglect it 
when we come to aggregate demand. This is the vital difference between the theory of the 
economic behaviour of the aggregate and the theory of the behaviour of the individual unit, 
in which we assume that changes in the individual’s own demand do not affect his income” 
(Keynes, 2007, pp. 83-85). 
Uncertainty is particularly strong in relation to long-term investment in capital assets, 
because circumstances are dynamic, the decision-maker can not obtain sufficient relevant 
information from the current conditions to guide his acts. As a matter of fact, no 
mechanism can coordinate
-run equilibrium position. Both Keynes and Marshall approached the long period to 
sustain the notion of ‘normality’. Normality is a behavioural concept which refers to the 
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reactions that consistently accompany a given stimulus. Investment of capital fails on this 
criterion (cf. De Carvalho, 1994, p. 208). “The outstanding fact is the extreme 
precariousness of the basis of knowledge on which our estimates of the prospective yield 
have to be made. Our knowledge of the factors which will govern the yield of an 
investment some years hence is usually very slight and often negligible” (Keynes, 2007, p. 
149). Keynes pointed out that the expectations of prospective profits are based partly on 
existing facts which we know and partly on future events which can only be forecasted 
with more or less confidence. However, the current conditions and confidence are not 
sufficient to make rational investment decisions. Usually, investors regard the marginal 
efficiency of capital primarily in terms of the current yield of capital equipment. But this 
supposition would be correct only in a static state where there is no change in the future. In 
fact, there are always changes not only in type and quantity of the stock of capital-assets, 
but also in the tastes of the consumer. Also the effective demand is changing from time to 
time (cf. Keynes, 2007, pp. 145-147).  
If short-period and long-period values diverge, the economy will move toward another 
short-period position and will keep moving as long as the divergence remains. Not being in 
a state of full equilibrium, agents would continue trying to change their own position. This 
is the main role assigned to the notion of long-period equilibrium by Keynes. Even if long-
period values can be calculated, nothing can guarantee that these values will ever become 
‘normal’ in the long run (cf. De Carvalho, 1994, p. 209). Keynes stated: “I should, I think, 
be prepared to argue that, in a world ruled by uncertainty with an uncertain future linked to 
an actual present, a final position of equilibrium, such as one deals with in static 
economics, does not properly exist” (Keynes, 1983, p. 221). Therefore, the short-period 
employment must be solved coincide with the actual conditions under which short-run 
decisions are made. At any given time, it might be decided in relation to the existing 
capital equipment, whether the productive processes would be set on foot to produce 
consumption goods or investment goods. But the capital equipment does not remain in any 
sense constant from one accounting period to another (cf. Keynes, 1983, pp. 64-65). “The 
short period is here and now, with concrete stocks of the means of production in existence. 
Incompatibilities in the situation … will determine what happens next. Long-period 
equilibrium is not at some date in the future; it is an imaginary state of affairs in which 
there are no incompatibilities in the existing situation, here and now” (Robinson, 1965, p. 
101). The existing situation is characterized by the institutions. Therefore, the activity of 
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the government, e.g. government spending, plays a major role in the economic 
development.  
Let’s recall the internal employment mechanism (cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 190): 
 
( )[ ] ( )vdgkz
GQ
s
i +−−= /11* .             (2-42) 
 
As interpreted in Chapter 2, in the long run, output and employment depend upon the 
relation between government expenditures (G) and leakage (zs). zs is the leakage out of 
property income and ( )[ ]kzs /11−  is the leakage out of domestic income which is 
negatively associated with output and employment. The leakage out of income increases 
when income distribution becomes more unequal. The leakage out of property income (zs = 
1 - cs = ss + ts) is large because more is saved if property income is unequally distributed 
(cf. Bortis, 2008, p. 74). Hence, investment being derived demand in the long run, output 
and 
demand because of the capacity effect (cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 144). It is worth noting that 
employment depend upon the relation between government expenditures G and 
leakage z. The leakage z is dependent on the income distribution. Therefore, long-period 
employment policy should be primarily distribution or incomes policy, that is to say, a 
more equal distribution is, in principle, associated with higher output and employment 
levels (cf. Bortis, 2008, p. 79).  
The long period equilibrium is a fully adjusted situation which consists of the normal 
prices p* (governed by the conditions of production and by the institutions regulating 
distribution, specifically target profit rates) and of the normal quantities (the normal output 
Q* and employment N*) and the technically associated normal capital stock K*. Normal 
prices and quantities determine normal sector sizes. Hence long period equilibrium is also 
a stock equilibrium (cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 87).  
Because of the capacity effect of investment, trend gross investment must in the long 
run be proportional to output and employment and to the trend capital stock K* since the 
long period equilibrium represents a stock equilibrium:  
 
I* = (g+d)vQ               (6-2) 
 
where v=K/Q is the capital output ratio at standard capacity utilization, Q is output and d is 
depreciation ratio of fixed capital. Hence, in the long run, investment represents derived 
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since the effective demand determines the volume of the whole investment in the long run, 
there is no uncertainty of long-period investment volume; however, uncertainty still 
rema
6.7 Induced Investment in the Medium Term: Inter   
Profits and Investment 
 and by the rate of interest, it describes the reaction of the 
actu
 from past experience, summarised by ke 
(real
arameter q will be relatively small 
and experience period e large. In this case they know that the larger volumes of investment 
are negatively linked with profits 
 an ideal state i.e. equilibrium, the actual investment It is equal to (desired) normal 
ins in each single investment.  
 
action between
 
The relationship between investment and profits constitutes the heart of classical-
Keynesian trade cycle theory. The investment-profit relationship can be formulated as 
follows: 
 
It = [(g* + d*) + q(ke – k*)]Kt   (6-3) 
 
where It is the gross investment undertaken in period t; g* and d* are the trend growth rate 
(effective demand) and replacement rate; the experience period e reflects investment 
behaviour: a small e means that entrepreneurs are impatient and shortsighted, and vice 
versa; ke is the average realized gross profit (mark-up) over e time periods, starting from t - 
e, and k* is the target trend mark-up (or distribution); parameter q is governed by the 
estimated profitability of capital
ally undertaken gross investment to the differences between realized and target profits; 
Kt is the capital stock in time-period t. This equation pictures the interaction between 
medium-term aggregate behavioural outcomes and the functioning of the system which in 
the long run, determines entrepreneurial actions (cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 168, pp. 207-208, pp. 
210-211). If entrepreneurs are shortsighted, the income effect of investment dominates 
which implies that the entrepreneurs know
ized profits), that higher levels of investment raise profits in the short and medium 
terms. If the entrepreneurs are cautious and take account of the capacity effect of 
investment to form expectations about the future, then p
ke in the long run (cf. Bortis, 1997, pp. 210-211).  
In
investment I*, if the average realized mark-up ke is equal to the actually desired mark-up 
k* at normal capacity utilization k* during the period t-e; this would imply that the actual 
capital stock Kt and the trend capital stock K* are identical. This is impossible since 
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individual entrepreneurs do not know the equilibrium outcomes produced by the system 
and consequently economies can never be in equilibrium (cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 168, p. 208). 
In Figure 6.13, Qt is the full employment output, Q* is the trend or normal output, Qc is the 
capacity output which would obtain if the presently existing capital stock K were normally 
utilized. No  
real capacity output Q  normal or equilibrium capital stock K* and 
equilibrium output Q*, because the system equilibrium is largely unknown to individual 
entre
(cf. Bortis, 1997, pp. 205-206).   
ortis (1997) interpreted the medium-term theory in his book Institutions, Behaviour, 
and Economic Theory, if Qc 
past (and vice versa), thus the output is not enough to cover the demand. Consequently the 
rs can 
affec
rmal output Q* represents the equilibrium. The real capital stock Kt and the
c are always diverge from
preneurs who take investment decisions independently of each other. This means, 
again, an economy can never be in equilibrium, i.e. in the institutionally governed normal 
situation 
B
is below Q*, not enough capital has been accumulated in the 
realized profits will exceed desired target profits. Because of the income effect of 
investment, this situation leads to investment increase. This results in “a cyclical upswing 
during which actual output Q tends to exceed capacity output Q* which, in turn, implies 
that profits and/or prices or degrees of capacity utilization get above their normal levels. If 
investment goes on rising, the actual rate of growth (g) gradually rises above the trend 
growth rate (g*) which implies that actual output will tend to exceed trend output. (All the 
movements are reversed if Qc is above Q* with investment and profits diminishing.) The 
meaning of the endogenous mechanism of cyclical movements now begins to emerge: 
cycles occur because economies are never in a long-period equilibrium, that is to say 
capacity output Qc never equals trend output Q*, simply because entrepreneurs do not 
know what the fully adjusted situation is. Entrepreneurs take investment decisions on the 
basis of information which they consider to be important (past and present evolution of 
sales and profits) and expectations about the future. However, the fully adjusted situation is 
the outcome of the functioning of society (institutions) as a whole … with technological 
and institutional change occurring. Cyclical growing actual variables thus interact with the 
institutional trend” (Bortis, 1997, pp. 206-207). 
Not only the above mentioned endogenous factors, but also exogenous facto
t the cyclical growth. “…for example, a temporary increase of government 
expenditures raises effective demand … The temporary increase in G may also lead to an 
increase of market prices or to improved degrees of capacity utilization in some sectors of 
production.  
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Figure 6.13 The mechanism of the cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bortis, 1997, p. 209. 
 
In each case, the realized mark-up k will rise in the industries in question. If this 
persists for some time, entrepreneurs might decide to invest more which implies an 
increase in the actual rate of growth (g). The latter will result in an additional rise of the 
realized mark-up k: prices of investment goods go up and/or capacity utilization in 
investment goods industries improves. An increasing rate of profit, implied by a rising k, 
may induce entrepreneurs to invest even more. This process of cumulative causation, based 
upon the investment-profits (or g-r) relationship, thus reinforces (or weakens) an already 
existing cyclical movement initiated by the endogenous mechanism” (Bortis, 1997, p. 
207). 
In the newly industrialized countries (NIEs) in East Asia, government polices have 
played a major role in the process of capital accumulation by pushing profits beyond those 
that could have been attained under free market conditions. Policies were designed and 
implemented to promote the investment-profits connection, which made a great incentive 
for investment. Higher investment, in turn, raised profits in the medium-term by enhancing 
rates of capital utilization and improving the productivity. Consequently, incentives to save 
and 
itable investment opportunities. The government has linked the distribution of 
invest increased with the pace of technological progress and profits accumulation. 
Those governments have utilized wide policy instruments to create and sustain a strategic 
allocation of sectoral resources to made comparative advantages in the light of strategically 
targeted growth factors. In order to apply such policies, relative prices have been changed 
to create prof
Qc
A 
B 
Q
Qt
Q 
Qc
Q* 
t
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scar ance-related, with the performance 
of firms being measured by their contribution to the growth of exports (cf. United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization, 1998, pp. 104-105). Experience shows us how 
strong and dynamic the East Asia governments have intervened in their economic growth. 
For the purpose of further development, especially in the recession period since 2008 when 
growth through exports is increasingly difficult, these Asian governments have to change 
the export incentive system to domestic demand or domestic infrastructure incentive 
system. 
6.8 Short Term: Autonomous Investment 
any social scientists before Keynes had a strong feeling that there might not be an 
auto mployment in a monetary economy, but they failed to 
convince the economists’ profession. Keynes argued that there was a failure in the market 
mec
ents, not through price variations. We can rewrite this in the following multiplier 
relat
ce resources to an incentive system that is perform
 
 
M
matic tendency towards full e
hanism. He concluded that the capital market did not function in the neoclassical way 
which means that saving leads to a reduction in the rate of interest and thus to a higher 
volume of investment. In the view of Keynes, increasing saving reduced the aggregate 
demand for consumption immediately. As the effective demand decreases, the investments 
decline, no matter how low the interest rate is. In other words, the volume of saving 
passively adjusts to investment through a change in the level of output. The money market 
links with uncertainty and expectations of consumption demand provide the solution of the 
new explanation for the interest rate. Hence, equilibria are established through quantity 
adjustm
ion 
 
Q = (1/s)I     (6-4) 
 
which summarises Keynes’s short-period theory of employment (cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 132). 
Q is the output, s is the saving rate, and I is investment.  
In a simple Keynesian model of income determination, the equilibrium level of output 
is entirely demand-determined. The growth and employment are driven by demand. If the 
level of demand is too low to absorb all the output produced under conditions of full 
employment, producers will change their expectations and adjust output accordingly, thus 
the economy will come to a state characterized by unemployment and surplus capacity. 
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Investment is exogenous (i.e. determined outside the model) and it is assumed that there is 
no financial sector, thus consumption is dependent only on the income level: 
 
C = a + cY      (6-5)  
 
where Y is the income, a is the autonomous consumption spending, i.e. that spending 
which exists for the subsistence even when the real income is zero, c is the consumption 
rate, i.e. the marginal propensity to consume out of income. Any change in an exogenous 
variable is regarded as an autonomous change (cf. Nattrass, Wakeford, Muradzikwa, 2003, 
pp. 40-41). 
 equilibrium, national income is equal to aggregate demand and is comprised of 
priv
In
ate consumption, government expenditure, and saving which will be invested later. 
Therefore:  
 
Y = C + S + G = (a + cY) + I + G.  (6-6) 
Then,  
 
Y = 
c - 1
1 (a + I + G).   (6-7) 
 
c - 1
1  is known as the multiplier. Equation (6-7) shows that one unit change in the 
exogenous variables (a, I and G) will result in 
c - 1
1 units change in Y. The multiplier effect 
shows that firstly, an autonomous increase in demand will initially boots income by an 
equivalent amount; secondly, this increase gives rise to further rounds of demand stimulus 
and output growth (cf. Nattrass, W
Y
akeford, Muradzikwa, 2003, p. 42). 
Of vital importance, the government can influence the national income  by adjusting 
its expenditure G. If G goes up by the amount ∆G, then Y will go up by the amount 
c - 1
1
∆G. Note c is less than 1 and greater than 0 (since consumption amount is only a part 
of income and must always be positive), so that the multiplier 
c - 1
1 is always greater than 1. 
This means that the increase in Y will always be greater than ∆G. For example, assume that 
the consumption rate c is 0.8 (i.e. 80 percent of the income will be consumed). If G goes up 
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by 20 billion USD, the multiplier 
c - 1
1  is equal to 5, so that income Y will go up by 20 
billion USD multiplied by 5, i.e. by 100 billion USD (cf. Nattrass, Wakeford, Muradzikwa, 
2003, p. 42). China reacted to th  in 
infrastructure projects from 2008 to 2010 (see Chapter 9. Global Financial Crisis and 
at the multiplier is driven by the consumption rate, i.e. by the marginal 
prop
e. For the poverty reduction project in China, if the government increased its 
spending by 20 billion USD in order to pay poor people to build and repair rural roads, the 
multiplier effect on total nation
imm  spend 16 billion USD (80 percent of 20 billion USD) on commodities such as 
food and clothes. Consequently, the incomes of shopkeepers rise by 16 billion USD. They, 
in turn, spend 80 percent (i.e. 12.8 billion USD) on consumer goods. Then 80 percent of 
this income, which ends up in the hands of 
and the cycle goes on until no further income is generated. If we add up all the increases of 
inco
mechanism only works if the national income was at least 100 billion USD below the level 
spending would bring the economy toward full employment (cf. Nattrass, Wakeford, 
G (equation 6-3), 
and 
slop
Wakeford, Muradzikwa, 2003, p. 44). Given that only the equality between actual and 
briu
by the government, thus the state could help move the economy towards full employment 
e global financial crisis by investing 586 billion USD
China). Since any increase in government spending has a multiplied effect, i.e. much 
greater effect on income Y (in the example, the effect on Y was 5 times the original 
increase in G), it contributes to keeping the national income growth and creating 
employment opportunities. 
Note th
ensity to consume. In the above example, the people spend 80 percent of their income 
to consume, then the increase in government expenditure results in 5 times greater increase 
in real incom
al income would work as follows: the workers will 
ediately
producers and other shopkeepers, is re-spent 
me, we come up with the sum of 100 billion USD. Very important, the above 
of full employment. Only in this case, an injection of 20 billion USD of government 
Muradzikwa, 2003, p. 43).  
This model can be presented in the famous Keynesian cross diagram (see Figure 
6.14). The 45°-line represents the equilibrium condition Y = E = C + I + 
at all points along the line, aggregate demand is equal to output, in other words, 
aggregate demand = demand expected by firms = output. Since G and I are exogenous, the 
e of the C + I + G line is c, i.e. given by the consumption function (cf. Nattrass, 
expected levels of expenditure brings an economy to equili m, Keynes argued that 
equilibrium positions could easily be positions of less than full employment. Government 
expenditure is a large component of aggregate demand and can be manipulated as a policy 
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by increasing government spending (cf. Nattrass, Wakeford, Muradzikwa, 2003, pp. 45-
income will, through the effect of the multiplier, increase by ∆Y, which will be 
substantially more than the increase in government spending. According to the assessment 
of the challenges China faces in Chapter 5, China’s growth was strongly dependent on the 
export-led demand, income distribution was very unequal and the employment level was 
far below the full employment, so that additional government spending should work 
effectively in China, especially in the period of global recession.  
 
46). As shown in Figure 6.14, if government increases its spending by ∆G, the national 
Figure 6.14 The Keynesian cross and multiplier effect of increase in government 
spending 
 
 
Source: cf. Nattrass, Wakeford, Muradzikwa, 2003, p. 45, Figure 4.2; p. 46, Figure 
4.3.  
 ∆Y 
E=Y 
E2=C+I+G2
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Y=Q 
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It is clear that boosting demand could help bring the economy to a state of full 
employment equilibrium in times of recession. However, there are informational problems 
facing a government when it attempts to boost an economy to full employment with 
increasing government spending. Firstly, the government must have the ability to assess 
effectively what the full employment level of output actually is. Secondly, the 
government’s economists must be in the position to estimate the value of the multiplier and 
the time it is likely to take entrepreneurs to revise their expectations sufficiently to create 
the additional desired output and consequently employment (cf. Nattrass, Wakeford, 
Muradzikwa, 2003, pp. 46-47). If the government doesn’t have these abilities, 
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expansionary economic policies might cause long term problems, for instance excess 
capacity.  
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7. Social Security System, Consumption and Economic  
 Development  
 
Social security is a key foundation for building a harmonious society and sustaining 
economic development in China. In the history of the Chinese civilization, mutual 
assistance and helping the weak and poor have been a concept of a long and peaceful reign. 
About 2500 years ago, Confucius (551-479 B.C.), founder of Confucianism, made a 
classical description of the ideal world in his vision – a world of great harmony. He 
believed that a perfect society should be one in which everyone lives equally and shares all 
social benefits. In such a society, all the elderly enjoy a happy life in their remaining years, 
all grown-ups play an appropriate role and all children grown up healthily, all the disabled 
are well supported. The “society of great harmony” envisioned by Confucius has been 
regarded as the earliest description of social security in China. For centuries, the Chinese 
people have never given up the pursuit of their wonderful ideal (cf. Tian, 2006, p. 4). 
The social security system can act as an instrument to affect behaviours of 
consumption and economic development. Despite the rapid economic development, 
China’s consumption rate has been falling over the last three decades. Meanwhile, the 
saving rate in China has remained very high. The Chinese people are not necessarily 
economically super-prudent, but the insufficient socio-economic welfare system makes 
them feel insecure about healthcare, children’s education, employment and retirements. 
Without an effective social security system, the increase in personal incomes would not 
automatically boost consumption (cf. Huang, 2009). This chapter discusses why the social 
security system is important for China and what kind of it China needs.  
 
7.1 Overview of the Theories of Social Security  
 
In a social insurance system, premiums are paid by workers to obtain coverage and 
benefits are intended to replace part of the earnings lost to the worker and the family when 
the worker retires, becomes disabled, or dies. Generally, there are two forms of social 
security system, namely Pay-as-you-go and Fully Funded.  
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7.1.1 PAYGO 
 
The social insurance form you-go) refers to an unfunded system in 
which today’s workers pay for the benefits of today’s retirees. The primary revenue source 
is a 
urity 
refo
). But it is worth 
mentioning that on one side, since the economy can not regulate itself, all capital 
investments have ma  is not secured, for 
instance, the American subprime mortgage crisis in 2007 resulted in a large financial loss 
of t
the Chinese culture, to support 
their children. For instance, today many retired parents in China contribute financially to 
purchase real estate for their adult children, and even pay the education fee of their 
                                                
 PAYGO (pay-as-
payroll tax which is paid by current workers and their employers. When revenues 
exceed outgo, the surpluses are invested in bonds and credited to the social security trust 
funds managed by the treasury department. For instance, the US Old-Age, Survivors, and 
Disability Insurance (OASDI) programs are primarily on a PAYGO basis (cf. Tamborini, 
2008, p. 74).  
The major challenge of the PAYGO system is a long-term financing problem. The 
primary reason is the program’s PAYGO financing structure in combination with the 
demographics of an aging society. Demographics are important because PAYGO systems 
are sensitive to the ratio of workers to beneficiaries. Just like Europe, US and Japan, China 
faces also rising longevity and a low birth rate because of the medical improvement and 
the One-Child-Family-Policy since 1979. There are different views on the social sec
rm. One approach would maintain the PAYGO program structure and make relatively 
modest changes to restore the system’s long-term solvency, such as increasing the 
retirement age, reducing the cost-of-living adjustments, or raising the amount of the payroll 
tax. A second approach would change the PAYGO program’s structure and create a 
partially or fully funded system based on personal savings and investments in individual 
retirement accounts (cf. Tamborini, 2008, p. 75).  
The critics said that in a pay-as-you-go system no funds are saved and invested, 
nothing is added to production. It is just a matter of redistribution and simply transferring 
funds from one generation to another (cf. Ferrara, Tanner, 1998, p. 60
croeconomic risks, the return on investment
he Americans’ net worth21; on the other side, the ultimate driving power of the 
production is not the capital investment, but the consumption, stating more precisely, the 
effective demand. In a pay-as-you-go system, the retirees will spend part of their pension 
for themselves, and the other part of it, as often the case in 
 
21 Net worth is the total assets minus total outside liabilities of an individual or a company (cf. Covello, Hazelgren, 1995, 
p. 123) 
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grandchildr  will not be saved, effective demand is made, thus the 
production rises.  
en. Since the money
Let’s recall the Keynesian theory, investment is autonomous,  
 
−
I = S = sY = sQ     (7-1) 
 
where the investment 
−
I is equal to savings S, both of them are dependent upon output Q 
respectively national income Y, and s is the saving rate. If the saving rate rises, the 
cons
. The role of the state is to mediate the 
extre
in economic fluctuations.  
umption falls. Current market performance builds the expectations of the investors for 
the future. Without enough aggregate demand today the investors will reduce investment 
for the production tomorrow, thus the output declines.  
Keynesian economic theory, with its emphasis on maintaining the demand for goods 
and services in order to prevent the economy from spinning into a recession, provided 
much of the theoretical basis for the social security act. Aggregate demand and the 
maintaining consumer purchasing power during the depression could stimulate the 
economy and create a demand for goods and services which, in turn, create jobs for 
workers to produce them, thereby an economic justification for social income support and 
transfer programs is provided. Public works programs, old age pensions and 
unemployment compensation were essential to lift the economy out of the depression and 
to provide a counterpoint to radical restructuring
mes of the business cycle and to offer some protection to its victims (cf. Peterson, 
Lewis, 1999, p. 468).  
 
7.1.2 Fully funded 
 
However, in a private, fully funded system, the money paid in is saved and invested in 
capital investments which, in turn, increase production. And the value of the new 
production is returned to investors in the form of a profit on their investment. Over a 
lifetime, such return would accumulate to quite large amounts and could be used to finance 
retirement benefits. Because of the increased production, retirement benefits would be far 
higher than the amounts the workers had paid into the system over the years (cf. Ferrara, 
Tanner, 1998, pp. 59 - 60). But, as mentioned above, a fully funded system is not secured 
In the neoclassic theory, saving is equal to investment, what is saved will be invested:  
 173
 S(i) = I (r)     (7-2) 
where saving S is dependent upon interest rate i and investment I upon profit rate r, and 
profit rate is greater than or equal to in rd g to the neoclassic 
econom can regulate itself, in other words, the economic system is able to self-correct. 
The saved capital may finance the fund. As saving rises, the interest rate will decline, so 
b
GO social insurance and public 
assis
 for present consumption. However, a fully funded system replaces 
individual savings with group saving. A nation’s savings rate remains unchanged when 
individual savings are entirely replaced by social savings. Hence a fully funded system 
should induce a higher savings rate than the rate under a PAYGO system (cf. Skipper, 
Kwo
-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Trust Funds which is 
 
terest rate. Acco in theory, the 
y 
that the profit rate will e higher than interest rate, the individuals as well as the state have 
incentive to invest because they can benefit more from investment, thus production 
increases. Hence, in the expectation of neoclassicists, a fully funded retirement system may 
have great capital return through saving and investment.  
Further, neoclassical economists argue that PAY
tance distort incentives. As a result, they claim that these programs represent a drag on 
the economy, by expropriating tax money that would be better used for private investment 
and by undermining individual initiative to work and save. In the neoclassic opinion, 
cutting public assistance and replacing social insurance with incentives for private 
insurance is good public policy because it restores the economic incentive to work. The 
taxes necessary to fund welfare programs reduce disposable income of the individuals and 
thus their purchasing power (cf. Peterson, Lewis, 1999, p. 468). 
As a matter of fact, a fully funded retirement income system may increase a country’s 
savings rate, whereas a PAYGO system may reduce the individuals’ savings for retirement. 
In other words, in PAYGO system savings that were once intended to fund an individual’s 
retirement can be used
n, 2007, p. 230). A large national saving means that the money, which can be used in 
production sector, is now put into the financial sector. Skidelsky summarised the substance 
of Keynes book Treatise on Money and made the statement: “Depressions arise ... when 
money is shifted from the ‘industrial circulation’ to the ‘financial circulation’” (Skidelsky, 
1992, p. xxiv). In case of a high saving rate, consumption declines, consequently 
production and the economic development will be impeded.  
U.S. Social Security is not a pure PAYGO system, but also includes Trust Funds, 
officially known as the Old
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managed by the U.S. Treasury Department (cf. Modigliani, Muralidhar, 2004, p. 9). 
According to the Federal Reserve, in the pe
pension funds are invested in stocks, 30 percent in domestic fixed-income securities, 5 
at risk”, meaning they will be 
prob
ing social equality of the 
econ
 to get rid of unemployment 
and 
riod 2007 – 2008, about 60 percent of public 
percent in real estate, and the remaining 5 percent in other products. However, the 
Retirement Savings of the United States have been hit hard by the stock market’s volatility 
and lost 2 Trillion USD within 15 months from 2007 to 2008, a blow that could force 
workers to stay on the job longer than planned. For many Americans, retirement savings 
are their only form of savings. “Americans’ retirement security may be one of the greatest 
casualties of this financial crisis.” said George Miller, chairman of the House Committee 
on Education and labour (cf. Trejos, 2008). The Center for Retirement Research at Boston 
College estimates that 43 percent of Americans are “
ably unable to maintain their current standard of living in retirement (cf. Wyss, 2009). 
This empirical evidence shows us that a social security system financed by savings could 
create a great decline in private wealth in times of crisis. 
 
7.2 Importance of a Sufficient Social Security System 
 
The social security system is a necessary means of maintaining social stability and 
economic development, a device for redistribution and maintain
omy and a policy instrument to improve consumption and employment. Of vital 
importance for China, where the people have strong propensity to save, a sufficient social 
security system may play an important role to boost the individuals’ consumption 
spending, which will be the main engine of China’s further development.  
 
7.2.1 Maintaining Social Stability and Economic Development 
 
It is well known, that the social insurance system is adopted to maintain social 
stability and ease labour tensions. Since the Social Security Act was drafted in the United 
States in 1935, social security is taken as a necessary means of maintaining social stability 
and economic development. The Social Security Act of the US was based on the theories 
of Keynes. Keynes argued in his book The End of Laissez-faire (1926), the government 
should actively intervene in economic development in order
depression. In the view of Keynes, it was the shortage of effective demands (including 
investment and consumption demands) that led to the problem of production surplus and 
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unemployment in the economic crisis in 1930. Therefore, the government should make 
every effort to stimulate private investment and consumption. Social security is strongly 
related to economic development. Economic crisis can be suppressed if the government 
greatly raises social welfare and wage standards. Further, Keynes proposed the abolition of 
slums and the implementation of progressive taxation and bottom wage systems. Keynes 
argued that the government should take on such social responsibilities as old age relief and 
unemployment security, which the private sector and market were incapable of doing. This 
could overcome market failure and crisis and was one of the efficient “economic 
stabilizers” (cf. Keynes, 2004, pp. 10-12, pp. 52-53, p. 255; Cheng, 2001, p. 177).  
 
7.2.2 Redistribution and Maintaining Social Equality of the Economy 
 
With the increasing gap between the rich and the poor, China needs social security 
system as a basic device to fulfil its function of redistribution and maintaining social 
equality. Based on the marginal utility theory, the British economist A. C. Pigou argued 
that the gre the ag istribution, the 
greater the social welfare. The social welfare for the average people brought by the 
incre
, overall social 
welfare could be increased by implementing progressive income tax and heritage tax on 
the rich and sin he poor 
(cf. Cheng, 2001, p. 178).  
ater gregate national income and the more balanced its d
ase of national income depends on the increase of social output, which requires the 
optimal allocation of resources of social production. In addition, the monetary marginal 
utility of the rich is smaller than that of the poor, so that one unit income increase of the 
low income earners could raise the entire utility of social welfare stronger than one unit 
income increase of the high income earners. Hence an increase of universal welfare could 
be achieved through the redistribution of national income. Concretely
 increa g unemployment subsidies for workers and social relief for t
A welfare state should be a state that is responsible for the welfare of all its nationals. 
Since the state has a greater role in ensuring social equality than market forces, the state-
managed social security system can act as a means of social reallocation and should, to 
certain degree, reduce the gap between rich and poor, ease social tensions (cf. Cheng, 
2001, p. 178).  
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7.2.3 Improving Consumption and Employment 
 
Today, China’s effort to rescue economic downturn has exposed further problem: the 
structural imbalance of the Chinese economy, demonstrated by not only the heavy reliance 
on export-oriented manufacturing and processing industries, but also the excessive 
expansion of industrial capacity at the expense of consumption. The stimulus plan to invest 
over 586 billion USD in the next few years is decisive. But the massive stimulus plan is not 
just to keep the economy going during the global recession. The essential goals are to 
develop a strong and balanced internal market, i.e. domestic demand, more importantly, to 
maintain socio-political stability by creating jobs for millions of workers. The remedies for 
China’s eco  
dem economic welfare system. These two aspects 
are e
blic goods. To this date, China is to develop national programs 
on h
ent health expenditures in 2005. In other words, for the total health 
expenditures in China, the individuals had to pay 82 percent by themselves, and the 
government only 18 percent. Without a complete government-sponsored social security 
net, an increase in personal incomes – if the stimulus plan achieves its desired goals - 
nomic problems in the long run are to increase the consumption level (effective
and) while developing a sufficient socio-
ssentially interrelated (cf. Huang, 2009).  
Despite a steady increase in investment, China’s consumption rate has kept falling in 
the last three decades, from around 55 percent of the GDP in the 1980s to 35 percent in the 
year of 2008. This is certainly an unmistakable indication of an underdeveloped internal 
market. The reason is the slow increase in personal incomes despite the fast economic 
growth (cf. Huang, 2009). Compared with the extra-low consumption rate, the saving rate 
in China has remained very high. China’s gross saving rate (the percentage of GDP that is 
not consumed immediately) including both public and private saving is around 50 percent. 
By contrast, the saving rate in the US is roughly 10 percent of GDP. Almost all other 
countries are between these two extremes (cf. Shiller, 2006).   
Because of the insufficient socio-economic welfare system in China, the people feel 
insecure about healthcare, children’s education, employment and retirements, and would 
rather save than spend. We can better understand this problem by looking at the 
government spending on pu
ealthcare, housing schemes, retirement, and social welfare. Amidst rapid expansion of 
the market economy, people’s expenditure on healthcare, education and housing, has 
increased dramatically. As shown in Figure 7.1, the individuals’ expenditures in health 
care have been much higher than the government expenditure, and accounted for about 4.6 
times governm
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would not  to eople have to employ 
their own savings to serve as their safety net, consumption is more a luxury than a 
nece
devote boost consumption in China. Indeed, when p
ssity (cf. Huang, 2009).  
 
Figure 7.1 Government and individual health expenditures (million yuan) 
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Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2008, p. 106, Figure 3.35. 
 
7.3 The Current Social Security System of China 
 
Review of Social Security Development in China (Mainly in Urban Areas) 
 
From 2001 to 2006, government spending on social security across the country 
increased from nearly 200 billion yuan to around 436.18 billion yuan, while the share of 
social security in total government spending was 11 percent. The government spending on 
social relief and its share in total government spending both increased. The scale of 
national social security funding has been expanding. By the end of 2006, the enterprise 
annuity reached 91 billion yuan; in the first half of 2007, the total income of the social 
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security fund had increased by nearly 30 percent. The number taking part in work-related 
injury insurance and maternity insurance grew the fastest, up 133 percent and 85 percent 
respectively. However, the number taking part in urban old-age insurance and 
unem loyment insurance grew the slowest (cf. United Nations Development Programme, 
2008 er of people 
covered by all schemes except the rural pension program steadily increased.  
However, China faces very strong challenge in this regard, since many low income 
people are still not covered by the current social security system and distribution of the 
social security is very uneven, that is, the high income population enjoys more social 
security than the low income population.  
 
Figure 7.2 Insurance holders under various schemes (millions) 
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ource: United Nations Development Programme, 2008, p. 55, figure 2.6. 
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The government has implemented since 1999 a policy of providing basic living 
allowances in urban areas to subsidize the living costs of people who are below the locally 
defined poverty line. Surveys in 2008 in 14 cities show that only 37.1 percent of eligible 
households received the basic living allowances. However, the state must do more to 
improve the system of ensuring the minimum living standard in rural areas, where the 
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people are generally poorer than those living in the urban areas (cf. Lu, Feng, 2008, pp. 61-
62).  
As shown in Figure 7.3, the number of urban people benefiting from the minimum 
living allowance system has increased in an exponential manner, from 4 million people in 
2000 to 22.7 million people in 2007. 
 
Figure 7.3 The growth in coverage of urban minimum living standard allowance 
(number of people in million) 
 
 
 
Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2008, p. 57, figure 2.7. 
 
Progress has been made in the 9-year compulsory education as well as in higher and 
secondary vocational education. In 2006, the gross enrolment ratio reached 59 percent for 
senior middle schools, and 22 percent for higher education. Although education 
expenditures accounted for 15 percent of the government’s total expenditures and 2.9 
percent of gross domestic product (GDP), it is still smaller than other countries with 
simi arge gap of 
income distribution between rural-urban areas in the average educational resources per 
stud
reemployment service centres and provided subsistence support for laid-off workers. The 
lar level of economic development such as India and Brasil. In addition, l
ent still exists and is a matter of concern (cf. Lu, Feng, 2008, pp. 62-63). 
For the employment, since radical reforms were introduced in 1998, state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and collective enterprises were required to lay off redundant personnel 
within 3 years, meanwhile, these enterprises must guarantee basic subsistence allowances 
to laid-off workers for 3 years. To help laid-off workers, the government set up 
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proportion of institutions paying for unemployment insurance has increased, at the same 
time, workers have also started to pay a premium equivalent to 1 percent of their wages for 
the u
ce in China, this was only a relative small proportion. 
Although the government has been implementing proactive employment policies, 
unem
 Social Security indicated that every year about 10 million 
people wish to enter the labour force in China, but only 40–50 percent can find jobs. The 
unemployment rate for young people aged 15–29 years is 9 percent, which is higher than 
the 6.1 percent average in 2006 (cf. Lu, Feng, 2008, pp. 63-64). Unemployment insurance 
for urban workers covered 116.5 million people in 2007, an increase of 4.6 million people 
over 2002. The number of people covered by work-related injury insurance reached 121.7 
million in 2007, an increase of 19.1 million people over 2002 (cf. United Nations 
Development Programme, 2008, p. 56). Note the official unemployment rate in China has 
been calculated without consideration of the migrant workers from rural to urban areas. In 
the first quarter of 2009, China’s government estimated about 20 million rural migrants, or 
15.3 percent of all rural workers employed outside their hometowns, have returned home 
without jobs. Meanwhile, urban unemployment rate, which excludes migrant workers, was 
estim  2009, higher than 4.2 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008. 
This rket harder 
than expected (cf. Xinhua News Agency, 2009).    
of enterprise 
annu
nemployment insurance. By the end of 2006, 111.9 million people were covered by 
unemployment insurance, and 3.3 million people benefited from unemployment subsidies. 
But compared to the whole labour for
ployment of young people has become an increasingly critical issue. A survey made 
by the Ministry of labour and
ated to hit 4.6 percent in
 number shows us that the global financial crisis blew China’s labour ma
Among all social insurance programs, pensions are by far the most important with a 
share of around 80 percent in revenues and expenditures (cf. OECD, 2005, p. 187). China’s 
government adopted the pay-as-you-go model of providing old age pensions in 1997. It 
was based on the Three-Pillar Model proposed by the World Bank (1994). The first pillar 
is funded by the employer on a pay-as-you-go basis, and amounts to 20 percent of each 
employee’s annual income, considered as the minimum subsistence level. The second 
pillar is a cumulative account jointly funded by the employer and the employee and is 
equivalent to 40 percent of the latter’s annual income. The third consists 
ity and is at present only practiced in profitable enterprises. The number of people 
covered by old age insurance grew from 86.7 million in 1997 to 186 million in 2006. 
Currently, old age insurance covers 48 percent of urban employees (cf. Lu, Feng, 2008, p. 
65). In 2007, the number of employed urban residents with old-age insurance exceeded 
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201 million, an increase of nearly 14 million people compared with 2002. The average 
participation rate among employees was around 74 percent (cf. United Nations 
Development Programme, 2008, p. 56).  
Of the 1.3 billion Chinese people, about 400 million are living in urban areas, the 
other 900 million in rural areas. The majority of rural population in China doesn’t have 
such old age insurance. In the countryside, old-age security has traditionally been provided 
by cultivated land and extended family. Today, as family size shrinks and more and more 
people move to cities to work, the old age security has become a challenging issue. China 
has already adopted the urban model in some rural areas on a trial basis. By the end of 
2005, it had been expanded to cover more than 54 million people in rural areas, which 
accounted for about 6 percent of the entire rural population. Today, the childless elderly 
people in rural areas receive subsidies each month from the state and the rural people over 
60 years old who only have one child (son or daughter) or two daughters, receive at least 
RMB 600 per year from the state as a reward for not having more children. Despite all the 
progress, the coverage is still low and labour mobility is constrained by the poor transfer 
ability of the current pension system, and the differences between rural-urban pension 
systems are still very large (cf. Lu, Feng, 2008, pp. 65-66).  
Before the opening, China’s health care system contained “barefoot doctors” in rural 
areas and free medical care for the employees in cities. Since market-oriented reforms were 
adopted, great expansion and improvement have been made in medical resources and 
facilities. Nationwide expenditures on health reached RMB 759 billion (about 95 billion 
USD) in 2004. However, the medical expenses grew faster than personal incomes, nearly 
one fifth of patients of China in 2003 could not afford to visit a doctor. A survey from the 
Ministry of Health of China in 2003 showed that 65 percent of the population did not have 
medical coverage, among them 45 percent in cities and 70 percent in rural areas. Three 
fourths of the population ranked expensive medical bills as the top social issue in China, 
according to another large-scale survey. Public health expenditure accounted for only 36.3 
percent of all health expenditures in 2003 (cf. Lu, Feng, 2008, p. 66). This means, the large 
proportion of healthcare expenditures was borne by individuals themselves.  
Since 2004, the government has begun to reform the urban and rural medical care 
system (see Figure 7.4). In cities, the system relies mainly on the employee medical 
insurance scheme, which currently covers 130 million workers. For the rural population, 
the government launched the cooperative medical care in the countryside in 2003. Large 
medical expenses are covered by a fund to which individual farmers contribute RMB 10 
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each year while central and local governments contribute RMB 40 each year per registered 
resident. At the end of 2006, this system covered 410 million farmers, or 45.8 percent of 
the rural population (cf. Lu, Feng, 2008, p. 67).  In 2007, another 223.1 million people 
were
 
s: (1) A dual 
econ
 using urban employees’ medical insurance, an increase of 65.8 million people over 
2002 (cf. United Nations Development Programme, 2008, p. 56).  
 
Figure 7.4 Urban and rural medical care system 
 
 
Source: Lu, Feng, 2008, p. 67, Figure 3.  
 
China’s current social security system has the following characteristic
omy with separate and unequal social security systems for urban and rural areas; (2) 
Low coverage and low levels of provision; (3) Rapidly increasing burden on the 
government. Nowadays, China set an ambitious goal to realize a universal social security 
with special focus on the low-income group and the government is emphasizing human 
development increasingly (cf. Lu, Feng, 2008, pp. 68-69). 
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Rural Social Security System in China  
 
Social security is an important regulatory measure for the government in the 
transitional period of the economy. In the practice social security relies on the economic 
development to some extent, however, its main function is to ensure a balanced 
socioeconomic development. According to international practice, industrialized countries 
start idely not at the stage of economic 
prosperity, but in depression and social transition stages as a very significant social policy 
to meet the socioeconomic challenges or helping the country overcome the economic 
crisis. China’s economy is now in a historic transitional stage with great challenge caused 
by the uneven growth between the rural and urban areas. The Chinese Government must 
use social security policy to reduce the income gap between the rural and urban workers 
and promote the development of rural areas. In order to reduce the income gap, it is not 
enough to regulate the income redistribution only by taxation. The use of an effective 
social security policy is necessary (cf. United Nations Development Programme, 2007, 
pp.57-58). 
In most countries, especially the industrial countries, the farmers not only own some 
land, but also have large investments in livestock and machinery that can be liquidated if 
necessary. Therefore the farmers have substantially more assets than urban people in these 
countries. In addition, in high income countries, most rural people are included in social 
security systems (cf. Johnson, 2000, p. 229). In China it is not the case. As a result of the 
collectivization movement in the 1950s, rural Chinese do not have the ownership of land 
any more, so that they can not use such asset to secure their life when they lose work 
ability on old age. In the early 1980s, the agricultural reform returned the management of 
land to farm households while keeping the state ownership of land. However, without 
private ownership of land, the farmers have severely limited ability to accumulate asset. 
The  children can not inherit the land as fortune. 
This means, unlike the traditional way of Chinese old age care which was mainly financed 
by t
ed to develop their social security systems w
elderly do not own the land, so that their
he younger generation of the family, the elderly farmers in China today have no 
effective means to ensure that their children will finance their life on old age. In addition, 
the reduction of the number of children, the shrinkage of family size and the migration of 
the young out to cities also impact the life of the rural elderly (cf. Zhao, Wen, 2000, p. 
280).  
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With the progress of urbanization in the past years, the urban labour force grew faster 
than the rural labour force. However, the majority of the entire Chinese labour force is still 
livin
d Table 7.3). However, the rural farmers who are living in the villages are still 
less 
g in rural areas. The current rural labour force totalled 480.9 million at the end of 
2006, 1.7 times the urban labour force (see Table 7.1). As mentioned above, most rural 
labour force is still not effectively protected by the social security. The contribution of the 
government on social security in the past was mainly concentrated in the urban areas. In 
other words, the majority of the Chinese labour force is not covered by the social security 
system. The key challenge of China’s development is, almost in each aspect, the 
underdevelopment of the rural areas, including inequality of income distribution, low 
consumption rate, unemployment and also low coverage of social security.  
Table 7.2 shows us the low coverage rates of the social security system for rural 
migrant workers in China, who left the villages and work in the cities. The coverage rates 
for pension, employment injury, and medical insurances for rural migrant workers were 
11.31 percent, 5.28 percent, and 4.92 percent respectively. The participation rates of rural 
migrant workers in social insurance were very low compared with urban employees (see 
Table 7.2 an
covered by the social security system than the rural migrant workers. 
 
Table 7.1 Number of employed persons at year-end in urban and rural areas (10,000 
persons) 
 
Year Total Urban 
Areas 
Rural 
Areas 
1980 42,361 10,525 31,836 
1990 64,749 17,041 47,708 
2000 72,085 23,151 48,934 
2003 74,432 25,639 48,793 
2006 76,400 28,310 48,090 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007 CD-ROM, 2007, Table 5-2.  
 
The underlying reason for the extreme low participation rates of rural people in social 
security schemes is the institutional segregation rooted in the hukou system. The so called 
“internal passport” hukou is a man-made institutional arrangement designed to control the 
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popu
stem for urban 
work
able 7.2 Coverage of social security system for rural migrant workers (2006) 
lation migration between rural and urban areas and across regions in the command 
economy. As a result of the hukou system, both employment and social security policies 
favour only local urban households and workers. Urban workers are often employed in the 
formal sectors22 with better protection by social security while rural migrant workers are 
mainly employed in the informal sectors with less protection (cf. Wang, 2008, pp. 56-58). 
Data showed us that migrant workers were most often young males and concentrated in 
low skilled, dirty and dangerous temporary jobs of construction and manual production 
which were rejected by the local urban workers (cf. Roberts, 2001, pp. 18-25). China has 
undertaken a radical reform of its urban social security system in 1990s, including basic 
pension insurance system for enterprise workers, basic medical insurance sy
ers and unemployment insurance for urban workers. But the reform policy design 
paid only much attention to local urban workers and did not take the welfare of the rural 
migrant workers into account. The country also introduced the work injury insurance for 
all enterprises in 2003. However, in practice no effective work injury protection was 
provided to rural migrant workers who do not have permanent jobs in the cities (cf. Wang, 
2008, p. 58). 
 
T
 
Items Number of people % in total rural 
covered (million) employees 
(480.90 million) 
Medical insurance 23 92 ,67 4.
Employment inj uranc 25,3  ury ins e 8 5.28
Rural old age so nsion 54,4  cial pe  2 11.31
 
Source: United Nat evelo rogram , p.37,  
 
 most parts of China’s countryside, the social old age caring system has not been in 
plac of experiment. 
Meanwhile, as mentioned, a great number of young people leave their villages and go to 
work
ions D pment P me, 2007  Table 3.
In
e and the new rural cooperative medical system is still in the phase 
 in the cities. Traditionally, the young people supported elderly people. But as the 
number of young people in villages drops, caring for rural aged people becomes more 
                                                 
22 Employment in formal sectors are all those types of employment which offer regular wages and hours, which carry 
with them employment rights, and on which income tax is paid (cf. Barr, Diamond, 2008, p. 310). 
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difficult. China had 38,000 social welfare institutions for elderly and 1.205 million beds for 
elderly caring in 2006. On average, each 1,000 aged people may rely on 8.6 beds, this is 
significantly behind the corresponding figure of 50 to 70 in developed countries (cf. United 
Nations Development Programme, 2007, p. 65).  
 
Table 7.3 Coverage of social security system for urban employees in 2006 
 
Items Number of people covered 
(million) 
% in total rural employees 
Basic old age pension 
insurance 
140.28 49.55 
Basic medical insurance 115.87 40.93 
Employment injury 
insurance 
102.35 36.15 
Unemployment insurance 111.87 39.51 
Maternity insurance 64.46 22.77 
 
Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2007, p.37, Table 2. 
 
Table 7.4 Inco ntenance of th ural ple: 636 
old people) 
 
me mai e elderly people in r  China (Total sam
Channels for old age income security Number of old 
peop
% in the total 
le respondents 
Personal savings 245 39 
Supported by the family 311 49 
The village 70 11 
Rural social insurance 110 17 
Private insurance 21 3 
Other 33 5 
 
Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2007, p.33, Table 1. 
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The United Nations Development Programme surveyed 636 aged respondents in rural 
areas in five provinces of China. This sample survey showed that 39 percent relied on 
personal savings for old age, 49 percent on support from the children. Only 17 percent 
relied on rural social insurance averagely (see Table 7.4).   
 the past the government spent less on the social security schemes for rural 
inha al security 
expenditures between the urban and the rural population was 89 to 11 percent in 2001. This 
was parad since aroun ese  
countryside. In July 2003 a new coopera are project was launched in rural areas. 
villager c es 10 yuan annually, and the central as 
 local governments each contribute 10 yuan per person toward building up a 
al care for its m  As the government has proclaimed, this 
f l population till the end of 2010. The 
n rate in 2006 was about 23 percent. However, only the treatment of serious 
embership is s voluntary basis (cf. Da  2008, pp. 
nment needs to do n this aspect to reduce, and ultimately, 
elim ate the gap of government expenditure on the urban and rural social insurance 
syste
The rural pension insurance in China has mainly three ways of fund collection:  
ents with stable incomes or those living in rich regions. The amount of 
contribution can be a certain proportion of the contributors’ income or just a fixed 
a
2. Irregular contribution, which is a n most of ue to 
u or the local residents. The f rs pay more ears of better 
h omes and less or even nothing in years of bad incomes.  
nd-for-all contribution, which su armers of old ge best. The 
f ution to the insurance fund once and for all according to 
their own expectations for their old age life. They start to draw pension from the 
fund since they are 60 years old (cf. Tian, 2006, p. 146).  
his rural pension insurance scheme covered 54.28 million rural people by the end of 
2005 n China. The 
accumulative rural pension insurance fund reached 26 billion yuan and was paying pension 
to 1.98 million rural Chinese (cf. Tian, 2006, p. 146).  
In
bitants than on those for urban residents. The ratio of annual soci
oxical, d two-thirds of the Chin
tive healthc
 population lives in the
Under this pilot scheme, every 
well as the
ontribut
fund to finance the medic embers.
new scheme is to cover 80 percent o
participatio
the rura
illness is reimbursed and m till on a rimont,
208-209). The gover more i
in
m.  
1. Regular contribution, which is the common way of fund collection for rural 
resid
mount.  
dopted i the rural regions d
nstable incomes f arme in y
arvest or better family inc
3. Once-a its f er a
armers pay their contrib
T
. But this was only 7.06 percent of the total rural labour force i
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7.4 Principles and Policy Suggestions for Improvement 
 
In China, it is now recognized that a basic social security system should provide a 
reliable means of support in old age and absorb any shocks effectively. Major social 
insu
ent Programme, 2008, p. 54).  
, the 
following p
social s
for each social member.  
 
all s
must be encouraged to 
evelopment in China (2001) that the 
rance schemes in China include both urban and rural old-age pension programs, 
unemployment and work-related injury insurance, basic medical care, maternity insurance 
and the minimum living standard allowance program. According to the Human 
Development Report China (2008), China’s Government has set ambitious goals for 
improvements in social security system for its 1.3 billion population, given that an ageing 
population is exerting pressure on the payment of pension, medical and other social 
security benefits. By 2010, China intends to set up a sound old-age insurance system 
covering 223 million employed people with basic pensions, a basic medical care plan 
covering 300 million people, an unemployment insurance plan covering 120 million 
people, and a work-place injury plan covering140 million people, and maternity insurance 
for 80 million women. The Government also intends to progressively increase the coverage 
and levels of rural old-age insurance, a new rural cooperative medical system and the rural 
minimum living standard allowance, as well as the enterprise annuity (cf. United Nations 
Developm
In relation to the special conditions and characteristics of China’s society
olicy issues must be taken in careful consideration for the improvement of 
ecurity system in China:  
1. The basic objective of social security is to guarantee the basic living 
standards 
2. Social security is obligatory and requires legislation to force all concerned 
parties (state, society, work units, individuals) to fulfil corresponding obligations.  
3. Social security should be dominated by the government, which should put
ocial forces into operation to establish an efficient security system and provide 
necessary financial support.  
4. Additionally, social security needs to be supported and complemented by 
the self-provided security of individuals. All people 
strengthen self security through purchase of commercial insurance, family pension 
plans, etc (cf. Cheng, 2001, pp. 184-186).  
Cheng Siwei, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of China’s national 
Congress, argued in his book Economic Reforms and D
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Chinese peo shoul ings. But the 
author does not agree with this argument. On the one hand, the very high saving rate is 
alrea
ed to help reduce the income gap. Social policies 
and 
ocial welfare system enlarged the urban–rural residents’ 
income gap
to migrant workers who have a stable job in a city and let them then pay taxes. This 
proposal w
because
 
Ca
 
Since t
the urb
revenue
sources nt’s budgetary revenues and are mainly 
used
ple d also be encouraged to support themselves through sav
dy a problem for the consumption in China and slows down growth of domestic 
demand; on the other hand, because of the insufficiency of the social security system, the 
Chinese people are willing to save rather than consume. Therefore, saving might be a 
solution for other countries with very low saving rate, for instance the United States, but it 
is definitely not a suitable solution for China.  
China’s government should focus on the following points for the further reform and 
improvement of social security system: 
 
Reducing the Dualistic Nature of the Social Security System 
 
At present, parallel to the economic system, China’s social insurance system is also 
segmented between rural and urban areas and even within urban areas, and there are large 
differences in coverage across regions and enterprise ownership types. This is the so-called 
dualistic economy. The segmentation of social security schemes impedes labour mobility 
and hence the creation of a national labour market (cf. OECD, 2005, p. 187). China’s 
social security system should be redesign
welfare provision in China are still divided, leaving most farmers and rural migrant 
workers without social support, while most residents in the cities benefit from the social 
security. In the 90th century the s
 by about 20 percent. The government is considering providing welfare benefits 
ill need budgetary allocations from both the central and local governments, 
 only one of them cannot carry the burden alone (cf. Lu, Feng, 2008, pp. 73-75).  
lling for a Better Management of Capital Spending on Social Security 
he economic reform, government revenues are growing steadily. Along with 
anization progress in recent years, many local governments have increased their 
s by using agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes. Presently, such revenue 
 are not managed as part of the governme
 for funding economic construction activities and government operations. If extra-
budgetary and extra-system revenues are consolidated with budgetary revenues, the social 
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security system will be financed more effectively than today. The further public finance 
reform should make the government budget fairer, more efficient, more transparent, and 
better functioning. Firstly, the structure of public spending must be improved. The 
Government investment in economic construction activities still outweighs spending on 
social programs (culture, preservation of cultural relics, sports, publishing, education, 
public health, etc), although it has decreased from 64 percent of budgeted expenditures in 
1978 to 27 percent in 2005. In the same period, administrative costs have ballooned, 
grow
d extra-system revenues should be well managed 
and efficiently used. Thirdly, the transparency in public finance should be improved. 
Spen  people, it should be 
made more transparent and involve greater public participation (cf. Lu, Feng, 2008, pp. 75-
77).
r 
pensions, medical care, unemployment benefit and other types of social insurance. Its 
majo rding to 
changing needs and minimum need for personal information and low management cost. 
How
ing faster than social spending. All of these should be rationalized and strictly 
controlled. Secondly, extra-budgetary an
ding on social programs is closely linked with the needs of the
 The efficiency and effectiveness of public spending could be, principally, enhanced by 
exploiting the role of market mechanisms to integrate the capital and the current budget, 
improving the benchmarks for the evaluation of cost-efficiency of spending etc (cf. OECD, 
2005, p. 201).   
 
Ensuring the Solvency of the Social Security System 
 
How can we ensure the solvency of the social security system? Different countries 
have different practices, but in general they combine taxation and forced savings. Taxation 
is on a cash basis and means that employers and employees pay a certain percentage of the 
total salary as a salary tax. Then the government manages the money and uses it for short-
term redistribution. This fund-raising model is based on the principle of short-term 
horizontal balance of income and expense. It is a traditional method for raising funds fo
r strengths lie in its flexibility to adjust the percentage of taxation acco
ever, this model will cause inter-generation redistribution and it is thus difficult to 
adapt to the fluctuations of economy and an aging population. Forced saving is a long-term 
accumulation method. The employers and employees pay a certain percentage of their total 
salary as insurance premium into employees’ individual accounts, which can in the long 
term increase in value and works as long-term accumulation funds. This fund-raising 
method is based on the principle of balance of long-term income and expense. Its major 
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strengths are high motivation and transparency and stable withdrawal rate. Further, the 
collected funds can enter capital market without difficulty. But it has a very high 
management cost, as well as the very high demand for personal information and a complex 
information processing system. Since the interval between contribution and earnings is 
very long, the funds may lose their value when uncontrollable risks occur, such as financial 
crisis, inflation, natural disaster and war. Almost every country in the world is trying to 
seek an optimal combination of these two models to form a social security system, in order 
to ensure both the current needs and the future growing needs of expenses. Generally, the 
taxation is used to ensure the basic life needs of the nation and the forced saving is used to 
ensure the future needs of the individuals (cf. Cheng, 2001, pp. 188-189).  
The US social security system has faced serious challenges owing to the aging 
population. The US has put forward a proposal to set up a two-tier social security system, 
which might be recommendable for China’s further social insurance reform. The proposal 
suggests that “while maintaining the existing retirement plan supported by government 
taxation, measures should be taken to ensure its solvency, including slowing down the 
growth rate of earnings of high and middle-level income earners; gradually putting off the 
retirement age from the present 65 to 70; keeping 62 as the age of early retirement but 
incre ederal tax on welfare benefits 
above the amount of contribution by the workers” (Cheng, 2001, p. 189). The above is the 
first
asing the discount of retirement benefits; and levying a f
 tier. The second tier is the new defined contributions plan, which transfers to the 
individuals’ retirement accounts through forced savings, whereas both employers and 
employees are required to contribute 1.5 percent of the employees’ wages (cf. Cheng, 
2001, pp. 189-190).  
In certain circumstances, forced saving could be a solution for the solvency of social 
insurance in industrialized countries, where the people are protected effectively by 
sufficient social insurance and thus are willing to consume. However, as mentioned above, 
the saving rate of the individuals in China is already very high, thus it is questionable, 
whether forced saving, or to be more precisely, a further group saving really works in 
China. As Keynes pointed out, saving has an immediate effect of reducing consumption 
and hence employment (cf. Keynes, 2007, pp. 190-191). Lack of sufficient effective 
demand, investment will decrease since it depends on the expectation of future 
consumption which is built by the current market performance, thus the production 
declines. Therefore a further increasing savings rate in China will make the consumption-
driven growth strategy impossible.  
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According to a report of the International Labour Organization (ILO), as future social 
security systems in industrialized countries as well as certain developing countries, 
including China, come under increasing strain from an ageing population, changing the 
mechanisms for financing retirement will be unable to solve the problem of rising pension 
costs. Among the solutions, the ILO says, employment policies should be changed in order 
to enable older workers to stay longer in employment and it should be made attractive for 
them to do so (cf. International Labour Organization, 2002). Currently, the employees’ 
retirement age in China is 55 for women and 60 for men. Studies by the ILO show that 
pension costs can be reduced by about 50 percent by increasing the retirement age for 5 
years (cf. International Labour Organization, 2002; Cheng, 2001, p. 192). But we should 
note
butions from enterprises and personal savings. The government takes 
limi
l security is the increasing national expenditure to the 
 that this policy runs counter to the present unemployment challenge in China, so that 
it turned into a question that the Chinese scholars often debate. In order to relieve the 
unemployment pressure, many state owned enterprises have even decreased the retirement 
age of their employees from 55/60 to 50/55 (women and men respectively). The policy of 
raising retirement age might be not practicable until a fundamental employment 
improvement is made in China.  
The Interim Provisions for Social Insurance Collection of China, issued in January 
1999, requires businesses to pay for their employees’ basic pensions insurance, basic 
medical insurance, unemployment insurance, and work injury insurance. Employees must 
pay only 7 percent of their wages. Of the total contributions, which account for 36 percent 
of a worker’s wages, 21.1 percent goes into the social financing fund and 14.8 percent goes 
into the employee’s personal account. Thus, China’s social security is established mainly 
through forced contri
ted responsibility. For example, a basic living security fund of RMB 19.5 billion has 
been raised for the redundant workers in 1999, out of which 50.8 percent was contributed 
by the government, 20.5 by society, and 28.7 by enterprises (cf. Cheng, 2001, pp. 191-
192).  
The extension of social security coverage is a very important source of social security 
funds. Today, the social security coverage in China is far from extensive, insurance 
contributions have not been standardized in each region, and social security funds are still 
inadequate. The country needs to include all labours in the social security system as soon 
as possible. This action will not only increase sources of funding for social security but 
also promote social stability and economic development (cf. Cheng, 2001, p. 192). Another 
essential source of funding for socia
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social insurance system, because, as mentioned in chapter 6, government expenditure could 
enhance the consumption and economic development which, in turn, ensure the solvency 
of the social security system.   
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8. Global Financial Crisis and China’s Development 
 
This chapter discusses at first the influence of the current global financial crisis on 
the world economy, especially on China, and then analyzes the impact of China’s 
reaction produced by the crisis on its trade partners. For the discussion of the influence, 
empirical evidence is introduced and relevant theory is reviewed to explain the rising 
protectionism during recession. Finally, the Keynesian proposals on a single global 
currency are reviewed as solution suggestions for a new world economic and monetary 
order in order to ensure the stability of world market and prevent financial collapse and 
economic crisis.  
 
8.1 Influence of the Current Global Financial Crisis on the World  
Economy 
 
Empirically, Financial or Economic Crisis May Cause Large-scale Protectionism 
 
In order to identify the empirical prediction of the impact of financial crisis, let’s 
recall the Kindleberger spiral of the Great Depression. As shown in Figure 8.1, the volume 
of world trade fell from 3 trillion USD in January 1929 to 0.9 trillion USD in December 
1939 – one-third of its original level. 
Obviously, if the global trade volume continues shrinking under the impact of 
financial crisis, as it today really seems to be, the newly industrializing countries (NIC) 
like China can no longer rely on exports to keep the growth.  
As a matter of fact, the financial crisis has already hit world trade hard. Exports from 
Japan were almost 50 percent less in February 2009 compared with the same month in 
2008; China’s Exports were down 26 percent in February 2009. WTO had predicted that 
global trade would shrink by 9 percent in 2009, the steepest annual decline since World 
War II.  Battered by a collapse in the values of their assets, the households in the rich 
world start saving again. The Western consumers have less appetite for new cars and 
consumer electronics. In order to rebuild their shattered balance sheets, the banks reduce 
the capital supply that would once have been used to finance trade (cf. Elliott, 2009, p. 22). 
Weakening external demand hit the emerging economies hard in the fourth quarter of 
2008, especially China and other Asian economies that strongly relied on export-led 
growth (cf. Shah, Swinney, 2009, p. 27). 
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Figure 
 
8.1 The Kindleberger Spiral (in million USD) 
 
 
Source: Kindleberger, 1973, p. 179, figure 8. 
 
According to the estimation of Shah and Swinney, all of the main regions of the world 
have slower growth rate since the financial crisis (see Figure 8.2). The richest regions, such 
as North America and Western Europe, are in a serious recession. The Asia Pacific keeps 
probably keep growing, but the growth rate in 2009 was less than half that of 2007.   
Barry Eichengreen and Kevin H. O’Rourke compared today’s global crisis to the 
Great Depression and summarised in March 2010 that global industrial production and 
world trade continue to recover – something for which policy deserves considerable credit. 
But policymakers should note that the level of industrial production is still 6 percent and 
world trade 8 percent below its previous peak (see Figure 8.3). This is a sharp divergence 
from experience in the Great Depression, when the decline in industrial production 
continued for three years. However, expansionary policies in a number of important 
economies might result in considerable excess capacity. The question now is whether final 
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dem or whether consumer spending, 
especially in the US, will remain weak, causing the increase in production to go into 
inventories, leading firms to cut back subsequently, and resulting in a double dip recession 
(cf. Eichengreen, O’Rourke, 2010). 
 
Figure 8.2 Growth of the main world’s regions 
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Source: Shah, Swinney, 2009, p. 28, Figure A.3. 
 
ionist 
mea
The reduced demand and financial flows can explain the immediate cause of the 
downturn in trade. However, there is another factor which is potentially more damaging 
and ruins the world economic growth fundamentally: the return of protectionism. In early 
2009, the World Bank reported that although all G-20 nations agreed to avoid protect
sures when they met in Washington in November 2008, however, at least 17 of them 
have, since then, implemented measures whose effect is to restrict trade at the expense of 
other nations. The World Bank listed some of those measures: Russia has raised tariffs on 
second hand cars, Argentina imposed new licensing arrangements for imports, China 
banned Irish pork and India banned Chinese toys. At least 13 countries have granted 
subsidies to automobile industry. What the World Bank didn’t mention is, the US has 
stopped a program that allows Mexican trucks on American roads and Mexico has 
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retaliated by increasing tariff. The president of the World Bank Robert Zoellick said: 
“Economic isolationism can lead to a negative spiral of events such as those we saw in the 
1930s, which made a bad situation much, much worse.” British Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown said also: “Protectionism is the road to ruin.” Why everyone reaches for 
protectionism in tough times, though we know that protectionism is so ruinous? The 
grea downturns, according to the comment 
of Elliot, is that trade is a global phenomenon, however politics is national. When 
unemployment increases, politicians understandably feel that they have to respond to the 
immediate needs of their voters, not yet those people in a far away country who are 
irrelevant to their interest (cf. Elliott, 2009, p. 22). 
 
Figure 8.3 Volume of world trade, now vs. then 
test difficulty of avoiding protectionism during 
 
     Months since the crisis  
 
Source: Eichengreen, O’Rourke, 2010, Figure 2. 
 
Inflation in China fell sharply from 8.7 percent in February 2008 to just 1.2 percent in 
December of the same year. The Chinese authorities cut interest rate to stimulate domestic 
demand in order to counteract the expected fall in export growth. However, any 
improvement in domestic demand is unlikely to prevent a marked deceleration in the 
Chinese economy in 2009, because exports account for around 40 percent of China’s GDP, 
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most of this with North America and Western Europe, which will have very large negative 
growth rate according to the estimation of Shah, Swinney. Furthermore, a slowdown in 
export sectors has a negative impact on the domestic economy through an increase in 
unemployment. It is estimated that around 20 million migrant workers have already lost 
their jobs as a result of falling external demand. This, in turn, will reduce the consumer 
spending, and slow down Chinese economic growth (cf. Shah, Swinney, 2009, p. 30). 
 
Theoretical Background for Protectionism 
 
Keynes pointed out: “We know no way in which the initial impetus to increased 
employment can be given except by (i) an increase of exports, (ii) the substitution of home-
prod se of investment at home” (Keynes, 
1981, p. 285). Keynes had been convinced of the need for barriers to free trade. He 
explained: “We all need to be as free as possible of interference from economic changes 
elsewhere in order to make our own favourite experiments towards the ideal social republic 
of the future; and ... deliberate movement towards greater national self-sufficiency and 
economic isolation will make our task easier” (Keynes, 1982, p. 241). If the economy is in 
emergency, the revenue tariff is most necessarily in demand. “It should be the declared 
intention of the Free Trade parties acquiescing in this decision (i.e. to impose a revenue 
tariff) to remove the duties in the event of world prices recovering to the level of 1929 ... 
Free Traders may, consistently with their faith, regard a revenue tariff as our iron ration, 
which can be used once only in emergency. The emergency has arrived” (Keynes, 1972, 
pp. 237-238). The suggestion of the revenue tariff by Keynes was rooted in the recognition 
that free trade would damage the domestic employment. 
A country’s government can prevent or discourage imports from other countries by 
impo estrictions, as Keynes 
suggested, are tariffs and quotas. Tariff is a tax on imported goods. If a country’s 
gove goods to domestic consumers are 
effectively increased. US Tariffs are averagely lower than those imposed by other 
gove
uced for goods now imported, or (iii) an increa
sing certain restrictions. The most commonly used trade r
rnment imposes tariff, the prices of foreign 
rnments. But some US industries are always more highly protected by tariffs than 
others. For instance, American apparel products and farm products have historically 
received more protection against foreign competition through high tariffs on related 
imports. In addition to tariffs, a government can reduce its country’s imports by enforcing 
a quota, i.e. a maximum limit that can be imported. Quotas have been commonly applied to 
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a variety of goods imported by the United States and other countries (cf. Madura, Fox, 
2007, p. 52). 
 
Falling Demand and Rising Protectionist Measures 
 
According to the estimation of the WTO, the collapse in global demand brought on by 
the biggest economic downturn in decades would drive exports down by roughly 9 percent 
in vo  since World War II. The exports of the 
developed countries would fall by 10 percent. In developing countries, which are far more 
depe
le 8.1). Growth for the year was 
belo
lume terms23 in 2009, the biggest contraction
ndent on trade for growth, exports would shrink by some 2-3 percent in 2009. The 
WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy said that for the last 30 years trade growth has been 
often outpacing gains in output. Production for many products is outsourced around the 
world so there is a multiplier effect – as demand falls sharply overall, trade will fall even 
further. Consequently many thousands of trade related jobs are being lost. The use of 
protectionist measures is already on the rise.  The increasing of such measures will choke 
off trade as an engine of recovery of the financial crisis, since restricting imports only leads 
your trade partner to retaliate and hit your exports (cf. WTO, 2009, p. 1). 
Following the dramatic worsening of the financial crisis since September in 2008, real 
global output growth slowed to 1.7 percent, compared to 3.5 percent in 2007, and is likely 
to fall by between 1 percent and 2 percent in 2009. This is the first decline in total world 
production since the 1930s (cf. WTO, 2009, p. 2). Exports and imports of major economies 
have been falling since September 2008 (see Figure 8.4 and Table 8.1). Merchandise trade 
in volume terms (excluding the price and exchange rate fluctuations) expanded by 2 
percent in 2008, down from 6 percent in 2007 (see Tab
w the average 5.7 percent registered during the 1998-2008 period (cf. WTO, 2009, p. 
8). 
Trade prospects are heavily conditioned by the financial crisis that began in 2007 in 
the United States. The crisis intensified dramatically following the collapse of the Wall 
Street investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008, and the government’s 
bailouts for financial institutions in the United States and EU. Turmoil in the financial 
sector and credit shortages spread to the real sector. Declining asset prices and falling 
demand led to dramatically reduced production and trade growth in many countries. Trade 
                                                 
23 Production and trade may be measured in volume (“real”) or value (“nominal”) terms. Measures of volume or real 
production and trade flows are adjusted for price changes and do not take account of exchange rate changes, thus 
permitting an assessment of the actual change in flows. Value or nominal measures of changes in flows include actual 
changes as well as changes in underlying prices and exchange rates. 
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has also been affected adversely by a sharp shrinkage in credit supply to finance imports 
and exports. Financial institutions and economies throughout the developed and 
eveloping world have been severely affected. The variety of monetary policy measures of 
the g ness, with interest rates in the 
US and elsewhere approaching zero. The timing of the recovery may now depend on how 
effec
d
overnments may be reaching the limits of its effective
tive these fiscal stimulus plans work, which amounted to more than 3 percent of world 
production at the beginning of 2009 (cf. WTO, 2009, p. 2-3). 
 
Figure 8.4 Real GDP and trade growth of OECD countries, 2007-2008 (% change on a 
year to year basis) 
 
2
4
6
8
10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
Q1 2007 Q2 2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2008
GDP Exports of goods and services Imports of goods and services
 
 
 
Source: OECD, 2009a; OECD, 2009b.  
The financial crisis has disrupted the normal functioning of the banking system and 
reduced needed credit supply for the firms and individuals. Falling stock markets and 
housing prices have also made negative shocks to the wealth in the United States and 
elsewhere. Households are unwilling to purchase durable goods such as automobiles and 
they attempt to rebuild their savings instead (cf. WTO, 2009, p. 3). As discussed in 
chapters above, rising savings rate will bring the economy into further recession.  
According to the analysis by WTO, the following factors may explain the decline of 
the trade growth: first, the widespread fall-off in demand, as all regions of the world 
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economy are slowing at once, is reducing the trade volume; second, a shortage of trade 
finance is likely to contribute to the contraction of trade; third, the rising protection could 
contribute to trade contraction and threaten the prospects for recovery (cf. WTO, 2009, p. 
4-5). 
Also China, with its dynamic economy, is strongly affected by the global recession. 
China’s exports to its top six trading partners (if we treat the EU as a single partner) 
represented 70 percent of the country’s total exports in 2007. All of these trading partners 
are currently experiencing economic contraction or slowdown and are likely to have weak 
impo
s through the first two months of 2009. China’s exports were down 26 
percent in February 2009 compared with February 2008 and 28 percent compared with 
January 2009 (cf. WTO, 2009, p. 3).  
 
Table 8.1 GDP and merchandise trade by selected regions, 2006-2008 (Annual % 
change at constant prices) 
 
rt demand for some time. The most major traders showed large drops in merchandise 
exports and import
GDP Exports Imports  
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 
World 3.7 3.5 1.7 8.5 6.0 2.0 8.0 6.0 2.0 
US 2.8 2.0 1.1 10.5 7.0 5.5 5.5 1.0 -4.0 
EU(27) 3.0 2.8 1.0 7.5 3.5 0.0 7.0 3.5 -1.0 
China 11.6 11.9 9.0 22.0 19.5 8.5 16.5 13.5 4.0 
Japan 2.0 2.4 -0.7 10.0 9.5 2.5 2.0 1.5 -1.0 
 
uipment 
to th
Source: WTO, 2009, p. 9, Table 1. 
 
As shown in Table 8.1, US, EU and Japan, the three biggest trade partners of China 
had all negative imports growth rate in the year of 2008. Compared with 2007, China’s 
exports growth rate declined 56.4 percent in 2008, and imports growth rate fell 70.4 
percent.   
Despite its strong overall trade performance, China’s exports of some products 
weakened significantly towards the end of 2008. Exports of office and telecom eq
e rest of world (i.e. the world except US), worth some 381.5 billion USD in 2008, fell 
7 percent in the fourth quarter compared to the same period of 2007, after growing at an 
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average rate of 17 percent during the first three quarters of 2008. Exports of office and 
telecom equipment to the United States fell even more sharply, registering a 13 percent 
decline in the fourth quarter of 2008 after growth of 10 percent in the third quarter. The 
whole exports of Chinese manufactured goods to the United States in 2008 increased just 1 
perc
 investments in financial derivatives that threatened 
American banks, money market funds, securities firms, and mortgage lenders. China was 
first SD 
intended to realize China’s goal of an 8 percent annual growth 
rate (cf. U.S.-China Commission, 2009, p. 39). It is usually supposed that with 8 percent 
nnual growth rate the social and political stabilit a could be ensured.  
 
ina low Purchases of United es Se ies a crease Gold Reserves 
 
is l year n M rd Key ad sp  his m  about nal : “
e y nk ger usand ds, you are at his mercy. If you owe him 
 pou he i our .” Th ns th you a bank ge a nt o
oney, it is no longer your fate at risk, but also the bank’s fate (cf. Bareau, 1958, p. 26).  
nited States – roughly two-thirds of China’s 1.95 
trillion USD foreign reserves are in American securities. Premier Wen Jiabao and other 
Chin
 about the safety of our assets. To be honest, I am definitely a little worried.” 
The 
ent over the previous year (cf. WTO, 2009, p. 7). 
 
8.2 China’s Response to the Global Financial Crisis 
 
As a response to the global financial crisis, China emphasized quick spending on 
infrastructure projects such as highways, railroads, and ports, rather than on the financial 
services industry. The American experience has been a lesson to China, so that Chinese 
banks had avoided many of the risky
, in November 2008, to announce its economic stimulus package —586 billion U
over two years — chiefly 
a y of Chin
Ch  to S  Stat curit nd In
In h ater s, Joh ayna nes h oken ind natio debts If 
you ow our ba  mana a tho  poun a 
million nds, s at y mercy is mea at if owe  a lar mou f 
m
China has lent vast sums to the U
ese officials have expressed growing nervousness in the phase of global financial 
crisis. Premier Wen voiced concern on 13th March 2009 about China’s dependence on the 
United States: “We have lent a huge amount of money to the U.S. Of course we are 
concerned
main worry of Chinese officials is that American efforts to fight the current economic 
downturn will result in inflation and erode the value of American bonds (cf. Bradsher, 
2009). 
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According to data released by China’s central bank, the Chinese government sold 
foreign bonds heavily in January and February 2009 before resuming purchases in March. 
Chinese foreign reserves fell a record 32.6 billion USD in January and 1.4 billion USD 
more in February before rising 41.7 billion USD in March. The growth of China’s foreign 
reserves in the first quarter of 2009 was at the slowest pace in nearly eight years, edging up 
7.7 billion USD, compared with a record increase of 153.9 billion USD in the same quarter 
of 2008 (cf. sher,
hina’s reserves have soared in recent years as the People’s Bank of China bought 
dolla
 think more 
carefully about underweight gold positions,” said John Reade, a precious metals strategist 
at U  
US dollar as a reserve currency should be reduced. It’s very essential to note that the 
incre
3 
billi
 signal that China is losing its confidence in US dollar.  
 
 Brad  2009).  
C
rs on a huge scale to prevent China’s currency from appreciating as foreign currency 
flowed into the country from trade surpluses and heavy foreign investment. But China’s 
trade surpluses have now dropped as exports have fallen and foreign investment has 
slowed as multinationals have conserved their cash (cf. Bradsher, 2009). 
Since the financial crisis started, investors have piled great amounts of money into 
gold, boosting prices to above 1,000 USD an ounce. As China slows purchases of United 
States securities, it has meanwhile almost doubled its gold reserves to become the world’s 
fifth-biggest holder of gold in April 2009. “When the largest holder of foreign exchange 
reserves discloses an increase in gold holdings, other countries may decide to
BS. In G20 summit in London in April 2009, China suggested global reliance on the
ase in China’s gold reserves has come primarily from domestic production and 
refining. However, is it a signal that Beijing is to change its foreign reserves policy in the 
future? Suki Cooper, a gold analyst at Barclays Capital, said China was just “reigniting 
gold’s relevance as a monetary asset”. China’s foreign exchange reserves grew from 62
on USD at the start of 2005 to 1,906 billion USD at the end of September 2008, but in 
the period October 2008 to April 2009 this growth has slowed to a virtual stop, with 
reserves rising by just 7.7 billion USD in the first quarter of 2009. That means smaller new 
purchases of everything from US Treasuries to gold. China became last year the world’s 
largest producer of gold, outranking South Africa. Paul Atherley, Beijing-based managing 
director of Leyshon Resources, said that even after the latest purchases, China’s reserves in 
gold were still far below the US or other developed countries (cf. Anderlini, Blas, 2009). It 
is still too early to say that gold will be the major reserve of China in the future, but it is 
surely a
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China’s Stimulus Package Plan 
 
According to a report in November 2008 by David Barboza in New York Times, 
China’s economy is beginning to weaken after five years of growth in excess of 10 percent. 
Growth in exports and investment is slowing, consumer confidence is declining, stock and 
property markets are severely depressed, and factory closings in southern China are 
resulting in mass layoffs. On 8th November 2008 China announced a huge economic 
stim
ailways, subways 
and 
nnual conference in April 
2009, China’s Premier Wen Jiabao said that China’s economic stimulus package plan was 
ulus package plan aimed at bolstering its weakening economy and fighting the effects 
of the global slowdown (cf. Barboza, 2008). The theoretical background of this stimulus 
package plan is the internal employment mechanism (see relation 2-43 in chapter 2).  
China said it would invest ca. 586 billion USD in infrastructure projects over the next 
two years – roughly 7 percent of its GDP each year — to construct new r
airports and to rebuild communities destroyed by a heavy earthquake in the southwest 
in May 2008. The stimulus would cover 10 areas, including low-income housing, 
electricity, water, rural infrastructure and projects aimed at environmental protection and 
technological innovation – all of which could encourage consumer spending and bolster 
the economy. The State Council said the new spending would begin immediately, with 18 
billion USD scheduled for the last quarter of 2008. This package is the largest economic 
stimulus effort ever undertaken by the Chinese government. Though driven by domestic 
concerns, the stimulus plan is likely to cheer foreign investors in China’s economy by 
ensuring that the country remains a source of growth. Beijing is moving aggressively to 
cope with rapidly slowing economic growth (cf. Barboza, 2008). 
China’s package is not comparable to fiscal stimulus measures of Washington. In 
China, much of the capital for infrastructure improvements comes not from central and 
local governments but from state banks and state-owned companies that are encouraged to 
expand more rapidly. The plan also differs from the 700 billion USD financial bail-out 
package approved by US Congress, which has helped strengthen bank balance sheets but 
did not directly support specific investment projects in the United States. China’s overall 
government expenditure remains relatively low as a percentage of economic output 
compared with the United States and Europe. However, Beijing maintains far more control 
over investment trends than Washington does, thus it has much greater flexibility to 
increase investment in order to counter a sharp downturn (cf. Barboza, 2008). 
At the opening ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia a
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alrea es have taken place in the economy. The measures 
taken by China to deal with the crisis have proved essential for easing major problems in 
the e
scien
frastructure as part of the 
stim
ding 
shar
dy paying off, and positive chang
conomy, shoring up confidence and stabilizing expectations. The GDP of China rose 
6.1 percent in the first quarter of 2009, the slowest pace in a decade. Premier Wen said the 
economy was “better than expected”, for example improvement in investment, 
consumption and industrial output, as well as sufficient liquidity in the banking system. He 
said the stimulus policies were primarily aimed at boosting domestic demand, and at the 
same time made full use of external demand, both of them may drive economic growth. 
Further, the stimulus policy would give a big push to the shift from extensive economic 
growth driven by high consumption of material resources to intensive growth driven by 
tific and technological advancement, improved quality of the workforce and 
institutional innovation (cf. China Daily, 2009).  
Asian Development Bank reported that driven by the central government’s fiscal 
stimulus, China’s 2009 growth rate would be 8.2 percent (cf. Global Times, 2009), which 
is much higher than expected.  
In the view of David Dollar, World Bank Country Director for China, China’s 
stimulus package is good “because it will keep China’s growth rate up at a pretty healthy 
rate and so imports will continue to go into China at a fairly good rate. That’s good news 
for countries like Mongolia and Australia that export commodities like copper and iron ore 
to China – it’s also welcome news for countries selling primary products, machinery and 
parts to China. The bad news is there won’t be as much stimulus to these exporting 
economies as China was giving in the past.” As China builds in
ulus package, domestic demand and domestic needs are enhanced (cf. Li, 2008). 
China’s further development will depend more on domestic consumption and domestic 
investment instead of exports.   
China’s Premier Wen also said that the government was doing everything in its power 
to create jobs, especially for college graduates and rural migrant workers. The urban 
employment rose as 2.68 million jobs were created in the urban areas in the first quarter of 
2009. The industrial output has gradually stabilized, and agriculture production is on the 
whole stable. But this doesn’t mean that the impact of the global financial crisis on China 
is over. On the contrary, the crisis is still spreading. Premier Wen pointed out that the crisis 
had presented China with great challenges in economic and social development inclu
p decline in exports, greater difficulties in stabilizing agriculture production and 
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increasing farmer’s income, industry overcapacity, and slow recovery in industrial growth, 
and severe pressure of unemployment (cf. China Daily, 2009). 
 
China to Tax Some Imports from Major Trade Partners 
 
China, the world’s largest steel consumer, was striking back after the United States, 
the European Union and other countries imposed protective tariffs on Chinese steel and 
commodity products in September 2009. The United States and Russia last year exported a 
combined 602 million USD of the designated steel products to China. Flat-rolled electrical 
steel products from steel makers including AK Steel Holding Corp., OAO Novolipetsk 
Steel and Allegheny Ludlum would attract duties of as much as 25 percent starting on 11th 
December 12, 2009, as a result of the investigation and judgment by China’s authorities. 
This
the world. This crisis led almost all countries try to protect 
jobs
 is the first time China has conducted an anti-subsidy and anti-dumping investigation. 
Disputes between China and its trading partners are growing as the worst economic crisis 
since the Great Depression hit 
 by cutting imports. China protested U.S. duties of as much as 99 percent on 3.2 billion 
USD of Chinese steel pipe exports in November 2009, and announced the start of an anti-
dumping investigation into American carmakers (cf. Bloomberg News, 2009). Protectionist 
policies can never be implemented from one side. Cutting imports during economic crisis 
would protect domestic jobs, but cause trader partners follow suit and cut its imports either. 
Thus the world trade volume would shrink, as shown in the Kindleberger Spiral. 
 
8.3 Suggestion on a New World Economic and Monetary Order:  
Keynes’s Proposals at Bretton Woods 1944 
 
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 and 1998, the current global financial crisis and 
recession, and also the trade imbalance and exchange rate conflicts between the West and 
China caused the world to waver in its faith in the underlying basis and the efficiency of 
financial and trade liberalization. The fragility of the international financial system and the 
rationality of the investors could lead to an increase in the general insecurity and to a rapid 
transformation of a local shock into a global liquidity crisis (cf. Cartapanis, Herland, 2002, 
pp. 259-261). The imperfection of the financial market and international trade market 
determines that free market is not the key to solve economic problems.  
 207
It is important to keep international trade and payment accounts in balance so that the 
exchange is mutually beneficial and economic relations are reasonably stable. One of the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) original responsibilities, as a matter of fact, was to 
help er, the current policies of 
the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO not only ignore this principle but even make effort 
to p
hich was 
pushed forward by the pressure of enhancing competitiveness in international trade market 
(cf. Rodrik, , pp. the 
trade surplus countri e suppression of the 
increase of wages, so that most of the Chinese workers can not afford to buy what they 
prod
ined by 
effective demand. Therefore, the priority of policy making in economic area for each 
 nations keep their international accounts in balance. Howev
revent nations from reaching the balance, because in the current economic system, 
liberalizing trade and investment and enhancing international competitiveness are usually 
seen as the means to growth and the key to prosperity. The result is imbalance, instability, 
inequality and deprivation. In the last decades, the United States has been buying far more 
from others than it sold to them and paying for the difference with money borrowed from 
the countries with trade surplus, such as Japan and China (cf. Cavanagh, Mander, 2004 pp. 
73-74). This resulted in a substantial surplus in production in other countries and 
increasing debt of American, which put the United States into financial collapse in 2007 at 
last. Indeed, lack of effective intervention in trade and financial market is seen as one of 
the major causes of the current financial crisis.  
In 1997 William Greider pointed out that regarding the poverty reduction and income 
distribution, scores of nations around the world were concretely in worse shape than they 
had been twenty years ago. The overall gap in incomes and wealth, or rather the poverty, 
has grown tremendously, in parallel to the growth of GDP (cf. Greider, 1997, p. 281). By 
studying empirical evidence, the Harvard economist Dani Rodrik came to the conclusion 
that the rising wage inequality resulted mainly from technological change, w
 1997  15-16). On the other side, the price advantage in export goods in 
es (like China) is always combined with th
uce. Very ironically, China is lending the American money to buy the products ‘made 
in China’ that they would otherwise not afford without the borrowed money.  
“The outstanding faults of the economic society in which we live are its failure to 
provide for full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and 
incomes” (Keynes, 2007, p. 341). The free market, if let alone, results in rising inequality 
of wealth distribution and thus inadequate effective demand, which causes unemployment 
and depression. In an uncertain world with uncertain future, there is no tendency towards a 
full employment equilibrium (cf. Bortis, 1997, p. 282), which is mainly determ
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coun
bilising mechanism, by which pressure is 
exer
 to its gold 
defin
try is not to grow through exports but to create domestic effective demand. It is not 
the growth rate, but the aggregate demand, i.e. the effective demand, which reflects the 
living standards of the people and thus the quality of development.  
In order to correct trade imbalance on the global level, control international financial 
stability, promote full employment and economic development, Keynes suggested a new 
international monetary system with a single global currency, bancor. The main idea of 
Keynes was “the substitution of an expansionist, in place of a contractionist, pressure on 
world trade” (Keynes, 1980, p. 176).  
By explaining the single global currency, Keynes wrote: “We need an instrument of 
international currency having general acceptability between nations ... We need an orderly 
and agreed upon method of determining the relative exchange values of national currency 
units ... We need a quantum of international currency, which is … governed by the actual 
current requirements of world commerce, and is also capable of deliberate expansion and 
contraction to offset deflationary and inflationary tendencies in effective demand world. 
We need a system possessed of an internal sta
cised on any country whose balance of payments with the rest of the world is departing 
from equilibrium in either position, so as to prevent movements which must create for its 
neighbours an equal but opposite want of balance ... We need a method by which the 
surplus credit balances arising from international trade, which the recipient does not wish 
to employ, can be set to work ... without detriment to the liquidity of these balances” 
(Keynes, 1980, p. 168).  
The created single global currency would be circulating only among countries, but not 
inside them, and conveying the payment of their commercial and financial transactions. Its 
task would be to be given to an international institution (the Clearing Union) which would 
play have played the role of World Bank and would thus have been an intermediary 
between Central Banks of member countries. Member countries would use the bancor as 
the sole means of international payments and its value is corresponding
ition (cf. Cencini, 1995, p.137). 
“The proposal is to establish a Currency Union, here designated an International 
Clearing Union, based on international bank-money, called (let us say) bancor, fixed (but 
not unalterably) in terms of gold and accepted as the equivalent of gold by the British 
Commenwealth and the United States and all the other members of the Union for the 
purpose of settling international balances. The Central Banks of all member States (and 
also of non-members) would keep accounts with the International Clearing Union through 
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which they would be entitled to settle their exchange balances with one another at their par 
value as defined in terms of bancor. Countries having a favourable balance of payments 
with the rest of the world as a whole would find themselves in possession of a credit 
acco
y is simultaneously offered and demanded in terms of bancor. 
Sinc
t trade balance deficits of member countries. During 
such
unt with the Clearing Union, and those have an unfavourable balance would have a 
debit account. Measures would be necessary to prevent the piling up of credit and debit 
balances without limit” (Keynes, 1980, pp. 170-171). Each member country should be 
responsible to keep its self-equilibrium so that the rising imbalance on the global level 
would be prevented and the system as a whole would be secured. 
About the circulation and function of the bancor, Keynes suggested: “The principal 
object can be explained in a single sentence: to provide that money earned by selling goods 
to one country can be spent on purchasing the products of any other country. In jargon, a 
system of multilateral clearing. In English, a universal currency valid for trade transactions 
in all the world” (Keynes, 1980, p. 270).  
The bancor is supposed to be used to provide the effective payment of commercial 
transactions among the different countries, who are members of the multilateral clearing 
system. Issued by the World Bank, the bancor flows instantaneously back to it, in a 
movement allowing for the transfer of its real content from one country to the other. To 
convey real goods, the bancor is changed into the national currency of the country which 
obtains it from the International Clearing Union. Because of the circular operation of the 
bancor, the national currency is also immediately changed into the international one, so 
that the national currenc
e every international transaction submits national currencies to a couple of opposing 
and equivalent forces, the system has great advantage of assuring exchange rate stability. 
The stability of the exchange rates depends on two equilibria: the internal one which is 
related to the general level of prices, and the external one which is related to the balance of 
payments. In a system with bancor, exchange rates are essentially stable since they are no 
longer submitted to speculative market forces, however, they can still periodically be 
modified in order to avoid permanen
 re-adjustment, the stability of the internal equilibrium is guaranteed by the 
fundamental neutrality of the bancor (cf. Cencini, 1995, pp. 138-139).  
The International Clearing Union would adopt rules to impose sanction on debtor 
countries as well as countries which ran persistent surpluses and thus accumulated bancor 
reserves. Keynes called for a charge on excessive overdrafts and on excessive reserve 
balances of one or two percentage points in order to encourage balanced trade (cf. Wray, 
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1999, p. 192). The Governing Board of the International Clearing Union may require a 
member country with persistent trade deficit measures against its debit balance, including 
devaluation of its national currency in terms of bancor, the control of outward capital 
transactions, expansion of gold reserves, and domestic policy “which may appear to be 
appropriate to restore the equilibrium of its international balance” (Keynes, 1980, p. 462). 
A member country with persistent trade surplus may be asked by the Governing Board to 
take measures to restore the equilibrium of its international balances, including expansion 
of domestic credit and domestic demand, appreciation of its national currency in terms of 
banc
 is simple, namely, to generalise the essential 
prin
 may either fail to 
adeq
or, reduction of tariffs and other discouragements against imports and encouragement 
of international development loans (cf. Keynes, 1980, p. 463). By taxing the surplus, the 
International Clearing Union stabilizes the global financial market, encourages domestic 
demand and promotes global trade balance.  
“The idea underlying such a Union
ciple of banking as it is exhibited within any closed system. This principle is the 
necessary equality of credits and debits. If no credits can be removed outside the clearing 
system, but only transferred within it, the Union can never be in any difficulty as regards 
the honoring of checks drawn upon it. It can make what advances it wishes to any of its 
members with the assurance that the proceeds can only be transferred to the clearing 
account of another member. Its sole task is to see to it that its members keep the rules and 
that the advances made to each of them are prudent and advisable for the Union as a 
whole” (Keynes, 1980, p. 171).  
In his speech Reform the International Monetary System in March 2009, the governor 
of the People’s Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan, called the bancor approach of Keynes 
“farsighted”. As a response to the current financial crisis started in 2007, he said: “The 
crisis again calls for creative reform of the existing international monetary system towards 
an international reserve currency with a stable value, rule-based issuance and manageable 
supply, so as to achieve the objective of safeguarding global economic and financial 
stability. … Issuing countries of reserve currencies are constantly confronted with the 
dilemma between achieving their domestic monetary policy goals and meeting other 
countries’ demand for reserve currencies. … the monetary authorities …
uately meet the demand of a growing global economy for liquidity as they try to ease 
inflation pressures at home, or create excess liquidity in the global markets by overly 
stimulating domestic demand” (Zhou, 2009). This is the so-called Triffin Dilemma, which 
implies that the dollar as international currency leads to a tension between national 
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monetary policy and global monetary policy. While exploring better solutions for the 
challenges we face, the world might need to consider Keynes’ bancor approach.   
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9. Concluding Remarks 
 
The author would say that the essence of this thesis could be well summarised by the 
saying of Keynes: “The outstanding faults of the economic society in which we live are its 
failure to provide for full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of 
wealth and incomes” (Keynes, 2007, p. 341).  
 
9.1 General Summary and Policy Conclusions 
 
The rapid economic growth has transformed China from a negligible player in world 
trade to the third largest economy in the world after the U.S. and Japan in 2008 with GDP 
of 7.8 trillion USD in 2008, when measured by purchasing power parity (cf. 
EconomyWatch, 2009). China has aroused worldwide interest. This thesis reviewed briefly 
China’s achievements in growth, and concentrated on its major challenges that, if not 
resolved, could impede the further economic development. It has analyzed the drivers for 
China’s economic growth, the internal and external conflicts arising with the progress of 
the growth, the causes and solutions of current challenges, the interaction between the 
West and China in respect to trade, employment, and exchange rate policy, impact of the 
global financial crisis and recession on trade and China’s responses to it. By combining 
theories and practice, the thesis has explored in which direction the future development 
should proceed. Such direction could be also implemented in other countries with similar 
circumstances like China.  
At the beginning of the thesis, major economic theories about growth and 
development have been reviewed and compared in order to find out the most appropriate 
theory which should serve as background for policy making for China’s further 
development. According to the neoclassical economics, prices, outputs, and income 
distributions are all determined in markets through supply and demand. Individual 
preferences shape both the nature of the economy and the characteristics of the society. 
Market supply and demand are aggregated across profit maximizing firms and utility 
maximizing individuals and their interactions determine equilibrium output and price. The 
equilibriums are the solutions of any economic problems, in other words, market economy 
is a self-regulating system, because the market forces always lead to efficient allocation of 
resources and full employment. Excessive unemployment is only temporary and will be 
corrected by market mechanisms in the long run (cf. Cadwallader, 1992, p. 7). However, 
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the classica t the economy is not able to self-correct and 
the market need necessarily active government intervention to ensure economic growth 
and 
els of government expenditure and taxation, 
e level of aggregate demand would be controlled by the government, so that the 
developmen uld b 1).  
ith essential achievements in economic growth, China increased not only its own 
GDP
hina’s GDP growth is still too small to compensate the decline 
of e
l-Keynesian economists believe tha
stability. Market, when left alone, leads to either insufficient aggregate demand which 
causes unemployment or excessive aggregate demand which results in inflation. Lack of 
sufficient aggregate demand, involuntary unemployment exists and will not be corrected 
by the system automatically. By adjusting lev
th
t wo e promoted (cf. Downes, Goodman, 2003, p. 53
W
 and living standards, but also made significant contribution to the world GDP growth 
and poverty reduction. Meanwhile, the painful costs of the booming growth are also rising. 
Under the export-led growth mode, the income distribution become more unequal because 
the wage level in export sectors and in the costal areas where the most export-oriented 
companies are located is much higher than that in other areas and sectors; in order to keep 
the export advantages, the government implemented specific policies to encourage the 
development of export oriented sectors, most of them located in costal areas, and 
manipulated the value of Chinese currency, argued by most Western economists. Due to 
the supposedly manipulated value of RMB by China’s government and under the pressure 
of increasing unemployment through trade deficits, the industrialized countries have raised 
measures of protectionism against products ‘made in China’, especially since the global 
financial crisis and recession. However, the contribution of the increase of the domestic 
household consumption to C
xports. One of the most crucial effects of China’s high surplus in the balance of trade 
must be the record high foreign exchange reserves in US Dollar. That is, China deposited 
trade revenue in a great measure in the United States. These reserves should have been 
used as financial means for domestic investment in social security system and public 
services which could promote the domestic employment in underdeveloped areas, increase 
aggregate consumption, improve the income distribution so that the economy is put in 
motion a virtuous circle of effective demand: the more effective demand the public 
investment creates, the more private investment will be made; and with more private 
investment, more effective demand will be created, which is key for sustainable economic 
development. Currently, due to the low coverage of the social security, the Chinese people 
would rather save than to spend, leading to the fact that the savings rate is high and 
consumption rate is very low.  
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Considering the above mentioned experiences, we come to the conclusion that the 
neoclassical theory is no more valid for China’s further development. Free market 
economy is not the solution, since the free trade based on ‘comparative advantages’ 
already hurt both the West and China hard. China’s government must reduce the 
dependence on exports and commit itself to the domestic development, especially in the 
underdeveloped areas and for the low income population. Government expenditure aimed 
at increasing domestic demands should benefit rural population i.e. low income population 
firstly to reduce the income inequality. Public investment must be made in infrastructure, 
agric
) with favourable consequences for economic activity and 
ulture, education, employment creation and building an efficient social security 
system. These are determining factors for the aggregate demands. This means that policy 
making for China’s further development should be based on the classical-Keynesian 
theory.  
In the classical-Keynesian view, interest rate and exchange rate are both determined 
politically, and the price is determined in the production process. The reaction of the 
market is just a quantity adjustment. The government should set both the internal price of 
money i.e. the interest rate and the external price of money i.e. the foreign exchange rate, 
in other words, one country’s price of money in terms of another’s. Interest rate should be 
taken out of the play of the market forces and established by the central bank in order to 
achieve the objectives of high levels of employment. In addition, if the external price of 
money (the foreign exchange rate) remains within the play of market forces, the internal 
price of money (the domestic interest) would be affected and dragged into the market, be 
subjected to its influences. The creation of fixed exchange rates among governments 
worldwide was designed to remove the external price of money from market forces, in 
order to promote international trade and keep domestic interest rates from being influenced 
by external market forces (cf. Guttmann, 1997, p. 201). The suggestion of a single global 
currency has been discussed in chapter 8.3. 
Government expenditure could be a necessary means to sustain aggregate demands 
and to create jobs. The economy would be thereby put on the trend toward full 
employment. With the tax revenue based on earned income, the volume of resources 
collected by the government varies as income changes. Revenue falls during a recession, 
while government expenditure increases to stabilize the economy (cf. Steele, 2001, pp. 
186-187).   
By raising the level of government expenditure, the level of aggregate demand can be 
raised (by a multiplied amount
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emp
tting the economy together. Efforts to integrate the three major costal open 
econ
stments. Savings will be reduced to allow the 
wea
mand and is aimed at driving economic growth through both consumption and 
inve
loyment. Especially during recession, the government should aim to raise spending to 
stimulate the economy (cf. Griffiths, Wall, 2007, p. 479). Although such an expansion 
might result in a larger budget deficit because government expenditure exceeds tax 
revenue, it will be rebalanced by the increasing tax revenue when the economy is extracted 
from the recession and enters a booming phase again.  
 
9.2 Outlook on a Possible Future Development of China 
 
For the future development of China’s economy, we would expect to see some 
movement towards a national economy with strong emphasis on domestic-oriented 
development over the next decades. The national highway and railway infrastructure will 
start kni
omic zones of China, namely Greater Pearl River Delta, the Yangtze River Delta and 
the Bohai Rim, will continue. By such integration, linkages between provinces will be 
created and barriers between provinces will be reduced to create efficient national markets 
in China. But the municipal and provincial boundaries to trade and investment are likely to 
come down slowly. A range of second-tier cities will start to develop and become 
interesting business cities and markets (cf. Hoffmann, Enright, 2007, pp. 45-46). This 
means, the income distribution will be improved. The economic development will be 
driven by the domestic aggregate demand, i.e. the effective demand.  
Unlike the exports-led growth path over the last 30 years, the national self-sufficiency 
in China’s economy will be raising substantially. When China’s economy is not dependent 
upon exports, the vast holdings of foreign reserves become unnecessary. These might be 
used to buy strategic stakes overseas in energy and minerals to secure future access to 
these resources. The rules on foreign investment will be tightened up to prevent over-
investment in property and other such inve
k consumption to catch up with the strong domestic trade and investment (cf. Iley, 
Lewis, 2007, p. 227). 
In his speech at Summer Davos in Dalian, China on 10th September 2009, China’s 
Premier Wen Jiabao has repeatedly emphasized that domestic demand will play a central 
role in driving China’s economy forward. China’s stimulus package focuses on expanding 
domestic de
stment. Consumption will be stimulated by increasing subsidies for farmers, offering 
subsidies for the program of bringing home appliances and agricultural machinery, raising 
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the minimum purchasing price of grains, introducing performance-based salaries for 
primary and middle school teachers, and increasing the basic cost of living allowances for 
urban and rural residents so that the people will be able to spend more. Forceful measures 
will be taken to adjust the structures of domestic and external demands and strengthen the 
role of domestic demand in fuelling economic growth. The government will make great 
efforts to increase the share of consumption in GDP, raise urban and rural income, improve 
consumer expectation spend. The 
development of the service sector will be speeded up and it will be a priority task in 
boos
ges of Chinese policy 
(cf. 
at would simultaneously impoverish low-income population and 
rewa
s, and enhance people’s willingness and capacity to 
ting domestic demand, and an important factor in promoting balanced growth of 
supply and demand (cf. Wen, 2009). All these new policies will give a strong push to 
domestic demand and essentially reduce China’s dependence on exports. If one may 
interpret the difference, the past growth path of China might reflect to some extent 
Ricardo’s idea of “comparative advantages” (see chapter 5.3), however, its future growth 
path will rather be in accordance with Keynes’s doctrine of “effective demand” (see 
chapter 2 and chapter 6).  
However, a sharp increase of the value of the renminbi is not in the short term 
expectation. Such an exchange rate alteration would result in large capital losses on 
China’s large holdings of dollar assets, and would present those who speculated on a yuan 
appreciation with large gains. For purpose of stability, China is politically, culturally and 
economically opposed to rewarding those who speculated on the chan
Iley, Lewis, 2007, p. 227). Fan Gang, an adviser of China’s central bank and director 
of the National Economic Research Institute, said that a revaluation would not reduce 
China’s trade surplus with the United States and would only encourage more speculative 
capital inflows betting on further exchange rate gains.  A rapid revaluation of the reminbi 
would price China’s exporters out of the market and hit Chinese farmers and immigrant 
workers hard, as many low-wage jobs would disappear. He suggested that the Chinese 
currency would rise by an average of 5 percent a year (cf. Fan, 2006). China would reject 
any policy change th
rd wealthy speculators, because it is very harmful to social stability. But the gradual 
increase of China’s currency value of 5 percent per year seems feasible. In 6 years, the 
total increase would be 30 percent, which would substantially contribute to correct the 
global imbalances.   
Axel Merk, chief investment officer and manager of the Merk Hard and Asian 
Currency Funds, pointed out that China is by no means responsible for the crisis the world 
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faces, however, it has played an important role in allowing global imbalances to be built. 
China has to change and must take the responsibility to shape not only its own future, but 
also that of the global economy. Consumer spending in China has continued to increase 
year over year, but there is a seriously accelerating slowdown under way. Lifting the spirit 
of Chinese consumers might be far more effective than a spending program on 
infrastructure. The spirit of Chinese consumers is not encouraged by providing access to 
credit, but by giving the country a vision. The industry with low technology content such 
as the toy production will be a history for China, while the high tech industry of China is 
offering increasingly better product quality and performance. Toy production will be left to 
other Asian countries; China has to focus on technology and innovation since promoting 
the development of high tech industry contributes substantially more to the growth than 
subsidizing industries that have little chance to survive, such as toy production (cf. Merk, 
2008). China’s infrastructure stimulus plan will enhance the employment and thus increase 
the consumption. Furthermore, development of the high tech industry, poverty reduction, 
improvement of income distribution, development of social security system will not only 
enha
s 35 percent in 2008 and fell below that by the middle of 2009. It’s an 
econ
nce the purchasing power of the population, but also supply the population a positive 
vision for the future. Therefore, their increasing consumption will contribute essentially to 
the further growth.  
In the conference of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 2008, China’s 
President Hu Jintao said China will continue to follow the Scientific Outlook on 
Development by putting people first and making development comprehensive, balanced 
and sustainable. China will follow a new path of industrialization with Chinese 
characteristics and transform the mode of economic growth from an economy relying 
heavily on higher consumption of resources to one achieving development by making 
scientific and technological progress, improving the quality of the workforce and 
developing innovative management, he added (cf. China Daily, 2008). The analysis of 
Axel Merk, mentioned above, was consistent with China’s future development outlined by 
President Hu Jintao.  
In a TV interview on 19th October, 2009, Stephen S. Roach, Chairman of the Morgan 
Stanley Asia, said that literally 80 percent of China’s GDP is concentrated in two sectors, 
exports and export-led fixed investment, while the internal private consumption share of 
the Chinese GDP wa
omy that is more about supply than about internal demand, an economy that directs an 
increasing portion of its production to external markets rather than one that is supported by 
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internal markets. In the next few years, change will be made and China’s economy will 
become more balanced and moves away from the export model to one that’s supported by 
internal private consumption. The state investment in social security, private pensions, 
medical care, and unemployment insurance will transform the savings culture of the 
society away from the excesses of fear-driven precautionary saving toward a more normal 
savings rate. China’s pro-consumption model will reduce the nation’s trade and current 
account surplus. The rebalancing of the economy will also make an important contribution 
to lowering the oil and natural resource intensity of the Chinese GDP and result in at last a 
cleaner and greener GDP. This is because consumption-led growth, especially if it’s 
complemented by the development of the service sector, consumes less materials and 
energy inputs than a pure export-led industrial production. Further, there is a very 
important benefit from the development of the service sectors, namely the employment. 
While manufacturing, industrial production and growth are very capital intensive, service 
are increasingly labour intensive. Thus the development of the service sector would help 
China to absorb its surplus labour. The service sector in China is only about 40 percent of 
Chinese GDP, smaller than in any major economy in the world today. The potential is 
great. In spite of all challenges, Roach believed that China can continue to grow on a rapid 
rate (cf. Roach, 2009b). The author would say that the success of China’s future growth 
will largely depend on whether its economic transformation will be successful.  
 
Table 9.1 China: macroeconomic indicators 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Real GDP growth 13.0 9.0 8.3 10.2 9.3 
Inflation 7.4 7.2 -3.1 -0.2 -0.5 
Consumer price index 4.8 5.9 -1.1 0.1 1.0 
Fiscal balance ( percent of GDP) 2.0 1.1 -1.8 -0.9 -0.3 
Current account balance (percent of GDP) 11.0 9.8 6.4 5.4 5.9 
Note: The figures given for fiscal balance are consolidated budgetary and extra-
budgetary accounts on a national accounts basis. 
 
Source: OECD, 2009c. 
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Forecasted by OECD, as shown in Table 9.1, the annual GDP growth in 2010 will be 
10 percent, but ease slightly in 2011 as the impact of the fiscal stimulus ends. The strong 
increase in domestic demand created by the fiscal stimulus will draw more imports, while 
exports remain weak and may not recover to pre-crisis rates. As a result, the current 
account surplus will fall sharply to 5.4 percent of GDP by 2010 before rising somewhat in 
2011, as domestic demand growth eases. Inflationary pressures are likely to fall off (cf. 
OECD, 2009c). 
In November 2009 the World Bank raised forecast for China’s economy and estimated 
that Chinese export growth is likely to resume, helped by strong fundamental 
competitiveness and the recent depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate. The 
huge stimulus spending package of 585 billion USD, lower interest rates and vastly 
increased lending by state-owned banks helped offset the fallout from the collapse in 
demand in Europe and the United States, which has hit export industries in China hard. But 
the challenge, according to the World Bank, would be to continue weaning China off its 
reliance on exports and stimulate domestic demand. Meanwhile, other Asian emerging 
economies like Indonesia, Thailand and Cambodia which are exporting consumer durables, 
electronic components and raw materials to China, are benefiting from China’s rebound 
(cf. Wassener, 2009). 
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